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Foreign policy is a wide concept, and politicians and bureaucrats concerned in this 
field have a large variety in questions to deal with. One of the more peripheral of 
them is whether or not a state should attend World Expositions. Even though it is a 
minor part of a large field, it is of interest to study the process of bureaucrats and 
representatives of private sectors making foreign policy decisions on behalf of a state. 
This Master’s thesis is concerned with this theme using an example of how the Nordic 
countries worked together to present the Scandinavian Pavilion at the World 
Exposition in Osaka in 1970.  
1.1 Theme of the Thesis and Research Questions 
The general theme of this MA Thesis is how a minor foreign policy issue was handled 
in the 1960’s. The specific example is how and why the Nordic countries cooperated 
on decisions leading to a joint pavilion at Expo ’70 in Osaka. To show this, I have 
chosen four main topics that are relevant in this respect. The first one is what World 
Expositions are, who participates at these, and for what reasons. The fears of reprisals 
are also dealt with, and the question of how real they were. The second topic is how 
decisions are made in foreign policy bureaucracies. The patterns may not be entirely 
representative, but are sufficiently so as political interests and bureaucratic patterns 
emerge. The third topic is questions concerns Swedish, Norwegian and Danish 
cooperation and conflicts, a Norwegian distrust of the Swedes, and the answer by the 
Swedes being somewhat amused by the Norwegian antipathies. The fourth topic 
regards how the decision makers handle culture differences, and how this affect 
foreign policy decisions.  
 Linking World Expositions to foreign policy is not very common whether 
foreign policy or expositions are the points of departure. Thus, I have found it useful 
to present what these expositions are in general, the purpose of them, and reasons for 
attending them in the introductory chapter, in addition to presenting Expo ’70 more 
explicitly. Since the research chapter is based on topic and not chronology, I have 
chosen to present the chronology of the Nordic process, first leading up to the 
decision and then to the exhibition itself, in the Introduction. Here, also theory of the 
bureaucracies in Norway and Japan is presented, and I have explained my method in 
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depth. The context of the Cold War, Nordic cooperation in general, and the nature of 
Scandinavian relations to Japan are found in the Context chapter.  
1.2 What are World Expositions? 
The first World Exposition was held in London in 1851, and until the 1920’s there 
were held many international expositions. The participating countries, regions, 
organizations and private companies had to invest great resources to attend these 
exhibitions. The frequency of them made it almost impossible for states to be able to 
attend every exhibition they were expected to participate at. To reduce the costs, the 
participating states gathered in Paris in 1928 to negotiate and the result was the Paris 
Convention that has regulated international exhibitions since. This agreement resulted 
in the establishment of an organization – the Bureau International des Exposition 
(BIE). The task for this organization is to ensure that all the member states comply 
with the agreement, and deciding in which category international exhibitions are.  
 All member states are obliged not to participate in or support international 
expositions that are not in accordance with the Paris Convention and therefore not 
sanctioned by the BIE. The most important terms are that an organizer of a World 
Exposition cannot take any fees for renting out pavilion areas, duration cannot be 
longer than six months, and two such exhibitions cannot be followed without a given 
time in between.1  
The Convention divides international exhibitions into two categories. The 
exhibitions in the first category (World Expositions) are supposed to illustrate the 
development of humanity in all areas. The nations participating have to build their 
own pavilions, but they do not have to pay rent for the area the pavilion is situated. 
World Expositions are not commercial, and the pavilion cannot look like a trade fair. 
In the second category (International Expositions), nations cannot participate; instead 
private companies and international organizations are the main exhibitors. They do 
not have to build their own pavilions, but instead they have to pay rent to the 
organizers. International Exhibitions can be directed towards increased sales and 
exports. World Expositions are given a theme, which often can include almost 
anything as long as it deals with the development for the humanity. Every nation 
chooses its own theme for their pavilion, but it must be related to the overall Expo-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Archive of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Aaffairs (ANMFA), 47.2/53, 28.03.67, Kjell Öberg, 
’Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970’, 06.03.67 Attached to letter from Norwegian 
Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff 
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theme. At some exhibitions, it has been accepted that several countries go together in 
one pavilion.2 Pavilion exhibitions have to be exhibitions of ideas. If the commercial 
aspect was too obvious, the exhibition was heavily criticized, as happened to Japan in 
Expo 67. They had to change their exhibition after opening. This had the consequence 
that BIE warned Japan, at several occasions, that Expo 70 could not have the 
character of a trade fair. Japan had thus been very restrictive even towards Japanese 
private firms who wanted to participate with pavilions. Even they were not allowed to 
be commercial, and instead had to present ideas as well. 
Even though World Expositions cannot be commercial, Kjell Öberg at the 
‘Collegium for Sweden information abroad’ (and hereafter referred to as the 
Information Collegium) did not conclude that World Expos lacked commercial 
significance. What impact such expositions may have for export industries depend on 
how the participants manage to exploit the attention and goodwill the Expo presents. 
He therefore concluded that World Expos might be good for exporters in an indirect 
way.  
Up until 1966, the time gap between two World Expos had to be two years. 
From 1966 onwards it was changed till six years. This is why Japan, when the country 
applied in 1965, was allowed to arrange Expo ’70 in 1970, only three years after the 
one in Montreal. The reason why the time interval was changed was that a majority of 
the member states had found the costs of participating at World Expos exceeded the 
gains. They were skeptical about the value of such exhibitions overall when the aim 
was to present humanity’s development, because the technical development was too 
rapid to present at World Expositions.3 
 When states celebrate anniversaries or other major historical happenings, it is 
customary for other states to participate in the celebrations. This is especially 
important when there are close political or economical ties between them. Often, 
World Expositions are linked to such anniversaries in the host country. This was the 
case when Canada was given the right to organize a World Exposition in 1967, but 
before this, the Soviet Union was the planned organizer in 1967. It was their fiftieth 
years anniversary for the Russian Revolution. When they turned down the offer, 
Canada got the opportunity. In 1967, Canada celebrated hundred years of sovereignty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  ANMFA,	  47.2/53,	  28.03.67,	  Kjell	  Öberg,	  ’P	  M	  regarding	  the	  Word	  Expo	  in	  Osaka	  1970’,	  06.03.67	  Attached	  to	  letter	  from	  Norwegian	  Amabassador	  to	  Sweden,	  C.-­‐H.	  Nauchhoff	  
3 MFAA, 47.2/53, 28.03.67, Kjell Öberg, ’Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970’, 06.03.67 
Attached to letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff 
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within the British Empire. The World Exposition in Osaka in 1970 was also linked to 
an anniversary. In 1970, Japan celebrated approximately hundred years since the 
Meiji Restoration – which meant the start of Japan opening up to the rest of the world.  
 A World Exposition implies quite considerable costs for participating 
countries, but even more so for the host country. For the hosts, there is a lot of 
prestige at stake. A large part of the prestige is connected to the number of 
participating countries. When a state chooses to organize a World Exhibition as a part 
of their anniversary, participation can be one way of showing respect and willingness 
to celebrate the host country. If a country chooses not to participate, it may be 
considered less than friendly or bad mannered at best, which in turn can lead to less 
goodwill and more difficult conditions for trade. When Sweden chose not to attend 
the World Exposition in Brussels in 1958 due to the large costs it would have resulted 
in, critique was raised afterwards, both from abroad and from the exporters in 
Sweden. Afterwards, Sweden clearly felt the pressure of attending the next World 
Expositions held in the 1960’s. To avoid loosing goodwill also in Canada, Sweden 
took the initiative to participate at Expo ’67 together with the other Nordic countries. 
When they cooperated, the costs could be held down and it made it bearable to attend 
the exposition.4 The five Nordic countries thus had a joint pavilion at Expo ’67 with 
separate exhibitions for each country.  
1.3 The World Exhibition in Osaka in 1970 
Japan joined the BIE in 1965, and almost the first thing they did was to apply for a 
World Exposition to be held in Osaka in 1970. Because of great economic 
development and an “almost perfectly conducted Olympic Games” in 1964, they now 
wanted to continue to show Japan to the world by hosting a World Exposition in 
Osaka in 1970.5 1970 would roughly coincide with the Centenary of the Meji 
Restoration, which was a starting point for Japan´s modernization. According to the 
Norwegian Ambassador, Japan expected a large deficit on the exposition budget, 
which made him conclude that the Japanese people wanted to invest heavily in its 
own future.6 The Japanese Ambassador to Norway later also pointed out that Japan 
“has a firm determination to spare no effort to ensure that this Exhibition will succeed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 ANMFA, 47.2/53, Kjell Öberg, 06.03.67, ’Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970, Attached 
to 28.03.67, letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff 
5 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 29.03.65, Letter from Ambassador Thommessen to the NMFA 
6 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 29.03.65, Letter from Ambassador Thommessen to the NMFA 
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in all respects”.7 The BIE accepted Japan’s application in May 1965, and working 
committees were already in place by the end of the year. The Soviet Union and the 
United States had by that time indicated they would participate.8  
The World Expo in Osaka was the first Expo held outside Europe and North 
America. The overall theme was entirely at the core of BIE’s directions: “Progress 
and Harmony for Mankind”. Osaka was Japan’s largest industrial hub, with a 
population of 3.2 millions in the city, 12 millions when adjoining areas were included. 
The organizers calculated in 1966 with a total of 30 million visitors at the Expo, 
which was a low estimate compared to the actual number. It became the most visited 
World Expo since the beginning in 1851, with a total number of 63 million visitors. It 
stood as the record until 2010, when the World Expo in Shanghai broke the record. 
Also economically, Expo ’70 was a success – quite unusual in this context. By 
hosting a World Exposition, Japan wished to show the World its ”industrial 
confidence and technical sophistication offering more practical applications of 
technology already introduced to the public at earlier fairs”.9 The exhibition was still 
criticized for lacking major innovations, and for having a grey and boring 
architecture.10 
1.4	  Previous	  Research	  
There are many books about World Expositions, starting with the first one in 1851 
and until the last one in Shanghai in 2010. These are informative when studying the 
items on display, how big they were (countries attending, area and visitors), and how 
the pavilions and the items exhibited were presented. Several of the books written are 
concerned with architecture and design, which is hardly surprising. Every pavilion 
had a unique architecture made by the best architects in the pavilion’s country. Also 
the best designers a country could produce made the interior design and exhibition 
inside the pavilion. One good example of this kind of literature is World’s Fairs, 
which goes through all the major international exhibitions between London in 1851 
and Hannover in 2000.11 The focus of the book is how the exhibitions as a whole, and 
some of the pavilions, were presented with regard to architecture and design. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 09.12.66, Letter from the Ambassador of Japan, Oslo, to the Norwegian Minister 
og Foreign Affairs, John Lyng  
8 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 29.03.65, Letter from Ambassador Thommessen to the NMFA 
9 John E. Findling (red.) & Kimberly D. Pelle (ass. red.): Historical dictionary of fairs and expositions, 
1851-1988, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1990), s. 346. 
10 Erik Mattie: World’s Fairs, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998), s. 236. 
11 Mattie: World’s Fairs. 
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decision making process is not in focus. Still, historical evidence may illustrate some 
political reasons of for example why a country would want to host a World 
Exposition. The focus is not on how and why the pavilions ended up as they were, 
and there is little evidence of the connection between World Exhibitions and foreign 
policy.  
Research on international exhibitions in countries exists. In a Nordic context, 
this is mostly the Stockholm Fairs in 1897 and in 1930.12 To some extent, the research 
concerns not only the design, but also the historical context of the fairs. Still, they 
were far from World Exhibitions in the definition of BIE. Instead, they are national or 
Scandinavian exhibitions. In the Swedish examples, there is no evidence of Nordic 
cooperation.  
A Norwegian Master’s Thesis from The University of Oslo concerns the 
Norwegian exposition in Christiania in 1914.13 The interaction between the 
Scandinavian countries is one of the main subjects of the thesis. It is of course 
interesting that the Scandinavian countries had debated participation at fairs earlier 
on, but the national exhibition in the Frogner Park in 1914 is something totally 
different from what a world exposition was in 1970. First of all, it was not states that 
wanted to present their best achievements to the people of the world, but Norwegian 
private companies that wanted to sell more products to the Norwegian consumer. In 
the end, Sweden and Denmark sent some delegates to visit, so there was some kind of 
international public present. It was still more like a trade fair.  
Nikolas Glover has in his PhD thesis, National Relations, Public diplomacy, 
national identity and the Swedish Institute 1945-1970, dealt with the topic of public 
diplomacy and soft power with Sweden as an example.14 This is a very relevant study 
showing the value of soft power as a means in Swedish foreign policy in the years 
from 1945 to 1970. Glover also shows the importance the Swedish Institute had for 
Sweden’s soft power abroad. Among other topics, Glover is concerned with how  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I.e. Anders Ekström: Den utställda världen. Stockholmsutställningen 1897 och 1800-talets 
världsutställningar, (Stockholm: Nordiska Museets Förlag, 1994); Ylva Habel: Modern media, modern 
audiences. Mass media and social engineering in the 1930s Swedish welfare state, (Stockholm: Aura 
Förlag, 2002).	  
13 Anne  Simonnæs,, Jubileumsutstillingen på Frogner 1914. En Nasjonal feiring med internasjonale 
motiver? En kulturhistorisk undersøkelse av forarbeidet til Industriutstillingen i Kristiania i perioden 
1900-1914, Hovedoppgave i historie, Universitetet i Oslo, 2003. 
http://www3.hf.uio.no/1905/publikasjon17.php  
14 Glover, Nikolas: National Relations, Public diplomacy, national identity and the Swedish Institute 
1945-1970, (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011). 
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actors and interests show  Sweden to the World, in different ways at different times. 
Thus it is an interesting study, though not directly concerned with World Expositions. 
Also, Glover has a strictly Swedish focus.  
In my Bachelor’s Thesis at Stockholm University, I studied the Scandinavian 
participation at Expo ’70, using far less archive material than in this thesis, and with a 
different theoretical framework.15 After giving me the idea and supervising me, 
Glover went further and wrote a chapter in Communicating the North, dealing with 
Scandinavian participation at Expo ’67 and ’70.16 His focus is not as much of the 
decision-making process, but more on the ways in which countries present themselves 
to the world – it has more of a soft power and public diplomacy angle. These studies 
are merely from a Swedish point of view. Even though some research already has 
been done, there is still plenty of material and interesting research questions to 
explore. This is especially true with regard to detailed research on the decision 
making processes and the role of the bureaucracy. Still, especially Nicholas Cull has 
done research on the role of World Expositions in a Cold War context. Jack Masey 
and Conway Lloyd Morgan have written about the cultural Cold War.   
1.5	  State	  and	  Politics	  in	  Japan	  
It is not easy to understand the Japanese state and how power sharing is constituted. 
The Dutch journalist, writer and professor in Comparative Politics Karel van 
Wolferen argues that there is a fiction that Japan is a sovereign state with central 
organs of government that could recognize what was good for the country and bear 
ultimate responsibility for national decision-making. For other countries it was 
difficult to interact with Japan if they concluded there was no state, so they assumed 
that there was one.17 Even if van Wolferen possibly constructs a picture that is a	  little	  bit	  of	  a	  caricature,	  he	  serves	  to	  pinpoint	  problems	  that	  are	  of	  relevance	  for	  my	  thesis.	   
Statecraft up to 1990 was very different in Japan than in Europe. Certain 
ministry officials and some political cliques and clusters of bureaucrats-businessmen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Catharina Backer, ‘Expon, mjuk makt och samnordisk utrikespolitik: En studie av det nordiska 
deltagandet i världsutställningen i Osaka 1970’, Kandidatuppsats (unpublished), (Department of 
History, Stockholm University, 2011). 
16Nikolas Glover, “Unity Exposed. Promoting the Nordic Countries at the World Expos 1967 and 
1970”, in Jonas Harvard & Peter Stadius (eds), Communicating the North (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013). 
17 Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power. People and Politics in a Stateless Nation, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p 5 
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were running the country. Subordinate to these, there were many others who were not 
a part of the core, but still a vital part of the system. Among them were agricultural 
cooperatives, the police, the press and gangsters. These were the components of the 
‘System’.18 Van Wolferen labels the political powerprocess ‘the System’ because  
 
it denotes little more than the existence a set of relationships, with reasonably 
predictable effects, between those engaged in socio-political pursuits. The 
term ‘system’ is also frequently used to suggest an arrangement of inescapable 
forces against which the individual is helpless without resort to violence. It 
hints at something beyond the range of the potentially corrective powers of 
democratic politics; it is something that cannot be reasoned with – although it 
may occasionally be duped. As it happens, the Japanese are rarely allowed to 
forget the existence of socio-political arrangements that are infinitely stronger 
than any kind of might the individual could ever bring to bear on them and 
have,, at best, only a dim notion of changing them. The term ‘system’ is very 
useful when speaking of political Japan.19 
 
The System is distinguished from the state, because no one is ultimately in 
charge, and even though there is a hierarchy, no one is at the top of it. Van Wolferen 
suggests that these semi-autonomous components, that have flexible powers that 
weaken the authority of the state, do not have any central body to lead them.20 There 
were no supreme institutions with ultimate policymaking jurisdiction. Japan had all 
the state institutions and the political positions as Western liberal democracies, but the 
power was not in the hands of the official leaders. The Prime Minister or other power-
holders were, according to van Wolferen, limited in the way that he would be unable 
to deliver on promise if the System would want it differently.21 As a Minister in the 
Government, the main task was to defend their ministry against potentially 
antagonistic interest groups in the System.22 
 On paper, Japan had a liberal democratic system with free elections and 
several potentially parties to vote for. In reality, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
was the only government option. According to van Wolferen, LDP got their required 
48 per cent of the votes, and thus maintained themselves in power, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 5 
19 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 43-44 
20 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 5 
21 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 6 
22 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 126 
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gerrymandering23, by using money to assure votes, and using propaganda to make 
people believe that LDP was the only option for rural areas if they wanted to have 
infrastructural improvements.24 Because the opposition parties are happy not to be in 
power, LDP could go on and continue in office – something they have done since 
1955 with only short-term exceptions.  
 Several observers have argued that it is the bureaucracy that holds the power 
over the Japanese state. According to van Wolferen, “in the everyday business of 
governing Japan, groups of officials, especially those of the ministry of finance, 
international trade and industry, construction, and post and telecommunication, wield 
a great deal of power, definitely more than they are theoretically authorized to 
exercise. They restrain, control and provide spurs for the economy. They make nearly 
all laws – which if not everything, is quite something in terms of measurable power. 
These laws are almost always rubber-stamped by the Diet, and the bureaucrats 
typically proceed to use them as means to achieve their own cherished aims. Their 
informal powers, moreover, give them even greater control over the realms of social 
activity for which they are formally responsible. This informal power, because it is 
not exposed to debate about merits, is very open-ended.”25 This description leads van 
Wolferen to label Japan as an “authoritarian bureaucratic state”.26 
But, it is not perfect as a description of Japan either. Van Wolferen also 
discuss the power of the zaikai – the broad circle of top business functionaries, 
especially those who speak through the business federations.27 Still, he thinks it is the 
easy way for foreigners to claim that it is this group that holds the power. It is just 
because it is what the foreigners see when meeting the Japanese in business settings.  
Since no one was holding power in a central state, van Wolferen asks if the 
Japanese people actually needed a state?28 From 1945 and well into the 1970s, the 
Japanese had little need to worry about whether they were a state or not. They were 
rarely called upon to act as a political entity.29 Instead, they heavily relied upon the 
USA for military protection, and thus did not have to worry about national security. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Gerrymandering is practice that attempts to establish a political advantage for a particular party or 
group by manipulating district boundaries to create partisan advantaged districts. 
24 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 29. 
25 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 33 
26 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 33 
27 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 34 
28 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 35 
29 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 40 
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Thus, Japan became totally dependent on the USA, not only for security, but also for 
diplomacy.30  
When they had no need for a strong central state, Japan solved their political 
issues in a way that must have been very strange to Europeans. If they had not 
pretended to have a well-functioning state, in the way as they had the institutions and 
ministers of a Western democracy, it would probably have been easier to understand 
that things were not as the Europeans were used to. It is understandable that it became 
difficult for the Scandinavians to grasp how to handle negotiations with the Japanese, 
because no one knew who actually was in charge of, or held the power to decide, 
anything.  
1.6	  Method	  
The archives I have used for searching for relevant documents are the Archive of the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry (ANMFA), the National Archives of Norway (NNA), 
and the Swedish National Archives (SNA).31 The result was approximately two 
thousand pages of documents regarding the World Exposition in Osaka, of different 
character, in addition to all the documents I have read regarding the Expositions in 
Brussels 1958, New York 1965, Montreal 1967 and Philadelphia (planned for 1976). 
After reading everything, Expo ’70 was the one that stood out as the exposition with 
the most fascinating stories that could give answers to questions of general interest. 
Still, some lines will be drawn to earlier exhibitions.  
 All the different archives have to some extent overlapping content of 
documents. Some of the reports have been possible to avoid reading in depth several 
times, but copies of letters, telexes and other documents of that kind has been 
important to read in the context it has been placed in by the bureaucrats in the 
different archives. I have mostly referred to the ANMFA, but often the same 
documents have been found in different archives at the SNA and in the NNA. To 
reduce the length of the footnotes, I have chosen to refer to one of the archives only.  
Often, handwritten comments to the content of the letter have been added, and 
the comments have given valuable information. Thus, it has been worth wile reading 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 41 31	  At	  the	  SNA	  I	  have	  read	  archives	  from	  The	  Scandinavian	  Avilion	  Committee,	  The	  Swedish	  Information	  Office/Upplysningsberedningen,	  The	  Collegue	  for	  Information	  on	  Sweden	  Abroad,	  and	  Svenska	  Institutet.	  At	  the	  NNA	  I	  have	  gone	  through	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Trade’s	  archive	  on	  World	  Expositions	  from	  1930s	  to	  1976.	  At	  the	  ANMFA	  I	  have	  gone	  through	  ”Borlegningsperioden	  1960-­‐1969”,	  Volume	  1-­‐8.	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the same documents several times. Most of the documents are written by machine, 
and I have had close to no problems with handwriting. Sometimes I have at first had 
problems understanding who the author of comments was, but it has always been 
possible to sort out after some research.  
The material contains letters, telexes and telegrams to and from Scandinavian 
ambassadors, different bureaucrats, politicians and private organizations and 
companies involved in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark, and officials and 
private sector representatives from Japan. A large part is memorandums and minutes 
of meetings from different Scandinavian committees both in Japan and in 
Scandinavia, some are protocols from parliamentary debates, and some are newspaper 
articles. There were also a number of drafts of speeches telling how the Scandinavians 
wanted to present themselves at official dinners in Japan and when Japanese officials 
visited Scandinavia. A lot of correspondence between the Norwegian Royal Castle 
and the Foreign Ministry was saved in the archives, due to the planned visit of the 
Crown Prince Harald’s visit to Expo ’70. So also in SNA regarding the Crown 
Prince’s visit for the Sweden Day. Negotiations between the Scandinavian Expo ’70 
Committee and constructors, hotels in Japan, and others providing different practical 
solutions are also saved in the archives.  
It has not been possible to include all of the material I have found in this 
thesis. I have thus seen it necessary to choose the stories that I have found the most 
interesting, and exclude a number of potentially interesting parts of history. I have 
thus chosen to focus on the documents regarding how the bureaucrats and the other 
actors made decisions and negotiated with each other in the process of deciding 
whether or not to participate, and which theme the pavilion would have. I have also 
focused on inconsistencies among the involved actors – for instance what they said 
internally and what they said to the press.  
There are some challenges when using this kind of material. Often, letters are 
sent from one person to another, without copying them to the sender’s archive. This 
makes it difficult to know if every letter written is saved. The Foreign Ministries and 
the Ministries of Trade have been, as it seems, good at saving copies of their own 
letters, and thus the same documents are filed at both the sender’s and the receiver’s 
archives. Thus, I have read the same letters several times at different archives. Still, 
this has not been a waste of time, because other letters and documents that follow 
the ones I already have read often puts the “old” letter into a new context. When this 
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happened, it was easy to think that the information was complete after understanding 
the new context. I still have no guarantee that there were no phone calls in between 
without any written reference or documents that have got lost, with information that 
could change the context and thus also this thesis.  
When reading the documents, stories come forth, and it is easy to think that all 
the information needed would be found in the archives. This is not necessarily true, 
but to diminish the risk, I have used several archives, but it would be surprising if 
there were not any more relevant documents somewhere. The archives in especially 
Denmark, but also in Finland and Iceland, are of course places where more 
information could be found. Also Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) may have 
relevant material. I have not had enough time and capacity to go through these 
archives, but I am certain that most of the relevant documentation for the themes I 
have chosen to include in this thesis was filed in the archives that I have consulted. 
Other stories making Denmark or Finland the lead may be possibly found in Danish 
and Finnish archives, but that is most doubtful. I have also read documents that give 
indication of possible further discussions in the archives from Norway and Sweden. 
Still, when little more evidence of this has been revealed, I have chosen to focus on 
the stories that are better documented. On basis of this, I have made the selection of 
the themes.  
Due to the space limitations, I have not been able to include in depth 
description of all the interesting parts of the process, even when documentation is 
satisfactory. It has been necessary to focus on certain questions, and thus I have 
chosen to find the themes that are both well documented and of general interest. I 
have done this with as little speculation as possible, even though it has not been 
possible to avoid completely. Where archives do not on their own suffice to explain 
what we see, I have taken the liberty to draw conclusions that cannot be directly 
verified, as long as they do not conflict with the available evidence. 
The reality and time the actors lived in also gives a challenge to the reader of 
such documents. Not all information was necessary to document. When reading 
letters with negative or positive attitudes towards for instance participation at Expo 
’70, without any argumentation for or against, it may appear peculiar to the reader and 
difficult to understand why the sender was positive or negative. Sometimes, I have 
found the reasons in the historical context. Thus, understanding the 1960’s, both in 
Japan and in Scandinavia, has been important to be able to draw conclusions. The 
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understanding of statements has at several times increased remarkably when reading 
books on bureaucracy, relations between Scandinavia and Japan, and on Nordic 
cooperation in general. Still, I have not read every book on the topic and more secure 
conclusions could probably have been draw by knowing even more of the context.  
There is no guaranty that all the information is present. It is impossible to be 
sure that every conclusion drawn in this thesis is correct because the actors had 
information in front of the process, which for them was obvious, but not necessary is 
obvious today. I have thus tried to make it clear when I know that the information is 
incomplete, and when it is speculations, though there are never any wild guesses. All 
speculations are based on the documents that give clear indications in one way or 
another. Silence, for instance, can give indications of realizing defeat, but it is also 
possible that some documents proving otherwise are missing.  
Many of the letters and notifications are written directly after decisions were 
made in meetings or as conversations by telephone were finished. When this is the 
case, it is less of a challenge knowing who had said what. Still, different actors had 
different motives, and some minutes of the same meeting written by two people are 
slightly different. This indicates that even though the time elapsed between the 
meeting and the production of a report is short, the reader cannot be completely sure 
that all the involved parties agreed on the content. Often, these meetings were 
documented by more than one, and the pattern in difference between individual actors 
sometimes becomes an interesting feature on its own.  
But some of the most valuable documents for this thesis are memorandums 
and reports of the processes, often summarizing months of work. These reports are 
not written directly after important events, and the question of bad memory is of 
course present. In most cases, it is easy to recognize traces of previous reports, 
minutes of meetings and memorandums. Thus, the reports written afterwards are often 
based on material produced closer to the events. Even so, the time elapsed between 
productions of documents and the meeting or conversation the document is referring 
to, can be a problem. It is often clear that the actors did not remember very well what 
actually was said or done, even though documents are written just months afterwards. 
Of course, this can lead to misinterpretations. Still, by reading several documents on 
the same topic, most of the misunderstandings can be avoided, and often the faulty 
memory of the actors can be interesting on its own. Sometimes it is obvious that 
	   18	  
	  
they could not have forgotten certain incidents, but still left it out of reports. Why this 
is done is not always easy to tell, but this is potentially also interesting to discuss.  
Another challenge is how big the culture gap actually was. The Japanese had 
their phrases and ways of speaking, in addition to a different perception of what 
would be appropriate behavior in meetings and negotiations. Did the Scandinavians 
fully understand the Japanese platitudes?  Would they, for instance, believe the 
Japanese negotiators when they were saying that “the Japanese people would be 
disappointed” if the Scandinavians did not attend the exposition? The Japanese people 
probably did have few ideas of Scandinavia, and the only reason why they could be 
disappointed would be that five countries would not join. Due to the prestige in 
having many countries participating at World Expositions, it would be noticed if there 
were 65 instead of 70 countries present at Expo ’70. But if the people would be 
directly disappointed with the Scandinavians is difficult to understand. Did they 
understand the argumentation literally, or did they have an understanding of the 
different cultural ways? I choose to credit the Ambassadors and trust that they were 
not naïve. They could not have taken the feelings of the people as valid arguments. 
When they reported the arguments home, it is probably just the Japanese talking, and 
words repeated by the Scandinavians. Of course, the Japanese Expo Committee, 
politicians and bureaucrats working with this could feel disappointed if the Expo ’70 
did not break any records or if the exhibition would not be a great success. It is thus a 
challenge to know how the Japanese arguments were received in Scandinavia. These 
differences would also potentially make them more insecure in which way they would 
answer, and also more insecure with regard to what actually would happen if they did 
not attend the exposition. Would the Japanese people perhaps stop buying anything 
from Scandinavia? Would this make any difference in exports to Japan? How much 
knowledge did the Scandinavian bureaucrats actually have of Japan? By 
contextualizing, some of this is possible to answer in a general way, but how much 
influence the arguments using the Japanese people’s feelings actually had is difficult 
to say. Did the Ambassadors reporting the platitudes home understand the content of 
these better than the receivers in Scandinavia? How much more understanding of 
Japanese culture and practices did they have? When they argued hard for 
Scandinavian participation, were they more Ambassadors for Japan in Scandinavia 
than for Scandinavia in Japan? It is challenging to read out the intent and hidden 
agenda of argumentation.  
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1.7	  Chronological	  Overview	  
In August 1966, all the Nordic countries received invitations to participate at 
the World Exposition in Osaka in 1970. Because of the forthcoming World Expo in 
Montreal opening in March 1967, none of the Nordic countries were especially 
interested in participation. The costs were high and the gain too small. Thus, little 
effort was used on Expo 70 before the spring of 1967. When research was made on 
what involved parties thought of Nordic participation at Expo ’70 during the spring of 
1967, most of the exporters were negative to participation. Still, the Norwegian 
Shipowner’s association, the Ambassadors in Tokyo, some Swedish exporters and 
especially SAS reacted strongly against the negative attitude among the bureaucratic 
and political decision makers in Scandinavia. SAS was eager to be present, but 
wanted to avoid the area for cooperation and instead situate their restaurant at the site 
for national pavilions. They thus needed a country to cooperate with. The Swedish 
Government had notified SAS in early July 1967, that there would be no Nordic 
cooperation at Expo ’70.32 SAS certainly had an interest in showing Scandinavian 
flags at the Expo, and a suggestion to continue the fruitful cooperation from Montreal 
came natural.33 Earlier restaurants managed by SAS Catering at Swedish and 
Scandinavian pavilions had been successful, both financially and because of the 
reputation the pavilions got. The restaurants had received good reviews and 
contributed to making the pavilions more frequently visited than Scandinavian 
countries could hope for with the limited resources they had. Both SAS and the 
participating states had gained goodwill due to the good food served at the pavilion.34 
Because Sweden had shown most interest in participation, SAS chose to 
negotiate with the SMFA. Thus, in July 1967, The Swedish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (SMFA) met with other Swedish interested parties and SAS to negotiate on a 
possible cooperation to build a restaurant at the nation area at Expo ’70. The Swedish 
intention, which they discussed with the chairman of the Japan Association for the 
1970 World Exhibition, Yoshimura Kanno, was that the exhibition part of the 
pavilion would be small and that the main part would be a restaurant run by SAS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 ANMFA 47.2/53, Erik Paalsgaard , 22.11.67 and Telex from SMFA tpo NMFA, 07.07.67  
33 ANMFA 47.2/53, Erik Paalsgaard , 22.11.67 
34 ANMFA 47.2/53, Erik Paalsgaard , 22.11.67 
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Catering. This was a solution that would make participation affordable for Sweden, 
and it was acceptable, and even welcomed, by the Japanese Expo organizers.35  
In the fall of 1967, SAS demanded that the other two Scandinavian countries 
would join the cooperation, or else they would not contribute. Finland and Iceland 
were also welcome to join. This had been the Swedish intention all along. In January 
1968, a meeting was held in Copenhagen and a possible Nordic participation was 
discussed. Several representatives from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
attended the meeting. Representatives from all the Nordic countries had been positive 
to participation, with the condition that the cost was kept as low as possible. They also 
agreed that it was of interest to have a restaurant, and that SAS Catering should run 
this. 
The company with most experience from construction in Asia was a Swedish 
constructor of industrial buildings, Svenska Industribyggen AB (SIAB), and their 
expert engineer Edlind was concerned that the costs would escalate if they waited 
long to start constructing the pavilion. They also agreed on hiring the Danish architect 
Bengt Severin to draw the pavilion. In total, the costs would be approximately 10 
million NOK.36 
Thus, after some negotiation, all the five Nordic countries cooperated on 
presenting one joint pavilion with one exhibition at the pavilion, representing the 
Nordic region as one unit, sharing the pavilion with the SAS Catering restaurant. 
Without any disputes or negotiations, they chose to continue using the name they had 
used in Montreal – the Scandinavian Pavilion – even though this was not accurate, but 
easy for the public in the far East to understand.  
The next issue to decide was how they wanted to present Scandinavia. During 
the spring of 1968, this was heavily debated and misunderstandings of the process 
occurred. On February 21, a meeting was held in Stockholm, where Öberg presented 
a draft of a pavilion theme: environmental protection. The meeting agreed on 
presenting other possible options in mid-March, so that they could decide the theme 
on the Copehagen meeting on March 20. At the meeting, no other real proposition 
was presented, just loose ideas, but nothing like the Swedish one. Öberg had written 
memos on the theme and got an expert (Hans Palmstierna) to write a memo on 
environmental challenges that the Nordic region faces at the time. Even though the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 ANMFA 47.2/53, 14.07.67, Letter from Ambassador Almqvist in Japan to the SMFA.  36	  ANMFA, 47.2/53, 05.06.68, Knut Thommessen	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Danes and Norwegians were not perfectly happy with the suggested theme, they 
managed to change the title from being negatively focused, into being Environmental 
Protection During Increased Industrialization, and were thus able to agree. The 
theme was decided at the March 20 meeting. Also, they agreed on a timeframe for 
finding the best design for the exhibition. In April a memo containing background 
information on the theme would circulate. This information was meant to help the 
selected architects and designers from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to 
come up with suggestions of how the interior of the pavilion and the exhibition might 
be. At the March 20 meeting, Finland announced that they would join the 
Scandinavian pavilion, even though previously had informed the Japanese authorities 
of their no show. 
The Danish architect, Bent Severin, who was responsible for the exterior 
design of the pavilion, came to the meeting and showed his draft of the pavilion. From 
Swedish industry had suggested that the roof of the building should be 1 meter higher 
than it was planned to be. Mowinckel-Larsen did not want this, due to the extra costs. 
Norway was not able to pay more than agreed on at the Stockholm meeting in 
February. Even though he states this clearly here, the pavilion roof was raised by 1 
meter. It does not seem that he exercised much influence over the situation at these 
meetings. 
At the next meeting in Stockholm on May 15, all the architects, designers and 
the members of the Scandinavian Committee would meet and be briefed on the 
subject. The contest entries had to be submitted before July 1, ant the competition 
closed on September 1. At the May 15 meeting, the Norwegians reacted to the theme, 
and still considered it not to be agreed on. They said the Norwegians were not happy 
with it, and that they came to the meeting to discuss it further. They clearly felt that 
the Swedes had overrun them in the process. How this is possible, after what they had 
written themselves in memos and minutes of meetings is somewhat hard to 
understand. This will be discussed in depth later. Still, by July 1968 they had solved 
the problems, and the Swedish proposal of environmental protection under 
industrialization, while at the same time displaying Nordic topography and culture. 
The next question up for debate was how to find the architect for the exhibition. The 
architect of the exterior had been appointed by SAS even before the negotiation 
started with the Scandinavian countries, so the construction could start at a very 
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early stage. This was a good way to save money, but no one was very happy about the 
design. Still, the interior had to be as remarkable as possible.  
To decide who would get this honorable mission of all the skilled and clever 
Nordic designers and architects, the Danish Honorary Commissioner General, Kristen 
Bo, and the General Secretary of the Norwegian Trade Fairs, Edward Mowinckel-
Larsen, suggested that a competition possibly would be difficult, and that they rather 
should agree on one highly distinguished one. The leader of the Information 
Collegium and the Swedish Honorary Commissioner General, Kjell Öberg, said that 
he already had announced the competition in Sweden and that they therefore did not 
like the idea of changing this. Still, if they could agree on one architect, he was open 
for this solution as well, though he thought it would be hard. Öberg had his way once 
more, because it was the most logical suggestion. They thus agreed to appoint two 
architects from each country (Finland could appoint one) and have a competition 
among the chosen ones. An information meeting would be held in Stockholm 
regarding the theme and other questions they might have. A program for the 
competition would circulate in late March or early April, and the meeting would be 
held at the end of April.  The short time frame was important due to the desire to 
reduce costs. If they started the construction process early, they would not suffer from 
inflation.  
Thus, in May they asked SIAB to send all the needed documents to Japan, in 
order for everything to be set for construction start in July 1968. Still, the 
Scandinavians feared the Japanese bureaucracy and the import regulations, which 
could delay the process. At the Kyoto conference, the Scandinavians were reassured 
that the building process would go on as planned, as the Japanese were very 
cooperative. The Japanese representatives promised to do what they could to stretch 
and bend the regulations, even though Ambassador Thommessen was sure that 
conflicts would occur, and that the Embassies would have to intervene and that the 
Japanese Government had to make great exceptions. The Japanese gave the 
impression of being aware of possible problems, and promised to be flexible. 
The problem here was the official appointment of the Commissioner General. 
All the five Governments had to do this in order for the CG, Svan A. Hansson, to sign 
the official contract. After he signed it, the construction could start. The Ground 
Breaking ceremony thus took place in late July, as the second first of all the 70 
pavilions.  
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All the competitors in the architectural competition had received additional 
information on the theme, after deciding this at the CG meeting in Oslo on July 1. In 
September, the design competition was closing. A Danish proposal named “+ and –“ 
won. It was pictures projected from the ceiling that could be caught by a white 
cardboard when walking through the exhibition hall. The pictures showed challenges 
to the environment in industrialized countries, and solutions on how to solve these 
issues. They also had pictures and information on the walls, in addition to an 
information desk. The Scandinavian Pavilion was one of the first nation pavilions to 
be finished, and due to this, they managed to keep the costs down and to get a lot of 
publicity and goodwill in Japan. The pavilion theme was heavily criticized in 
Scandinavia, especially in Norway where they could not see the gain for the exporters 
in connecting them to environmental protection.37 In Sweden, they were more certain 
that it would become something positive, and they were right. Japanese press and 
politicians loved the Scandinavian Pavilion, because it raised a question of interest for 
the world and humanity, which was, and is, the overall aim for World Expositions in 
general.38  
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”Scandinavian Scandal in Osaka”, and 20.04.70 ”The World Exposition worthless!” 
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2	  Context	  
2.1	  Soft	  Power	  and	  The	  Cold	  War	  
Foreign policy is policy directed towards state interests in relation to international 
surroundings.39 The term includes the goals governmental representatives try to 
achieve outside the boundary of their own state, the values that constitute the basis for 
the goals and the means or instruments that are used to achieve the goals, and the 
decision making processes where foreign policy is created.40 Foreign policy is thus 
actions state institutions perform in relation to other states, to strengthen their national 
interest. It is states that publicly decide and present their foreign policies, and the 
focus is on how a state relates to other states. This, however, does not mean that there 
cannot be other organizations, institutions and individuals that can influence the 
foreign policy, and the foreign political actions, of a state. Thus, governments might 
also use sub-national and international institutions and organizations to conduct its 
foreign policy in action.41  
 With time, the concept of foreign policy has been extended from being 
concerned solely with territorial security and political sovereignty, to encompass a 
broader understanding, including other areas of international relevance. This is 
especially evident when the technological and economical development made states 
interact both more frequently and more intimately. Examples of such recent areas of 
foreign policy are trade, finance, resources management, research and science, 
environmental protection and migration.42  
 Many have defined the concept of power. Bertrand Russel laid the foundation 
of the causal power definition by saying that power is to achieve more of your own 
goals than others with the same goals.43 The definition used in this thesis is Joseph 
Nye Jr.’s. His definition is that to hold power is to get the outcome that you want.44 
For states, the aim is to make other states do as your own state considers important. 
The state with the greatest possibilities of acheiving this, is the one with the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Fermann, Gunnar i Jon Hovi & Raino Malnes (red.): Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal 
politikk, (Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, 2001), s. 192. 
40 Fermann: Normer og makt, s. 193. 
41 Fermann: Normer og makt, s. 195. 
42 Fermann: Normer og makt, s. 197. 
43 Østerud, Øyvind i Normer og makt,  
44 Joseph Nye, Jr.: Soft Power. The means of success in world politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004), s. 1.	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power. This can either happen through hard power – military force or coercion – or 
through soft power: ”the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political 
ideas, and policies”.45 As an example: If exports increase and receive a greater part of, 
and a larger responsibility for, a country’s national budget, it will become ever more 
increasingly important for a state to maintain good relations with the importing 
country, especially important when there are alternative sources for these imports. 
The level of soft power of the state will affect the economy, and thus, both soft power 
and trade policy are important parts of a state’s foreign policy.46  
 The importance of being able to influence the citizens of other states becomes 
increasingly important as states develop increasing web of linkages due to more 
intertwined ties between states. If people look at a state with positive eyes, among 
other benefits, products from this country are presumed to sell better. Propaganda and 
other means to influence the opinion in other states has thus become an important part 
of the instruments of foreign policy. The more goodwill a state possesses in 
international settings and among people in other countries, the more soft power it also 
enjoys. This process of states interacting with people and private actors in other states 
is the subject of Public Diplomacy.47 An important reason for states to use as large 
resources on a World Exposition as is the case exactly this: To influence what other 
state’s popular opinion think and believe.  
At the dawn of the World Expositions in the late 19th Century, the exhibitions 
were an important arena for communication between states. It was a place where new 
technology and design could be displayed and where states could compete in being 
the most developed in these areas. It was, as the Swedish Cultural Historian Anders 
Ekström, put it: “The Olympic Games of Culture”.48 They were arenas for friendly  
and peaceful competition between states. After World War II World Expositions 
became the cultural battlefield of the Cold War.49 In this way, World Expositions 
developed into being an increasingly important part of countries’ foreign policy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Nye: Soft Power, s X (i “Preface”) 
46 Trade policy has always been part of foreign policy, certainly in the case of Norway, cfr Løvland in 
1905, but they were to a degree considered separate strands for some time. 
47 See for instance Nancy Snow & Philip M. Taylor: Routledge handbook of public diplomacy, (New 
York: Routledge, 2009). 
48 Ekström: Den utställda världen, s. 18. 
49 Jack Masey & Conway Lloyd Morgan: Cold war confrontations. US exhibitions and their role in the 
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The Cold War developed into a competition on several fields between the 
liberal USA on the one hand, and the communist Soviet Union on the other. For a 
long time, the most popular way of looking at the Cold War was to divide the World 
in two. The bipolar World had to giant fighters, who fought a cold war for survival. 
The two superpowers never met in direct, hot conflict, but in several wars and 
conflicts around the world they helped, more or less, one party each with weapons 
and/or economical support war fought by proxy. The aim was to follow the realist 
way of the systemic survival, where ”two giant countries faced each other and battle it 
out for world supremacy by most means short of all-out war, until one of them was 
too exhausted to fight any longer”.50  
 As the concept of power changed, the understanding of the Cold War also 
became somewhat different. Among historians and experts in international relations, 
the Cold War is now seen as being ”more about ideas and beliefs than about anything 
else”.51 The Cold War was thus not just an arms race, but also a competition in 
ideology and culture. In the USA, it was the United States Information Agency 
(USIA) who held the responsibility during the Cold War for ”the US government’s 
attempts to explain itself to the world”.52  
 In the period after World War II, it was of great importance for the USA to 
gain cultural supremacy in addition to the political to prevent the Soviet Union from 
increasing their power and becoming stronger than USA.53 Thus, the USA and the 
Soviet Union developed a competition over soft power. Both from the Soviet and the 
American side, propaganda was directed towards the intelligentsia in the other 
country, in order “to influence the supposedly influential”.54 But this propaganda war 
was not just directed towards the opposition or the rest of the developed world. Also, 
popular opinion in the Third World was important. In this regard, ”by the 1950’s, 
Expos, World’s Fairs and international trade fairs had become a major focus point for 
ideological confrontations, a series of opportunities for each side to set out their views 
of the world, their own achievements and aspirations”.55  	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Jack Masey and Conway Lloyd Morgan argues that the reason why World 
Expositions became important, was that  
 
These exhibitions were an opportunity to speak to and influence diverse 
groups, and because of the size of the exhibitions, also a pretext to address a 
broad number of issues and present a myriad of opportunities for involvement 
and connection at the same time.56  
 
Thus, there is research showing the linkage between American efforts to project soft 
power around the world, and the increasing importance of World Expositions. 
Projecting ideas and images of own culture is important even for those who are not 
engaged in a struggle for global supremacy, and the governing elites, politicians of 
small states, also think their contributions may be important to make a mark for 
themselves and to promote the common global good.  
  
2.2	  Nordic	  Cooperation	  from	  WWII	  to	  1970	  
Traditionally, it is argued that successful Nordic cooperation is dependent on the topic 
and the area of cooperation. The argument is that if cooperation has been connected to 
security policy, the Cold War would limit such cooperation. Still, the five Nordic 
countries opened their borders during the Cold War so that people could move 
internally from a NATO country to a Soviet friendly state, without a passport.57 Also 
the establishment and the ongoing work of the Nordic Council, the cooperation on the 
common labor market and on cultural affairs have been successful. On other policy 
areas, the region has not been able to cooperate, even though it has little to do with 
defense policy and the Cold War. During the Cold War, it is also possible to argue 
that much of a country’s foreign policy was connected to security issues. Therefore, 
regional cooperation would be very difficult if it was related to that policy area. 
Examples of cooperation between Nordic countries that was not successful and still 
not a question of national security may be found in different development aid 
projects. On the other hand, we find examples of success in cooperation in larger 
organizations like UNESCO and the World Bank. I will, through examples from 
Nordic cooperation history, argue that it is the national interests of the Nordic states 
that provide the premises for the possibility of cooperation.  
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Presenting Norden, as one unit, is not a strong enough argument for 
cooperation per se. Instead, if the involved countries all benefit individually by 
cooperating, they will cooperate. In addition to this, Nordic region is not the only 
arena for cooperation. If it is beneficial to a state to cooperate on a larger arena, they 
will try to accomplish this. If it is not beneficial to cooperate with other states, in the 
Nordic region or elsewhere, they will avoid it. In this chapter, I will show some 
examples of Nordic cooperation that are found in the history of development aid, 
UNESCO, the World Bank, EFTA, Council of Europe, NORDEK and the Nordic 
Visa- and Passport Union.  
In the period after World War II it was perceived to be in the interest of small 
countries to help avoid major international conflicts and the UN thus became 
important in Nordic foreign policies.58 Another, intertwined, way of contributing to 
stabilizing the world was found in development aid. Economic development was seen 
as crucial for avoiding economic crisis and social unrest, which in turn was seen as 
leading to political extremism and war. From a security perspective, it was thus 
important to help development countries establish democracies and to help a free 
economy to grow.59 Development aid is thus a part of Western European small 
countries’ security policy during the cold war.  
In a world where small states cannot compete with the larger ones with regard 
to finances, people or military, it is important to find other branding possibilities. The 
Nordic countries have found one in being idealist. In Norden, it was argued that it was 
a moral duty to help developing countries, and at the same time it is important to 
show the world how good they are in doing so. Through foreign aid, the Nordic 
countries were able to build soft power and goodwill. Two examples from the history 
of Nordic development aid cooperation will demonstrate this, but the examples also 
show that Nordic cooperation is only useful when it is positive for branding individual 
states. 
Due to limited knowledge and resources, Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden started cooperating on development aid in the early 1960’s. Under the 
supervision of the Nordic Ministerial Council, the Nordic Board was set to administer 	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the joint projects from 1961.60 As a main recipient country, they chose Tanzania, 
much because of tight personal connections between Olof Palme and Julius Nyerere, 
and a Swedish radical missionary, Barbro Johanson, who eventually became a 
minister in Nyerere’s government.61 In the 1960’s, one Swedish led and one Danish 
led project were established there. The first project was led by Sweden and Nämnden 
för Internationell bistånd (NIB), the forerunner of Sida62. The Nordic Tanganyika 
Center opened its doors in 1964, providing educational efforts at different levels, 
focusing on agriculture, education, health and administration.63  
Even though the Center was a success with regards to development work, the 
administration of it was less of a success, both in Tanzania and at home in Nordic 
countries. Because it was a project led from Sweden, the Nordic administration was 
located in Stockholm. It was also Sweden that contributed the most (50 per cent) to 
the project financially, but had only one fourth of the decision making power. The 
difficulties in administering it can be seen as a reason why development aid 
cooperation has not been more regular part of the Nordic cooperation. Still, the 
motives behind the project were to a great extent need for visibility, international 
attention and political marketing of the Nordic countries. In fact, aid efforts may in 
general be seen also as political marketing.64 In Tanzania, the word ‘Nordic’ was 
often confused with ‘Norway’, something that bothered the Swedes. Because of less 
opportunities of placing one’s own flag on the map than expected and difficulties with 
the administration, the Swedes withdrew from the project. The Swedish retreat from 
the project led to a transfer of the Tanganyika Center from the Nordic Board to 
Tanzanian administration in 1970. During the 15 year period of Nordic cooperation 
on foreign aid, the four Nordic countries that participated had both acquired 
knowledge and finances to administer their own projects. Because of the possibility of 
building soft power for one individual state and the possibility to increase their 
international goodwill in addition to the role that development aid got in the 
countries’ foreign policy, it was more beneficial to work on their own than together as 
one unit. Cooperation was not needed anymore, and the interest in formalizing Nordic 	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cooperation on development aid had disappeared.65 Thus we may conclude that the 
national interest is of more importance than Nordic cooperation.  
The Danish project was intended to help strengthen the rural areas through co-
operatives and local democracy, all in the social democratic spirit. When the president 
of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, changed the whole foundation, took away the local 
democratic elements and even forced people to move into villages/ujamaas in 1976, 
little was left of the social democratic foundation from the outset in the early 1960’s. 
The political system went from being proto-democratic with a social democratic 
government, to being a one party state, with less democratic elements and without an 
organized opposition.66 Still, the Nordic countries continued their work in Tanzania. 
Jarle Simensen argues that this was much because of the charismatic appearance of 
Julius Nyerere and his personal ties to Nordic politicians.67 Kristian Paaskesen has 
another interesting answer to why the Nordic development aid continued in 
Tanzania.68 
Each Nordic country was given a project to administer by Nordic Board. The 
climate at the Board was not one where it was easy to criticize the others. As the 
Finnish representative Pär Stenbäck put it: “[t]o criticize one another would be like 
shooting oneself in the foot”.69 If the weaknesses of one of the projects would come 
into the open, it would probably end with critique against the other projects as well. 
Suddenly, the whole Nordic cooperation project on development aid might come to a 
halt.  
It would be normal to think of a well-functioning cooperation between states 
that it would be possible to criticize and discuss joint projects. When a project was 
developing into something completely different than it was supposed to be, and in 
addition gave support to changes forced upon the population by the state, it would be 
normal for Nordic states to discuss and possibly end the project. Because of the 
situation in the Nordic Board, the project continued.  
It must have looked from the outside as if the Nordic countries actually were 
able to cooperate, and they in turn did not want civil society to discuss the Board’s 	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matters. They feared that if the debates were to become public, they would lose 
control. If the public at home would know what was going on, both in Tanzania and 
on the Board, it would probably affect the relationship with Tanzania.70 This was not 
what anyone wanted. It was too much prestige involved. Development aid is and was 
important in building Nordic countries’ soft power. Tanzania was chosen to be the 
main recipient country, and it would be harmful to admit that the relationship and the 
efforts invested in Tanzania did not work the way it was supposed to.  
The Nordic countries were far behind in the race of being forerunners in 
development aid, compared to other countries, up until the mid-1960s. From then on, 
they made a major effort to make it to the top. Afraid of losing goodwill and possible 
soft power, the Nordic countries continued their work in the Nordic Board. Even 
though it may have looked like the Nordic Board functioned well in regard to Nordic 
cooperation, the case of the Danish led project in Tanzania shows that this is hardly 
true. Without a climate of open discussion and internal critique, it was more like 
international branding projects for individual countries, and a major loss of prestige if 
the projects were to fail. 
Several Nordic cooperation projects that have been initiated, have failed due 
to better options for one of the countries involved. It is therefore possible to argue that 
cooperation is something a country chooses only if it is in its national interest. If a 
country suddenly gets a better option, it will leave cooperation and go solo instead. 
Examples of this can be found in the different economic cooperation projects in the 
1950’s and the 1960’s.  
Denmark was the most eager to get the customs union agreement in place in 
the 1950’s, due to the necessity of selling their agricultural products abroad. The 
difficulties in such economic cooperation were the different needs in the Nordic 
countries. If Danish agricultural products were sold cheap in Norway, Norwegian 
agricultural products would lose out, and the same was supposed to be true when 
Swedish industrial products were to compete with Norwegian industry. The goods 
Norway sold abroad were in large part sold to markets outside Norden, and they had 
therefore less interest in a free trade area in the Nordic region. Thus, the Nordic 
negotiations were never formalized into binding agreements. When the European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA) became an alternative to a smaller Nordic economic cooperation 	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in 1960, it was seen as more favorable, especially for Denmark.  The Nordic 
negotiations failed.  
The most impressive attempt was yet to come. In the late 1960’s, the Nordic 
countries (still especially Denmark) needed more international cooperation in the 
economic area. Because of the veto from France to block Great Britain from the 
European Economic Community (EEC), no other countries were allowed to enter 
either. Thus, Denmark was held outside a market they badly needed. Much because of 
the need for a trade community, Denmark pushed for a Nordic solution. It was the 
second best option, but the EEC was blocked and they needed a bigger market. The 
Danish Foreign Minister argued, in 1965, that together, the Nordic countries would 
not only get the sum of the combined efforts on the international arena, but the 
product of it.71 At the end of the 1960s, the Nordic countries thus started working 
intensely to establish an economical agreement, NORDEK. At the Nordic Council’s 
18th session in the beginning of 1970, it was unanimously accepted. The aim of 
NORDEK was to help the different Nordic exporting economies. But, when Charles 
de Gaulle surprisingly resigned in 1969, it was clear that membership in EEC was 
again possible to obtain, and Denmark and Norway started negotiating with the EEC 
in June 1970. This was not acceptable for Finland that had to balance between trying 
to be associated as a westernized country, but still not provoke the Soviet Union. 
Without Finland, NORDEK failed, and Denmark became a member of the EEC in 
1972. After this, Denmark, that had been most eager to establish an economic 
cooperation in Nordic region, had an even better solution to the export problem. Thus, 
a Nordic trade union was redundant, and NORDEK was the last attempt at creating a 
Nordic economic community.  
It is obvious that the feeling of being Nordic and the product of the combined 
efforts this would give, which was the Danish arguments for cooperation in 
NORDEK, was not as strong when EEC became a real opportunity. At the same time, 
Finland also had difficulties of cooperating in a Nordic Regionwith one of the others 
as members of the EEC, which by the Soviet Union was seen as the economic part of 
NATO. Each of the Nordic counties had each own agenda. When it was beneficial to 
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cooperate, attempts were made to establish such. But when the cooperation did not 
coincide with the nation’s interest, the Nordic cooperation was easy to surrender. 
Above, we have seen examples of difficulties in Nordic cooperation, but there 
are several examples of successful attempts as well. In 1948, the requirement for a 
visa when working in another Nordic country was abolished, due to the many 
refugees working in other Nordic countries after the Second World War and the paper 
work this caused. In 1952, the Nordic Passport Union was established. From that 
point on, all Nordic citizens could move from one Nordic country to another without a 
passport, which is quite interesting regarding the geographical and political position 
Nordic Regionhad in the Cold War. It worked well, and the reason why it was 
established in the first place was primarily self-interest. 
When the Council of Europe was established in 1949, there were only ten 
member counties. Among them were Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and the 
impact the Nordic states had were strong.72 Today, there are 47 member states, and 
the feeling of drowning is thus greater. The Nordic countries, often together with the 
Baltic ones, go together and become 8 out of 47. This obviously increases their 
political clout. Still, it is only when it is beneficial and in the nations’ interests to do 
so this is possible to achieve, and Kjell M. Torbiörn argues that if the cooperation had 
been formalized, it is less probable that it would function well.73 
There have been several successful cooperation projects in larger 
organizations, like UNESCO and the World Bank. In UNESCO, the Nordic countries 
started cooperative talks in the 1950s. By pooling together material and intellectual 
resources, they hoped to increase the total Nordic influence in the organization.74 
Also, when Finland became a member in 1956, it was important for Finland to 
distance itself from the status as being an eastern bloc state and they needed the 
cooperation to build a stronger Nordic identity. Thus, at the end of the 1950s, the 
organization of the Nordic work in UNESCO was changed and cooperation became 
more stabilized. In the General Assembly, the instructions to delegates were that they 
should acknowledge all the Nordic countries’ positions, and representatives met 
regularly during the sessions to consult. One of the changes was that Nordic 	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Regionstarted to have joint delegates, representing the region as one. In this way, 
Nordic Regionalways had a representative on the board, and joint influence increased. 
In addition, a shared office for the Nordic countries was established. When the work 
load increased, they divided it internally. It meant that each country had responsibility 
for different areas, even though they all represented the entire Norden. If one of the 
countries were not entirely up to date on one question, they would trust the others and 
vote the same as the others on most issues.  
The traditional view has been that it was possible to achieve this because of, in 
the Cold War context, cooperation was limited to the low-tension fields of culture and 
education.75 Without contesting this entirely, I will argue that cooperation worked 
because it was in the national interest of all the Nordic states. UNESCO is, as 
Haggrén points out, an organization with low-tension policy areas. This makes it 
easier to cooperate than on fields regarding national security. Still, I would argue that 
this is merely one factor, and that the national interests of the Nordic countries were 
the most important. Nordic cooperation in UNESCO gave the opportunity for Finland 
to brand itself as something other than an Eastern Bloc country.  
The areas of culture and education opened up for possibilities of branding 
Nordic Regionas forerunners in these areas, which could build soft power and 
increase influence both in UNESCO, and in other similar areas and organizations. To 
do this, more resources were needed than each of the countries on their own was 
willing to put in. Each of the Nordic countries and their policies would drown in the 
large organization. By pooling, they could achieve more than they were able to do on 
their own. The Nordic welfare states were quite uniform in fields like education and 
culture. In addition, the results of UNESCO negotiations became UNESCO policies, 
not policies associated by individual states. The resources put into UNESCO didn’t 
give as much credit in the end for each state, so the output of the investments was 
limited. Thus, it was in the national interest of the Nordic states to cooperate.  
Much of the same is true for Nordic cooperation in the World Bank, even 
though the structure of the organization in the Bank was different from that of 
UNESCO. The board consisted of 22 executive directors, and 17 of these represented 
more than one state.76 Only the five biggest contributors had their own director.77 The 	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fact that the Nordic countries had one joint director was thus not exceptional. Ahead 
of the weekly board meetings, the Nordic countries conferred with each other to 
always be up to date with World Bank policies. Together, they established a Nordic 
Office at the World Bank and thus made it easy to cooperate on a daily basis. 
Traditionally, Nordic Region gave one speech at the Annual Meeting. In some cases, 
if one of the countries disagreed to the majority position it was informed that one 
country disagreed with the general Nordic view, but it was seen as unfortunate. From 
a Nordic point of view, it was expected that a joint position would give more 
influence on the organization than if they presented divergent views.78 To sum up the 
Nordic cooperation at the World Bank, we can establish that it worked well.  
According to Hanne Hagtvedt Vik, the Norwegian World Bank policy was 
only to a limited extent based on self-interest. The closest attempt was to give Nordic 
citizens work at different levels in the organization. The aim was development aid, 
not to develop the Nordic economies or to gain loans in foreign currencies.79 It was 
easy to cooperate, because the interests of the Nordic states were not to benefit from 
the result of the Bank policies. They were not receivers of the aid given. Instead, 
Nordic Regionwanted to contribute to development aid, and worked together to 
achieve this through the United Nation and other associated organizations, like the 
World Bank. But World Bank policies, like the policies of UNESCO, were not 
something specific Nordic, nor Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian or Swedish. 
The best way of influence the total outcome was to be united, and thus have more 
impact. The cooperation in the World Bank thus shows us that when it is in the self-
interest of the Nordic states, they can accomplish cooperation without tension and 
difficulties. 
With this in mind, the rest of the thesis will have a frame of being one of the 
Nordic cooperation projects that were a success, even though the cooperation was not 
perfect. At several times there were conflicts and misunderstandings, but at the end it 
was the national interest that won the battle. None of the involved countries saw it as 
fruitful to break out and go solo. It would be loss of prestige and costly at the same 
time – thus, they all did their best to keep the peace. 	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2.3	  Scandinavian	  Relations	  with	  Japan	  	  
Until the Meiji-restoration in 1868, Japan had been isolated to the world. After this, 
the opening up was slow. In the early years after World War II, Japan had little 
contact with Western Europe, but had close ties with the US. USA occupied Japan 
until 1952, and also afterwards helped economically to rebuild the country. When 
Japan gained political control, they were free to conduct economical diplomacy as 
they wished.80 The US helped Japanese products to find their way into Western 
markets. With American help, Japan rose to become an economic superpower during 
the decades after World War II. In the mid 1950s, Japan applied for GATT 
membership. 94 percent of all imports were liberalized following this, but imports 
still took place according to complicated licensing rules and heavy subsidizing from 
the Export and Import Bank of Japan.81  
Japan was also backed by the US when applying for OECD membership in 
1964, in spite of Western European protest. The political and economical relations 
between Japan and the US were of vital importance during the Cold War, but the 
relationship to Western Europe was still not very close. Thus, Japan had limited, 
though increasing contact with Western Europe in the 1970s.	  
With the exception of shipping, commercial relations between Norway and 
Japan were limited well into the 1960s.82 Exports to Japan were small compared to 
imports. The Norwegian historian Eldrid Mageli refers to Statistics Norway which 
classified Japan under ”other countries” to show how little importance Japan had for 
Norwegian exports in 1969.83 The same is true for the rest of Western Europe in the 
decades after the World War II: Japan has had an export surplus and has been 
reluctant to reduce this.84 Still, between 1963 and 1967, import to Norway from Japan 
had increased remarkably.85 This was especially true for import of ships. In 1963, 
Norway did not import any, but in 1967 they imported ships worth 1,594.6 million 
NOK. The import from Japan (without ships) increased from 92.5 millions in 1963 to 
148.7 million NOK. The total of exports from Norway to Japan also increased – from 
27.7 million NOK in 1963, to 161.2 million NOK in 1967. The import of ships from 	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Japan in 1967 constituted 40 percent of Norway’s total import of ships. Other 
products they imported were machines, electrical equipment and vehicles, consumer 
goods like photo equipment, optical and other instruments, sports equipment and 
others. But they also imported clothing and textiles worth 30 million NOK, and also 
rubber goods, glass, porcelain and steel. The exports without ships doubled six times 
from 1963 to 1967, whereas the total exports increased by 50 percent in the same 
period. In 1967, Norway exported goods worth 161 million NOK, and it was food 
(mostly meat and cheese), metal (iron and nickel) and machines and appliances 
(pumps, loading and unloading machines, and electric engines). As it seems, 
especially the Norwegian shipping industry had large interests in Japan, but there 
were also other markets interested in Norwegian goods. The remarkable thing here is 
the deficit in terms of great imports, but limited exports to Japan.  
In May and June 1963, a Norwegian industrial delegation went to Japan to 
investigate the possibilities of increasing their exports. They realized that the Japanese 
tried to be self-sufficient on all equipment used. In spite of all the formal 
liberalization of trade, The Norwegian Export Council found that protectionism in the 
shipping equipment industry in Japan was maintained.86 Import restrictions were 
strong in Japan until the end of the 1980’s. In 1976, the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (NMFA), as the Export Council had done in 1963, considered the 
export possibilities as small. Not because of formal restrictions, but because the 
Japanese business practice with administrative guidance implied a number of time 
consuming, expensive and complicated rules for imports. The NMFA wrote “The 
problem is that in several cases it is impossible to point out the existence of trade 
barriers”.87 So even though there were no official barriers on trade, there were a 
number of other obstacles, even though not easy to concretize, that made increased 
exports very difficult. It was unofficial, but still very real.  
The official statement was that Japanese import was totally free. On paper it 
was, but in practice the Norwegians experienced something else. For Norwegian ship 
equipment industry, it was very difficult to get into the Japanese shipbuilder’s market. 
But according to the Japanese Ambassador to Norway, the shipbuilders decided 
entirely by themselves, without any instructions, from whom they wanted to buy 
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equipment.88 Still, access for Norwegian shipping products was blocked by two 
Japanese financial arrangements: a rule stipulating that imported products could not 
exceed five percent of the total building costs, and favorable loans given to Japanese 
producers.89  
Van Wolferen argues that it is a fiction that Japan was a capitalist, free-market 
economy. Instead, he suggests there was no free market in Japan, and the strength of 
the Japanese economical system was the connection between bureaucrats and 
industrialists.90 The bureaucrats never attempted to gain full power over non-
governmental corporations. The bureaucrats guided the economy, and used 
businessmen as their antennae. In order to get information of what was happening far 
away from the center, they were constant monitoring the experiences of capitalist 
trying to find new ways of expanding their businesses.  
The reason why the economy was prosperous was due to areas of industry that 
showed prospects were stimulated by fiscal policies favoring investment. Industries 
considered of strategic importance were carefully nursed and protected against 
genuine foreign competition. Industries in trouble were temporarily protected, but if a 
dead end was met, it was easy to abandon it by policies forcing reorganization. It was 
thus a partnership sealed by a shared industrial policy and trade strategy. Market 
freedom was considered to be not a goal desirable in itself but one of several 
instruments for achieving the paramount aim of industrial expansion.91 
It was difficult for the Norwegians to prove that there was a specific limit to 
how much they could buy from Norwegians, but shipbuilders in Japan still did not 
buy the Norwegian goods. Even though officials in Japan refused that they used any 
restrictions, a specialist at the Japanese Shipowners’ Association admitted in 2004 
that the Japanese Government had adopted several measures to protect its 
shipbuilding industry until the 1980s, when the Government had started to encourage 
imports.92 
In the 1970s, the Norwegian Ambassador to Japan criticized the Norwegian 
efforts in Japan. The argument was that Sweden and Denmark had more personnel 
stationed there and had thus better possibilities of exporting goods. Tore Bøgh at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Mageli, 2006, p 68 
89 Mageli, 2006, p 66 
90 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 6	  
91 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 7 
92 Mageli, 2006, p 68 
	   39	  
	  
Norwegian Export Council, replied in 1977 that the main problem for the Norwegians 
was not little effort or too few people from the Norwegian side, but rather the 
Japanese attitude towards imports of finished goods. ’All of Japanese industrial 
society appears mainly concerned with sales. Imports, except raw materials and 
intermediate goods, are regarded as something close to treason’.93 
For SAS, the 1960’s were important in relations to Japan. The North Pole 
route between Copenhagen, Anchorage and Tokyo was opened in 1957. It was soon 
obvious to SAS that the frequency of two flights a week did not suffice to handle all 
the passengers wanting to travel from Scandinavia to Japan. Thus, they wished to 
increase the landing rights in Japan to three times a week. Japanese Air Lines (JAL) 
was not in favor of this, even though SAS and the Scandinavian Governments were 
willing to grant JAL additional landing rights in Scandinavia. Negotiations between 
the Scandinavian and Japanese Governments were held in 1967 and 1968. The 
Scandinavians did not make any progress, and was at times frustrated and angry about 
the way the Japanese negotiated.  
Japan became an economical world power in the years after WWII, even 
though it did not behave the way the rest of the world expected a world power to 
behave. 94In the late 1960’s, the rest of the world were advised to wait for the 
Japanese internationalization, but it took time, and thus in the late 1980’s, the 
international community got tired of waiting. The problem was easy to grasp in 
economics: the Japanese surplus in trade was $44 billion in 1984, $56 billion in 1985, 
and $93 billion in 1986, and it was impossible to change that.95 It is not only that they 
exported more than they imported, by doing so they also undermined Western 
industry. After the New York and London stock market crash in October 1987, 
Japanese stocks reached a new, high level. The Japanese exploited the situation and 
started to invest in foreign real estate, and bought foreign banks and corporations. 
Some Europeans and Americans understood, somewhat belatedly, that Japan was 
playing a completely different game than the game they had invented and still 
played.96 
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3.	  Scandinavian	  Cooperation	  on	  the	  World	  Exposition	  in	  Osaka	  
in	  1970	  	  
3.1	  The	  Organization	  of	  Expo	  Participation	  in	  Scandinavian	  	  
3.1.1	  Sweden	  
The Information Collegium was established to coordinate the official Swedish 
information abroad. Official Swedish participation at trade fairs was decided after 
recommendation from the Swedish Export Association (Sveriges Allmänna 
Exportförening). Due to their extensive knowledge of Swedish exporters’ interests, 
their statements were crucial in deciding which efforts would be made. They made 
surveys in countries, which possibly could be of significance for Sweden.97 The 
people monitoring the stands or pavilions were often from Chamber of Commerce or 
the Embassy. The Export Association often also sent people, and they tried to get 
more people from the private sector to take a part – which was not often the case.  
The Information Collegium had state funding, and financed official 
performances at international exhibitions and trade fairs. If the Export Association 
gave positive indication on a trade fair, they would be given funds to spend. The 
Association would then administer the participation in cooperation with the Swedish 
Chamber of Commerce or the Embassy. Private firms financed their own 
participation. The official funding covered, completely or partially, joint efforts. At a 
trade fair, the Export Association would construct a pavilion or stand, and Swedish 
firms could rent space in this pavilion. The products shown were thus decided of the 
firms renting from the Association. Participation in World Expositions was not 
included in the procedure described above. The final decision was made by the 
Information Collegium, but first after making extensive research. It was possible to 
ask for extra funding from the Government and Parliament, if participation needed 
funding beyond the budget of the Information Collegium.  
 In one way, it seems that the Swedes are well organized. Still, there was 
confusion on who decided and funded what internally. According to Gunnar Lonneus 
at the Swedish Institute, three Swedish institutions dealt with approximately the same 
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questions regarding information of Sweden abroad.98 This was confusing for many 
Swedish export companies who wanted to attend trade fairs abroad. These three 
institutions were the Information Collegium, the Information Office at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs99, and the Swedish Institute. These three filled different functions in 
almost the same area.  
The Information Collegium was planning and coordinating all officially 
financed information work abroad, which meant coordinating commercial information 
measures abroad. Information  Office was collecting marketing data and general 
information abroad, and was thus the link between information offices in Sweden and 
information gathered abroad, mostly done by Embassies and Consulates. The Swedish 
Institute was the organization responsible for marketing, production and distribution 
of goods and services in the information field.  	  
3.1.2	  Norway	  and	  Denmark	  
In contrast to Sweden, Norway had no Norwegian Institute or anything similar to the 
Information Collegium. If Norway were participating at an international exhibition or 
trade fair that needed resources from the Government, it had to be approved each time 
by the Storting. At the Foreign Ministry there was an Office for Cultural Interaction 
Abroad (OCIA), but it had little to do with exhibitions. Instead, its purpose was to 
communicate Norwegian culture.100 World Exhibitions were not seen as a part of this 
effort. It was the Ministry of Trade that had this responsibility, and at the NMFA, it 
was the office for international trade that managed cases like World Expositions. 
Obviously, the Norwegians thought of efforts of this kind as increasing exports to 
foreign countries. It had little to do with reputation management or creating goodwill. 
In other areas, Norway sought to build reputation – for instance in development aid 
and peacekeeping and peace negotiations.  Thus, it is not the case that Norway in the 
1960s was unaware of the importance of building a reputation abroad to use for her 
own good. World Expositions was just not a part of this effort. For Norway, World 
Expositions were merely a way of increasing exports.  
In September 1967, the Norwegian parties involved parties had discussed the 
matter and agreed that if they did not attend the exposition, it might have negative 	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effects on export possibilities, aviation and shipping interests.101 The Ministry of 
Trade was given the authority to continue the negotiations, as long as Sweden and 
Denmark intended to participate. The negotiations were halted because of the 
deadlock in the SAS-JAL negotiations, but were restarted at the beginning of 1968. 
The Norwegian Minister of Trade, Kåre Willoch, thus recommended to the 
Government in February 1968 that Norway say yes to participation at the World Expo 
in 1970, on the condition of cooperation with Denmark and Sweden, and that the 
Parliament would approve.102   
Because there was no such office like the Swedish Information Collegium, 
there was no money put aside for the purpose of promoting Norway at World 
Exhibitions. Thus, the politicians had to take the question each time to the Storting, 
and it would be debated there every time the budget was expanded. This seems to be a 
more cumbersome and time-consuming practice, when comparing to the Swedes who 
had outsourced the questions to bureaucrats who could make the decisions and take 
the responsibility. They did not need to get every decisions sanctioned by the 
Parliament.  
The situation in Norway was that they needed exceeding resources over and 
above the approved budget from the Government to participate in Osaka. The 
Minister of Trade in the meeting of the King in Council on March 15 1968 
recommended approving a proposition to the Parliament to appropriate another 
million for “Other Trade Purposes”. It was thus seen as a trade purpose to attend Expo 
70, not as a foreign policy strategy to present Norway abroad, and thus increase 
goodwill or improve the image of Norway (reputation management). 
A memo written by Gunnar Odd Hærum, the Director of the Foreign 
Ministry’s 3rd Trade Policy Office, illustrates the problem with regard to who made 
Norwegian policies.103 It seems that there was no general approved way of handling 
world exposition issues, and that they had to find a way of starting off every time the 
question came up. Hærum and the Director of Trade, Per Glad, discussed the question 
of the Norwegian Working Committee and the Norwegian Commissioner to the 
Nordic Expo 70 group. Glad found it appropriate that Mowinckel-Larsen at the 
Norwegian Trade Fairs (not a governmental institution, even though partially funded 	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by the Government) should be the Commissioner, because of his experience, which 
would make it easy for him to handle the tasks. The Norwegian Trade Fairs would 
thus be the place where the secretary was situated. Glad thought it best for the 
Norwegian Export Association and the Norwegian Ship Owner’s Association were 
represented at the Working Committee. He found it less important that the 
Government or any other state institutions be included in the committee. Hærum 
replied that it probably would be best if the Government in one way or another was 
represented, and Glad agreed, but did not wish that the Ministry of Trade (his own 
Ministry) would be the one who had to do it. When Per Borgen at the NMFA read 
this, he noted in the margin that it was perhaps not necessary for the Government to 
be represented, but he would find this strange due to the fact that it was the 
Government that paid the whole project. He also noted that he did “not realize that 
Norway did not have direct interests to safeguard both in the working committee and 
later at the exposition itself”.104 He then suggested that both Hans Ganestad and 
Hærum would be well suitable for the task. Responding to the Ministry of Trade, the 
Foreign Ministry found it “highly desirable to be represented” at the working 
committee.105 Thus, Per Borgen became a member. He was the Head of the Culture 
Department at the NMFA, and it is one of few exceptions to the rule that offices and 
ministries concerned with exports and trade handled the Norwegian Expo ‘70 
participation. Borgen never argues against that exports were the main purpose of the 
Norwegian efforts, and he never argues that Norway should use the possibility of 
increasing its goodwill. In addition, he argues in favor of Hærum being the one sitting 
in the Norwegian committee – probably because he considered it being a question of 
trade policy. Why Borgen ended up in the position does not come clear, but it seems 
as also he thought increased exports to Japan was most important. 
The Norwegian Government had, as already mentioned, recommended that the 
Parliament supply extra funding for the Expo 70 pavilion. The national budget for 
1968 was already approved, and no funding was included for the Expo 70 pavilion. 
Thus, Parliament had to agree to an additional appropriation for this purpose. The 
negotiation in Parliament is of interest to understand the way the Norwegian 
politicians thought of World Exhibitions. The proposition was passed in the end, with 
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only two against.106 Olav Langeland (The Centre Party), when presenting the case to 
Parliament, was well aware of the argument against participation. He acknowledged 
the problem of spending a large amount of money on an exposition that gave no real 
evidence of gain in terms of increased exports. Expo 70 could give Norway no real 
material gain, and thus they should use the money on trade fairs instead. This is in 
accordance with how most politicians and bureaucrats in Norway thought of World 
Expositions – they were more to increase exports than to secure and strengthen 
goodwill abroad. It explains why it was the Ministry of Trade and the Office of Trade 
Policy at the Foreign Ministry that had the responsibility for this kind of questions. 
But even if it was quite expensive to participate (3 million NOK), Langeland 
suggested that Norway could not afford to abstain. He used increasing exports and 
imports from and to Japan as his main argument, and that Expo ’70 would be an 
opportunity to show Norwegian products to an unaware Japanese public. He also 
noted that Nordic cooperation had been tested in Montreal, and that the experiences 
made from this could be used to make it better this time. Here, there is an intimation 
of Nordic cooperation in Expo ’67 being somewhat difficult.  
Paul Thyness (Conservative) was clearly against an extra grant for Expo ’70. 
He reminded the Parliament that Word Expositions are not trade exhibitions, and that 
they could not have a commercial character. Even though he thought it was important 
to do information work abroad, he considered Norway to be a small country with 
limited resources and that the gain from World Expositions was too insignificant 
compared to the input. He admitted that World Expositions could, more indirectly, 
give Norway goodwill that potentially could result in increased exports and more 
tourism, but he considered it as easier to achieve this through more direct procedures. 
In contrast to Langeland, who emphasized the high costs, Thyness considered 2,75 
million NOK to be a small number. He compared it to the budget they had agreed on 
for 1968, which in total was 15 355 millions. Still, it was a large amount compared to 
similar measures, and he thought the money could be better spent elsewhere. He 
connected the issue with the Office of Cultural Interaction Abroad (NMFA), which 
had less annual funding than Expo 70 would get. He is one of few who saw the 
connection between these two, and stressed the building of goodwill abroad in 
addition to focusing on more sales and exports. He would thus give the money to the 	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Office of Cultural Interaction Abroad and through this would improve the perception 
of Norwegian culture and performance in different areas far more efficiently. He still 
saw the importance of export promotion, for instance through Norwegian weeks at 
international trade fairs.  
At a World Exposition, Norway would have to compete for attention with 
great nations like the USA and Soviet Union. He considered the competition too hard. 
With the limited resources Norway had, little had been achieved by participating in 
Brussels and in Montreal, he argued. The exhibition in Brussels had not given the 
visitors any idea of Norway as a democratic country, high social standard, and high 
technological level. No one got the impression that Norway was one of the leading 
shipping nations in the world, a beautiful tourist destination or a country with culture 
and design as important factors in daily life. He was not impressed with the result. In 
addition to this, the pavilion in Montreal had a restaurant owned by SAS and it was a 
success in terms of profit. The same was meant to be in Osaka, and he could not 
understand why Norway should sponsor a company that was not fully Norwegian. He 
then referred to the Exporter’s Association, who had given advice against 
participation, as had most of the Norwegian business sector (except the shipowners). 
As a conclusion, he argued, the money was needed to present Norway abroad, but that 
World Expositions were not the place to spend them.  
Responding to this, Willoch stressed the importance of the exhibition in Japan. 
It was the first World Expo in Asia, and it marked the 100 years since the Meiji 
restoration, which was a turning point in Japan’s history both economically and 
politically. It represented a shift from Japan being a feudal country to becoming a 
centralized state.107 As a result of this, it was expected to get a lot of attention. 
Willoch argued that the Government had recommended participation first of all for 
reasons of international relations, and also because of foreign economic policy 
concerns. Participation could give a possible goodwill gain of significance, and 
abstaining would possibly give a negative effect on export possibilities and for the 
aviation and shipping interests. Willoch agreed that World Expositions were not 
commercial, but he disagreed that it would not have any commercial side effects. He 
also reminded the Parliament of the recommendation from the Nordic Council 
regarding a joint effort at the Expo 70. He referred to the report from NC on the 	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cooperation in Montreal, which concluded that the Nordic cooperation on Expo 67 
was most positive. It seems like the Montreal experience was used for whatever they 
thought suitable on different occasions. Thus, it is plausible to think that the 
cooperation at Expo 67 was neither particularly positive nor negative.   
Willoch argued that the costs would be lower for the Expo 70 pavilion than 
the one in Montreal, something he considered as remarkable. He also pointed out that 
the Ministry of Trade rarely asked for extra funding, and when they now chose to do 
so, it was because they thought it would give valuable positive effects. He answered 
his own question on whether or not World Exhibitions had any appropriate place in 
the modern world, by saying that Expo 70 already had been giving great attention and 
that he considered it wise for Norway to participate. He answered the critique against 
SAS, and their possible profit, by saying that they had pressured SAS as far they 
possibly could. 
The next speaker, Bodil Aakre (Conservative), argued that if Norway were the 
only Nordic country to abstain, it would not favor the relationship the export industry 
already had established with Japan.  
Tryggve Bratteli was concerned in the same ways as Thyness, but Bratteli 
would still vote in favor of the proposal because of how the case stood. He considered 
World Expositions to be an obsolete form of international relations. He acknowledged 
that the number of participants could be of significance for a host country’s prestige. 
Norway could possibly offend Japan by not attending Expo 70. Still, he did not think 
that it would be much of a goodwill gain or increased exports by participating at 
World Expositions.  
Bratteli considered the notion of World Exhibitions at the Nordic Council to 
be less positive than Willoch did. Bratteli had the impression that the Nordic Council 
was not in favor of World Exhibitions, but if the small states in the region had to 
participate, it would be better to cooperate.  
Canada had put pressure on Norwegian authorities to participate at Expo ’67 
because of the prestige involved, and Thyness suggested that this might have 
happened from Japan as well. Willoch used the argument of the courtesy of 
participating at Expo 70 because of the celebration of 100 years of openness, but 
Thyness recalled that there was a celebration for Canada as well. He suggested that 
this would be an argument with regard to all future World Exhibitions. He then 
asked the question one more time if the export industry would absolutely loose as 
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much as previous speakers had argued. He argued that business was determined on 
other criteria than participation at World Expositions. In addition, he did not want 
Norway to necessarily be a part of Scandinavian cooperation, because of the fear of 
drowning. He did not see the point in participation if Norway could not sell more 
products to the host country, and by being a part of Scandinavia, Norway would loose 
more than they would gain.  
Willoch said it was strange if Nordic Council’s point of view was what 
Bratteli said it was, because the recommendation was so clear. He concluded that he 
would not give any recommendation to Stortinget about how to vote, but that because 
the process had gone so far, it could cause problems for Norway in Japan if many 
delegates would vote against the proposition. Bratteli reacted to this, and said that no 
one should put pressure on delegates of Stortinget to vote for or against a proposition 
in this manner. At the end, only two delegates voted against the proposition, and the 
funding was granted. The debate gives an indication on how the Norwegian 
politicians thought of World Expositions in general, if Norway should attend these 
and also how the Norwegian organized their work.  
The Norwegian Committee especially established for the Expo ’70 consisted 
of Nils Fredrik Aall from Ulefoss108, Edward Mowinckel-Larsen at the Norwegian 
Trade Fairs109, Per Borgen, Head of the Culture department at the NMFA, Otto 
Christian Malterud at the Norwegian Export Association, Odd-Leif Skundberg, 
Norwegian Shipowner’s Association, and Odd Grann, Norwegian Trade Fairs. Their 
mandate was to organize the Nordic joint pavilion together with equivalent 
committees in the other Nordic countries. The Ministry of Trade was the one to 
appoint the Norwegian General Commissioner. The Committees’ secretariat would be 
placed at the Norwegian Trade Fairs.110  
It is striking that only one of the representative at the Committee was ministry 
employed, and that the daily work would be handled by a non-governmental 
foundation. It was the Ministry of Trade that had the responsibility, but it was not 
represented at all in the Committee. Even though participation in World Expositions 
was not regarded as the most important effort made in the foreign policy, it is still 
strange that almost the entire question was put in the hands of people representing 	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private interests. Only one of the members of the Norwegian Committee was 
employed by the state. The ministry in charge that, according to the Norwegian point 
of view, had the most to win from attending was not interested in participating in the 
committee. In Sweden, the question was handled by the Information Collegium, 
which was state funded and with the former Ambassador Kjell Öberg as its leader. 
The approaches of the two neighboring states were strikingly dissimilar.  
As the preparatory phase of the Norwegian participation at Expo ’70 ended, 
Mowinckel-Larsen decided to step down during the summer of 1968 and leave the 
Norwegian committee.111 Nils Fredrik Aall took over as the Norwegian Honorary 
Commissioner General, or the leader of the Norwegian Expo 70 committee, appointed 
by the Norwegian Government on July 12.112 At this point, the Norwegians were not 
very well organized. It seems that they were struggling with the organization and 
communication, something Öberg also noticed. At the Stockholm meeting on May 15 
1968, according to Öberg, two Norwegians met, both claiming to represent the 
National Association of Norwegian Architects.113 In order to appoint members to the 
referee committee, this dispute had to be solved. To Öberg, this dispute seemed 
somewhat amusing, or even helpless. And thus, it might have been a very good thing 
for Norway that Mowinckel-Larsen stepped down as the Honorary CG and was 
replaced by Nils Fredrik Aall.  
This shift was due to Mowinckel-Larsen’s retirement from his position at the 
Norwegian Trade Fairs. Odd Grann succeeded him. Grann took responsibility and 
informed the rest of the Norwegian Expo ’70 Committee of how the future work 
would best be done.114 He divided the process into three stages: the first step would be 
completed in September 1968, when the Architectural competition would be finished. 
In the same period, fundraising had to be done, to finance extra activities. The second 
stage would commence after the architectural competition was completed and the 
work to realize the winning suggestion started. He reminded that the nationality of the 
winner mattered, with regards to who would administer this work. He claimed that 
since the Danes had the main architect and SAS Catering, and the Swedes had the 
entrepreneur and the Commissioner General, it would not be strange if Norway would 	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be chosen to be responsible for the pavilion theme administration and 
implementation. He added “If we whish to?”115 If they did not take any responsibility 
for any part of the cooperation, it could lead to being overshadowed and left out in 
decisions that could matter for the presentation of Norway abroad. At the same time, 
to administer a part like this took extra resources and time. If they wanted to 
administer, and had the arguments of why they would be the obvious choice, it must 
have been strange to the Norwegians if they still did not get it. At the same stage, they 
had to have the extra finances in place, and they had to start preparing for PR 
measures in Japan. The third stage was to finalize the work and to tweak the 
“Norwegian participation” in Japan. They also had to conduct the PR initiatives in 
Japan. Grann stressed the importance of the work they had to do outside the pavilion, 
and they hoped that the Embassy could help both with research and actual 
performance. This was late compared to the Swedes, who already had made a survey 
on Sweden in Japan a year before.  
Grann also pointed out that the Expo committee was the deciding party in 
administering the Norwegian participation at Expo ’70. The Commissioner General 
had the Norwegian Trade Fairs’ Secretariat (with Odd Grann as their leader) at his 
disposal. An account with the Government funding would be established at the 
disposal of both Nils Fredrik Aall and Secretary General Grann. The daily work and 
follow through of the decisions made at the committee would be conducted according 
to agreement between Commissioner General Aall and Secretary General Grann.  
In the Norwegian and Swedish archives, there is little evidence of the way 
Denmark organized its work. In the Norwegian archives it is (of course) possible to 
trace the structure of the Norwegian organization. It is also easy to find the Swedish 
organizational structure from the Swedish archives. In the Swedish archives, it is little 
evidence for how Norway and Denmark organized their work. The difference is that it 
is also easy to find the Swedish organizational structure in the Norwegian archives. 
The Swedes informed the Norwegians of how they organized their work. Can this be 
because Sweden was better organized and had a structure that was easy to explain? 
Were they better organized? Or was it just more information going out? Was it 
perhaps that the Swedes thought the Norwegians needed some help to find their way? 
Because the scope of this thesis is limited, I found it hard to also include the Danish 	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archives. Thus, I have little certain knowledge of how the Danes organized their 
work.  
Still, one Danish newspaper op-ed article gives an indication on how the 
Danish work was organized.116 It is an answer to a critical voice asking in what way 
Denmark should be presented to the outside world at World Exhibitions, because 
Denmark could not compete with the superpowers and their resources, and could 
therefore not expect to have the most impressive pavilion and exhibition. Also, 
critique was directed towards the bureaucrats, who should take more responsibility, it 
was argued. The author, permanent undersecretary Kai Johansen, regretted that the 
public debate of Denmark’s participation had begun so late, after the framework of 
the exhibition already was in place. Denmark was a part of the Scandinavian 
cooperation together with SAS Catering.  
Denmark could not compete with the Soviet Union or the US when it came to 
recourses, but at Expo ’67, Czechoslovakia had impressed the public, and shown that 
smaller states could impress the public. They communicated a message that attracted 
people’s attention, and thus smaller pavilions could be successful as well. It was not 
all about the size of the economy, Johansen argued. 
Johansen responded to the critique of bureaucrats not taking their 
responsibility by stating that it was not they who had the mandate to make any 
decisions regarding a possible Danish participation, the budget, range or the content 
of such participation. Instead, it was politicians and people from the business 
community, that made these basic decisions, as it should be in a democracy, he wrote. 
After they decided, they could delegate responsibility to bureaucrats.  
Johansen was not fully satisfied with this system. Old ways of thinking and 
old habits stopped the renewal of these processes, and he suggested that there was 
something wrong with the organization and the administrative structure. The process 
of deciding until the product was finished, was perhaps logical at one time, but was 
probably not logical anymore. Johansen suggested that they had to shake everything 
up and come up with new solutions on how to administer tasks like Denmark’s 
participation at World Expositions, and thus new form of cooperation between the 
business sector and governmental institutions. The aim was to attract attention to 
Denmark abroad, and to do this he suggested that more of the people concerned with 	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national trade fairs had to be brought into the work on international World 
Expositions.  
The challenge was to cooperate in a new way. Information efforts abroad were 
spread out on different persons in different positions in different organizations and 
institutions. Nobody knew the plans and ideas of the others. The Ministry of Culture 
administered cultural agreements, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies abroad, 
the Danish Business Fund and the export sector administered combined cultural and 
business oriented measures. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Press and Information 
Department administered the general information from books, booklets, and 
magazines. The Danish Society was giving general information about Denmark 
abroad, and Dansk Samvirke administered the contact with Danes living abroad. 
World Expositions were placed under the Committee of Exhibitions Abroad, which 
had their secretariat at the Council of Industry (Industrirådet). Samvirkerådet, which 
was a cooperation body for institutes and others who worked for knowledge of 
Denmark abroad, was a subject to the Prime Minister’s Office. Also, the private 
sector had efforts abroad, which could interface with the above-mentioned 
institutions.  
No one of these worked against each other, but extensive cooperation was not 
in place. There had been efforts to start coordinating the efforts better, but each 
institution’s self-interest stopped such development, Johansen argued. Thus, when the 
bureaucrats were criticized for not taking their responsibility of Expo ’70, Johansen 
reminded that it was to give them more power than they actually had. He welcomed 
the debate on how to organize Denmark’s participation at future World Expositions in 
a better way, but argued that this had to come from politicians, not from the 
bureaucracy. Still, it is evident that the situation on Norway and Denmark has more 
similarities than the two of them had to the better-organized Sweden, that already had 
made an effort to administer such tasks in a more streamlined way. But the Danes 
were clearly more concerned with projected Denmark abroad than were the 
Norwegians. If we look at the number of institutions, it was somewhere in between 
Norway and Sweden. 
The impression is that in Norway, every change of budget had to be approved 
by the Parliament, which made the Expo 70 process in Norway much more political 
than in Sweden. The freedom of taking action on behalf of Sweden was, as it seems, 
placed in the hands of bureaucrats who had the authority to create a small part of 
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Swedish foreign policy as long as they reported to the politicians. There are almost no 
traces of governmental politicians in the Swedish material, whereas the Norwegian 
Minister of Trade is highly involved in the matter. In Norway, a small part of the 
Government Budget was reserved for trade fairs and other information/propaganda 
efforts abroad. A small office at the Foreign Ministry dealt with propaganda, but they 
were not heavily involved with the World Expositions. In Norway it does not seem 
that world expositions were seen in the context to reputation management. In Norway 
Expos were about exports. The Ministry of Trade and the Foreign Ministry’s 3rd 
office for trade policy handled negotiations with Denmark and Sweden. In Sweden, 
the Information Collegium, funded by the Government, was in charge. They 
complained of limited resources, but at the same time they could spend them as they 
wished. Their mandate was to spread information about Sweden to the rest of the 
world, and to build a good reputation abroad to increase Sweden’s goodwill. The 
main difference between the two countries was that Sweden had an office for 
information abroad that was active and which connected world expositions to a 
broader information purpose, whereas Norway connected world expositions mostly to 
exports, shipping and aviation and put the responsibility for this at the Ministry of 
Trade. The political aspect was thus higher in Norway than in Sweden. This can in 
turn explain why Sweden was more prepared and more efficient when decisions were 
made.  
 
3.2	  The	  Decision	  Making	  Process	  
The financial gain from a possible World Exposition participation was generally seen 
as low when compared to the relatively high cost demanded.117  Because of this, 
Sweden and Denmark had decided not to participate at the World Expo in Brussels in 
1958, but both countries had bitter experiences after this non-participation.118 The 
Swedish information office, Upplysningsberedningen, which was the forerunner of 
the Information Collegium, was heavily criticized in Sweden afterwards for making 
this decision, and made the Swedish Government decide to participate at the World 	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  “Commissioner General’s report on the Scandinavian 
Pavilion at Expo 70”, Sven A. Hansson, and ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.03.67, Memo regarding the Word 
Expo in Osaka 1970, Kjell Öberg. Attached to letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. 
Nauchhoff, 28.03.67.	  
	   53	  
	  
Exposition in Seattle in 1962. The decision had come close to the Expo start, and thus 
also the preparations had started late. This was seen as the reason why the pavilion 
had been poorer and more expensive than it otherwise might have been. After this, 
Swedish representatives had learned their lesson and contacted colleagues in their 
neighboring countries in 1963 to discuss a possible joint representation at the World 
Exposition in Montreal in 1967.119 To avoid the same result as in Seattle, Sweden 
wanted to start the preparatory phase early and cooperating with the other Nordic 
countries. The result was a shared pavilion at Expo ’67, though with separate 
exhibitions. They managed to limit the costs to a total of 18 million Swedish kroner in 
total divided on the five countries, when comparable countries spent 20 millions on 
their separate pavilions. The good economic result was seen as dependent on 
cooperation, a quick decision, as well as a quick start with preparations.120  
3.2.1	  Sweden	  
In August 1966 the Scandinavian Governments received invitations to 
participate at the World Exposition in Osaka in 1970.121 Expo 67 in Montreal was the 
main priority at this time, and the governments of Scandinavia did not want to take on 
a new effort of this magnitude just three years after Expo ’67.122 If they chose to 
participate, the already stretched budget would once again be spent on a World 
Exposition. Because of this, in early September 1966, the Information Collegium 
decided to discourage the Swedish Government from participating at the World Expo 
in 1970, but the decision had one precondition: that the other Nordic nations agreed to 
abstain. 
In November 1966, the Swedish Ambassador Almquist in Tokyo gathered 
representatives from Swedish industry in Japan, Kjell Öberg, and a representative 
from the Swedish Ministry of Trade in Tokyo. The reason for the meeting was that 
Almquist wanted state representatives and people from Swedish business sector to 
discuss the matter of Swedish participation at Expo ’70. Because Kjell Öberg at the 
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  Expo ’67 lasted from March to September 1967. 
120 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.03.67, Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970, Kjell Öberg. Attached 
to letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff, 28.03.67. 
121 NNA RA/S-5006/3/E/Ea/L0211,	  09.12.71,	  “Commissioner General’s report on the Scandinavian 
Pavilion at Expo 70”, Sven A. Hansson.	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  09.12.71,	  “Commissioner General’s report on the Scandinavian 
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Information Collegium was reluctant to participation, the Ambassador wanted to 
present the views from the Swedish interests in Japan.  
One of the representatives, Mr. Hoshino, who worked for the Swedish 
company Götaverken in Japan, was alarmed by the negative attitude, and referred to 
the possible negative reactions this might have on Swedish export opportunities in 
Japan. The Japanese officials and industry apparently expected Sweden to participate. 
Swedish industry in Japan was thus afraid of the possible retaliation the Swedes could 
expect in case of a Swedish no show, as well as the possibility of being forgotten “by 
the Japanese people and industry”.123 The image of Sweden in Japan was that Sweden 
was “the welfare state, the social model country, which all countries should 
imitate”.124 The rest of the group was not too worried that exports from Sweden 
would suffer, either direct or indirect, but worried that “the favorably disposed 
Japanese people would be disappointed”.125 This in turn might lead to less Japanese 
goodwill, and instead be replaced by annoyance and less interest in Sweden, which 
possibly would be noticed for a long time afterwards.  
At the same time, Ambassador Almquist stressed that to build goodwill in 
Japan, it was necessary for Sweden to participate at the Expo, and that the Japanese, 
“as all Asians, nurse their grievances; they don´t forget easily”.126 He was thus 
worried that abstaining would have long time effects, and that financial arguments 
presented by the Information Collegium were not strong enough to justify non-
participation. He argued instead that participation had to be put into a larger picture 
and that it was necessary for Sweden to participate.127 They also discussed Nordic 
cooperation at the meeting. To save money, they could build a joint pavilion, but 
would not recommend more extensive cooperation than what they would have in 
Montreal.128  
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Kjell Öberg also reported from the meeting and stressed that only one 
representative used a positive argument (higher direct export possibilities) in favor of 
Swedish participation. At the same time this representative discouraged Nordic 
cooperation. Several argued for a small Swedish exhibition, with the argument of 
being afraid of the negative consequences on Swedish exports if they were not there. 
Some did not fear negative consequences at all.129  
This is not quite the same impression Almquist gave. The two Swedish men 
had obviously different interests, and when reporting home they stressed different 
aspects of the meeting. Öberg would rather spend the limited resources he had on 
other efforts than yet another World Exposition. Almquist was stationed in Tokyo and 
obviously wanted more Swedish representation in Japan. This divergence in interests 
can explain the small gap between the two documents, which both were meant to be 
informative for the decision makers back in Sweden.   
After the meeting, more exporters of Swedish goods to Japan announced their 
concern about the possible negative consequences on exports.130 The argument for 
participation grew stronger, not because anyone wanted to participate, but because 
they were afraid they couldn’t afford not to. It was argued by the Swedish Exporter’s 
Association that not to have the means to participate would be met with more 
understanding in Europe or America than in Japan. Abstaining would be interpreted to 
mean that Sweden “did not fulfill her obligations towards her selves”, which 
apparently was very serious in Japan.131 In that way, it would be risky not only 
economically, but also politically, not to participate. The Exporter’s Association 
obviously had interest in Swedish participation, but argued that it was not only 
exporters who could loose from abstaining. The reputation of the Swedish state was 
also a part of this, and the more prominent the political argument was, the more 
responsibility rested upon the government. Öberg argued that if the negative 
arguments were decisive, the Swedish pavilion should be as small as possible – it was 
his budget that would suffer from the increased responsibility of the state.132 He still 	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warned that the quality had to be in the top range in order not to compromise the 
reputation Sweden had on this area.  
As early as December 1966 the Swedes had begun to lobby for a Nordic 
small-scale joint exhibition, where one country would have the mandate to represent 
the other countries in one pavilion. The Swedes didn´t really want to participate, but 
because of pressure, they had to look at solutions of how participate and at the same 
time spend as little money as possible. Nordic cooperation was seen as the best way to 
achieve this.133 Sweden was thus the initiator of cooperation, whereas Denmark at that 
time saw it as too costly, even if the Nordic countries were to cooperate.134 Finland 
gave no indication of whether they wanted to participate or not.135 Norwegian 
participation was seen as doubtful in late 1966.136 
Öberg was very impressed with the Nordic cooperation in Montreal.137 It went 
remarkably well, he noted, but he wouldn’t recommend that they did the same thing 
one more time. They had five General Commissioners; they used five different 
architects and five other architects who were responsible for each country’s 
exhibition. The many different opinions obviously led to technical and administrative 
complications. Instead of having five committees who had to agree on every part of 
the pavilion, he suggested that the five Nordic countries would have one pavilion 
altogether, with only one exhibition. He wanted one of the five countries to organize 
the pavilion on behalf of the others, and that the others contribute only financially. He 
suggested that the country in charge could be Finland.  
Öberg’s suggestion of Finland as the leader was not seriously debated in the 
Scandinavian Committee. The reason was probably that Finland did not wish to take 
the responsibility alone. In addition Denmark and Norway may have suspected Öberg 
of having an ulterior motive: to run the pavilion by proxy. Thus, they did not even 
bother discussing it.  
Why Öberg suggested this is uncertain. No memo or minute of meeting is 
informative when comes to different viewpoints. Probably, Denmark and Norway 
thought it was too unrealistic to even bother debating. Still, it is interesting to 	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deliberate on. Perhaps it was because Finland was smaller and contributed with less 
money than Denmark, Norway and Sweden did in Montreal. Finland also possibly 
had the least interest export-wise in Japan, and thus had less to loose and could be the 
less biased leader. If Sweden, Denmark or Norway were responsible for representing 
the other three as a unit, it would have been almost impossible to agree on who would 
be the leader state. None of them would trust the others to take all three countries’ 
interests equally seriously. If one of them would present all of them, it could easily be 
directed towards promoting their own exports. Was it Öberg’s suggestion because 
Finland was close to Sweden, with its Swedish minority, and close ties? Denmark and 
Norway would probably be difficult to control, but Finland might be easier to 
influence for Öberg and Sweden? There are no answers to these questions in the 
material I have found, but it might be both the neutral position Finland had and the 
possibility of influencing them that lead Öberg to suggest Finland. The question that 
is harder to answer is why Öberg thought Finland would take on this responsibility 
when they had so little interest in Japan. Did he hope that Finland’s negativity could 
change, and thus make the whole region commit to participation, if they were given 
such a distinguishing position? But the negativity towards participation was not 
changing after Öberg’s suggestion of cooperation.138 
In April 1967, Finland had decided not to participate at the Expo 70 even 
though the other Scandinavian countries would participate.139 Denmark was negative, 
but opened up for participation if Sweden and Norway said yes. Swedish industry had 
pushed for participation because of the fear of the possible negative effects of 
abstaining. Some of them assumed that the pressure from Japan was stronger because 
they had attended the Montreal Expo than it would have been if they were not present 
at Expo ’67. Because of the pressure from the exporters, the Swedish Government 
was more willing to participate and hoped for Nordic cooperation.  
A survey made in Japan on Sweden showed that the Japanese did not think of 
Sweden as having highly developed manufacturing industry. Öberg considered Expo 
’70 to be a good opportunity for correcting this perception. The survey Sweden made 
in Japan also shows that Sweden was ahead of the others in preparing for a smart 	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  “Commissioner General’s report on the Scandinavian 
Pavilion at Expo 70”, Sven A. Hansson. In Swedish: “politiskt, möjligen också ekonomiskt risikabla 
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  Minutes of meeting at the NMFA	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presentation at Expo ’70. There were several lessons learned by this survey – first of 
all what kind of perception Japan had of Sweden and Scandinavia, but also that the 
perception was so wrong that Swedish planners had come to realize that the likely 
gains in terms of an enhanced reputation might make the Expo investment worth 
while.140  
3.2.2	  Norway	  
The archive of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry indicates little Norwegian 
correspondence or interest in the Expo until the end of 1966. Even though Expo ’67 
was soon to start, it was just a little more than three years until Expo ’70 would open 
its doors. Participation at a World Exposition is quite a large project for a country. It 
demands much planning, time and financial resources.141 
In January 1967, the Norwegian Minister of Commerce, Kåre Willoch, visited 
Japan. Ahead of this trip, it was expected that Norwegian participation at the Expo 
would come up as one of the main questions for the Minister. The most important, a 
Foreign Ministry official advised, was for Willoch not to give any negative 
impression about Norwegian participation. Instead, he had to be “benevolent and 
positive to Norwegian participation if he should hope to be able to spread goodwill in 
Japan at the moment”.142 Also the Norwegian Ambassador to Japan prepared Willoch 
for this question and recommended that Willoch be positive without giving any 
definite answers. He still concluded that participation would be “of greatest 
significance for our goodwill here in this country. Unfortunately, one must certainly 
expect that participation will be costly, the question is only whether we can afford not 
to do it”.143 Even though Willoch never got the question while in Japan, the way the 
bureaucrats informed him says something about how the Norwegians thought of the 
question in early 1967.144 There was at least not a total ignorance of the effects on 
goodwillfor Norway and exports if the decision would be negative, or even if they 	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  ANMFA, 47.2/53, 01.07.68, Kjell Öberg. Attached to Minute of Meeting, Norwegian Osaka 
Committee at the Norwegian Export Council, 14.06.68 
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143 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 09.12.66, Letter from Knut Thommessen to the NMFA. In Norwegian: ”(…) av 
største betydning for vår good-will her i landet. Dessverre må man sikkert regne med at en deltagelse 
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144 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 07.04.67, Memorandumby Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
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gave that impression before the decision was made. This was state officials, and not 
the exporters. At the same time, almost all of the Norwegian interests in Japan were 
negative to Norwegian participation – they could not see any positive effects that 
could come from this. As earlier mentioned, they had made extensive research on how 
to increase Norwegian exports to Japan. They had failed to find any solutions, due to 
the Japanese system of exporting as much as possible and keeping imports at a 
minimum. The Norwegian exporters was thus not unprepared, they did not just see the 
point in participation.  
On April 21, 1967, six months after Sweden had done the same, NMFA 
arranged a meeting with The Export Council of Norway, the Norwegian Shipowner’s 
Association (NSA), the Norwegian Association of Manufacturers, Ministry of 
Commerce, The Norwegian Trade Fairs and SAS.145 The Export Council of Norway 
was negative because they could not see any commercial results from attending 
World Expositions; it would be a waste of money.146 They acknowledged the PR 
value of participation, as well as the negative effect it could cause in Japan, but for 
them this did not outweigh the costs. They had not directly surveyed the possible 
interest for this exhibition among exporters of food, textiles or marine equipment. In 
one way this might seem surprising that they recommended no-show before knowing 
what their members wanted. Still, they knew the Japanese system and thus assumed 
that there was no hope to increase exports. The Export Council did not see it as 
necessary for Norway to participate even if Sweden and Denmark would, because 
Norway often abstained from exhibitions and trade fairs (because of limited 
resources) when the others participated.  
David Vikøren at NSA had also not yet asked their members what they 
thought about Norwegian participation.147 He still expected that The NSA wanted 
Norway to participate. This was due to Japan’s increasing market for marine 
equipment, which could make it worth the effort to appear at the Expo, he said.  
Was he sure the market was increasing? This was not in accordance with the 
report from the delegation visiting Japan in 1963. Still, the trade relationship with 
Japan in the shipping sector grew – the Japanese sold more and more ships to 
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Norway, and thus it was still important to keep the relationship between Norway and 
Japan good, even though the Norwegian deficit was large.  
For the NSA, Expo 70 was more interesting than the Expo in Montreal, and 
Vikøren was afraid of the negative consequences if abstaining. He also noted that he 
hoped Norwegians would not oppose other Nordic countries’ participation, and that if 
one of the others participated, Norway should join them. Due to the shipping interests 
Norway actually had and needed to protect in Japan, it is surprising that this 
association did not push harder to make Norway participate at Expo ’70 (even though 
he said they probably wanted Norway to participate). They had not yet even discussed 
the matter, and Vikøren did not know for certain that they wanted Norway to be 
present – he just assumed. No real surveys or investigations had been done before late 
April.  
The NSA – finally, I would add – gave an official opinion four weeks later.148 
Japan was a significant market for Norwegian shipping and they strongly 
recommended that Norway should show their flag at the Expo ’70. They also stressed 
the negative effects if they did not participate. They considered the Osaka exhibition 
more important for Norwegian interests than the Expos in Brussels in 1958 and in 
Montreal in 1967 – at both of which Norway chose to be represented. For NSA, it was 
a matter of finances whether Norway should cooperate with other Nordic countries, 
but they reminded the NMFA that Mowinckel-Larsen thought it would be dangerous 
to start a bilateral cooperation with Sweden because they would be too domineering. 
Since Denmark and Finland were negative, the Norwegian Trade Fairs had 
recommended that Norway presented a pavilion on its own, and thus the NSA thought 
so too.  
The Federation of Norwegian Industries (FNI) did not give any indications of 
their stance before May 1967. They had not yet discussed the topic prior to the April 
meeting, but they supported the views of the Export Council.149 In May 1967, The 
FNI explained their view to NMFA. They could see no gain regarding increased 
export possibilities if Norway were to participate. The only possible negative effect 
was loss of goodwill, which they saw as a small hazard if the other Nordic countries 
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also abstained. If one of the other wanted to be represented, Norway should be at the 
Expo ’70 as well.  
The Director of Trade at the Norwegian Ministry of Commerce, Per Glad, 
noted that he had discussed the matter with Kåre Willoch. The Minister was positive 
to Norwegian participation because of possible negative effects on Norwegian export 
in case of abstention, especially if the other Nordic countries were considering 
representation. They had not discussed the possibility of a joint Swedish and 
Norwegian pavilion, but this could be the solution. Mowinckel-Larsen at the 
Norwegian Trade Fairs warned against this since he was persuaded that it “would be 
dominated by the Swedes”.150 In early May 1967, Edward Mowinckel-Larsen argued 
that the cheapest option was for Norway to build its own pavilion in Norway and ship 
it to Japan – if Norway would participate. He found that this would be a better option 
than to go along the Swedish path.151 He was skeptical of cooperation with the 
Swedes, as seen several times, which is worth noticing. Norway’s Ambassador to 
Japan argued in favor of participating, not surprisingly. He wrote that it would be of 
great importance for the export industry, and worried if Norway could afford not to 
participate at Expo 70, which had “extreme importance in Japan”.152  
SAS was interested in a Nordic participation.153 Still, SAS was not the one 
arguing most in favor. The airline only noted that participation was of only indirect 
interest for SAS. This is noticeable both because the SAS card would be a strong 
negotiation card later in the process, and because they must have started negotiating 
with the Swedes already. Either the representative from SAS was not completely 
honest with the Norwegians at this meeting or he could have been misinformed, but 
this is not likely. SAS had started negotiating with the Japanese on landing rights, and 
a good relationship between Scandinavia and Japan was important to succeed in this 
negotiations. It was, after all, negotiations between Governments – not between SAS 
and JAL. SAS could thus not be ignorant as to whether it was considered desirable 
that Scandinavia be present at Expo 70.  
In May, most of the organizations promoting Norwegian goods abroad (except 
for NSA and the Ambassador) discouraged Norwegian participation because it would 	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go beyond the limited resources available to trade fairs and other exhibitions that 
directly influenced Norwegian exports. They were aware of the strong pressure Japan 
would put on Norway, but they still thought the negative effects would be less than 
the costs of participation.154 It is also noticeable that the Norwegians were so little 
prepared compared to the Swedes who had debated the question for several months 
already. This can of course be due to lack of understanding. It is possible they did not 
understand how much prestige this was for the Japanese, and how this indirectly 
could affect Norwegian exports. Norway had been present at the World Exposition in 
Brussels, and did not experience the same negative effects as the Swedes and the 
Danes did after Expo ’58. 
The NMFA had a meeting with representatives from Denmark and Finland on 
Expo 70 in late June 1967. It is striking that no Swedes were present at the meeting, 
but the reason for this cannot be found in the documents. Everyone present was 
negative to participation due to the costs. The impression was that Sweden also was 
more reluctant than before.155 The Swedish reluctance was confirmed by Mowinckel-
Larsen a week after the meeting, but had given indication that they were planning on 
making a definite decision in the near future.156 This was clearly not quite true. 
Sweden had planned a meeting with SAS, because SAS urged them to join their 
restaurant project, but the other Scandinavians were ignorant of this. Perhaps the 
Swedes kept away from the meeting, just to avoid telling the others of their plans with 
SAS, before they were secured. 
Whether Mowinckel-Larsen was aware of the Swedes negotiating with SAS is 
uncertain. Why would he otherwise have said they were negative? Had he received all 
information from the Swedes, or did he interpret the answers he got according to his 
own preferences? Or did he have full information, but trying to influence the Finns 
and the Danes in any particular way? These questions are not easy to answer, but it 
would be strange if the Swedes had given him totally misleading indications. 
Mowinckel-Larsen was constantly skeptical of the Swedes and afraid they would run 
the show. It is possible to argue that it was his age – he was retiring during the 
summer of 1968 – and possibly his memory was not the best. He was born in the 
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period when Norway was a province of Sweden, and this might of course influence on 
his skepticism against the Swedes.  
 The misunderstanding and possible misinterpretation of the Swedish position 
is not necessarily only Mowinckel-Larsen’s fault. Perhaps they were indirect in their 
answers on whether or not they were planning to participate, but it would have been 
surprising if they gave clear indications to Mowinckel-Larsen that they were more 
negative than earlier and at the same time were negotiating with SAS. Perhaps the 
negotiations between SAS and Sweden had not yet started, but some kind of contact 
must at least have been established. I have not found any evidence on when SAS and 
the Swedes first started talking, other than Sweden informing all interested parties on 
July 7 that Nordic cooperation was failing.157 At the same time, they informed of their 
negotiation with SAS and SAS Catering.  
To sum up, two days before the information of the cooperation between 
Sweden and SAS, the status according to NMFA was that Finland decided not to 
participate, and they had notified Japan of their decision.158 Denmark was negative, 
but was open for participation if the other Nordic countries decided to participate. The 
most important part for Denmark was that they did not want Japan to know this before 
the aviation negotiations continued in September. Sweden was determined not to 
participate, but could change their minds if Denmark and Norway decided to go. The 
Swedish condition was that it would be a joint Nordic performance. Norway had not 
made up its mind either, and was in a situation where they could be decisive for 
Nordic participation over all. Norway wanted to wait for a clarification from the 
shipping sector, and how they would react if Norway abstained. The conclusion was 
that in case of a negative decision, it was of great importance to keep this information 
away from the Japanese until at least after the next negotiation rounds regarding 
aviation rights in September.159 It was thus a very negative climate for participation 
only three years ahead of the opening of Expo 70. But the Norwegian view of the 
situation was somewhat incomplete. It most have been based on the information 
Mowinckel-Larsen gave the NMFA in late June 1967, stating that the Swedes were 
negative to participation. Instead, the Swedes had gone further on their own with their 
attempt of establishing some kind of representation at Expo ’70.  	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The Norwegians in general did not want participation. Still, arguments were 
raised in favor if Sweden and Denmark would participate. The same way of 
argumentation is used in Sweden and Denmark. It seems that no one really wanted to 
make the final decision. Why is that? Was it a game of chicken – where they just 
waited for someone else to loose their nerve? This would lead to one of the countries 
eventually making a decision that would influence the others to participate or abstain. 
If one of them would make the decision, they could also be blamed for it afterwards 
and thus be one taking the burden of responsibility. On the other hand, and probably 
more accurate, it could be a game of “Passing the Buck”. In that case, no one wanted 
to take the responsibility. Instead, they hoped that one of the other would take charge 
and make a decision that would affect the decision of the other Scandinavian 
countries. In this case, they could wait it out and blame the lack of vigor on the others 
if nothing happened. This is exactly what happened. 
In early July, the SMFA stated that the attempts to establish a Nordic 
exhibition in Osaka were definitely without results.160 The only option for Sweden to 
be represented was to start cooperating with SAS Catering, they argued. The reason 
for participation was the friendship with Japan, which they did not want to 
jeopardize.161 When the SMFA argued like this, it looks as if Sweden all along had 
pushed for participation, which is not entirely true. Towards the Norwegians, they had 
given the impression of being quite negative all the way. But this was perhaps just a 
part of the negotiation game. I have found no evidence of why the Swedes acted in 
this way.  
One of the most eager advocates of Norwegian participation at Expo ’70 was 
the Ambassador to Japan, Knut Thommessen. But that was in the beginning of 1968. 
Some months later, he had changed his position radically. When the Norwegian 
Osaka Committee met him in mid December 1968, Thommessen was asked to inform 
the members of the committee on how it was to work in Japan and what he as 
Norway’s representative in Japan would consider to be the outcome of the 
participation at Expo ’70.162 Thommessen stressed the importance of personal contact 
with the Japanese. He recommended strengthening the Embassy with more personnel, 
but it had to be Japanese-speaking secretaries. In his opinion, engaging a Norwegian 	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trade secretary who solely would work with Expo ’70 was of no interest. He agreed 
that the Deputy Secretary should be Norwegian, but that he only should work in Japan 
before and during the exposition. Any follow-up work would not be necessary.  
According to Thommessen, some work could be done with regard to tourism – 
Japan were the host of the Winter Olympics in 1972. Except for this, little could be 
done to increase exports to Japan. They could work to continue the exports already in 
place, but there were no basis to extend this. He suggested Norway had to take one 
step at a time. First of all, they could engage a deputy secretary, but he reserved 
against hiring this person afterwards. As a second step, he would apply for more 
resources for more information work.  
Per Borgen commented to this in the margin of the memo that “Thommessen’s 
statements highly astonished those present.”163 It is striking that Thommessen was 
negative both to the suggested trade secretary, but also to the possible gain from Expo 
’70. He had argued in favor of Norwegian representation at the exposition all the way, 
and had never said anything of his expectation that nothing good would come out of it 
– and that the best they could hope for was a status quo regarding exports.  
Even though Thommessen felt he was misunderstood, and corrected the 
statements in a letter in mid-January 1969, the impression is still the same. He wrote 
that Norwegian participation was based on political grounds and that the Government 
decided to participate, even though the exporters recommended against this.164  
Norwegian participation was in most part due to the large shipping interests and 
freight on Japan.165 Regarding exports, the large number in 1967 (161 million NOK) 
would not be the same in 1968, because the total amount of 35 million NOK from 
whale meet would disappear. Thus, Thommessen suggested that Norwegian exporters 
had to be happy if exports could be held at a level around 150 millions annually. To 
increase Norwegian exports to Japan was difficult, he argued. The main purpose of 
participate at Expo 70 would be to consolidate the position Norway already had, both 
for ship owners and for exporters. 25 percent of the Norwegian merchant fleet worked 
in Japan, but the future grand plans of Japan to increase their own fleet was the 
Norwegian position uncertain. Norwegian ship owners had to work hard to maintain 
their position. To hold up the export would thus be big enough task, Thommessen 	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argued. The most important was thus, as the Embassy saw the situation, to extend the 
Embassy’s trade representation, first and foremost on the Japanese side by hiring 
more Japanese people. He agreed that the Deputy Commissioner General should be 
Norwegian, but how the Embassy could use this person afterwards was uncertain. It 
would depend on the qualifications of the person.  
In less than a year, Thommessens argumentation towards the Norwegian Expo 
’70 Committee had changed drastically. Still, two months later, when he was 
interviewed by Morgenbladet in February 1969, he shook his head over the low 
interest by Norwegian exporters to Japan. He found it strange that both The FNI and 
the Export Association dissuaded Norwegian participation, because they felt it was 
waste of money.166 He said to the reporter: 
 
I was particularly struck by the low interest from the exporters when our 
participation was accepted by Stortinget. Our annually export to Japan is 150 
million kroner; one could thus believe that our exporters would show more 
enthusiasm. The exports by the way decreased al little in 1968 due to a stop in 
whale meet, but we hope the numbers will go up again in 1969.”167  
 
This is far from what he said at the meeting with the Norwegian Osaka Committee, 
both according to the minute of the meeting, and to his letter afterwards. Why he was 
so inconsistent is difficult to say. He might in fact be astonished over the low 
response from the Norwegian exporters because the possibilities were in fact large, or 
he wanted to put responsibility on them in public, to blame someone for the modest 
presentation Norway had on Expo 70 (or for any other reason). He was however very 
inconsistent in what he said publicly and how he argued internally, and also very 
conflicting in his own argumentation over time. 
3.3	  Pressure	  from	  Outside	  
3.3.1	  SAS	  
SAS was negotiating with Japanese authorities on aviation rights in Japan during the 
same period. The first evidence on this being of importance for the Osaka 
negotiations and vice versa is from July 3, 1967. The working group for the rights was 	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informed in late June that the Nordic countries had decided not to participate in Expo 
’70. The Permanent Undersecretary Bernstrøm stressed the importance that the 
Japanese should be held ignorant of this information until the next part of the aviation 
negotiations were completed in September 1967. The reason was that it seemed as 
Japan considered participation at the Expo exceedingly important. If they knew that 
the Scandinavian countries would abstain, it would “rest heavily over the aviation 
negotiations in the Scandinavian country’s disfavor”.168 He then asked for a 
“foolproof” solution in order to prevent the Japanese from hearing about the negative 
decision at that point. 
Much because of these negotiations, SAS had given clear indications in early 
summer 1967 of the importance of Scandinavian participation.169 If this was not 
possible, they were interested in running a restaurant at Expo ’70 by themselves. It 
was unfortunate to be at the area for private companies, and they would rather be 
present at the area for state pavilions. Because of the interest among Swedish 
exporters to Japan, who were reacting stronger to the negativity in Sweden than the 
Norwegian and Danish exporters did, the Swedish Government was more willing to 
be welcoming to participation than Denmark and Norway. Thus, SAS Catering had a 
meeting with Kjell Öberg in July 1967, together with Swedish Industry and Exporters, 
Swedish Foreign Minister, and SIAB.170  
The result was five alternative possible solutions. Either Sweden participated 
alone together with SAS Catering, Sweden and one of the other Nordic countries 
cooperated with SAS Catering and for each country that joined in, the area would 
increase, or they kept the initial 1200 m2 regardless of how many of the other 
countries that participated. Either way, the pavilion had to be official, so that there 
would be no rent. If SAS Catering wanted to be at Expo ’70 without state cooperation, 
they had to place the pavilion at another part of the exposition site, and they would 
have to pay rent. This would be a far less favorable location, and much more 
expensive.171 
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In Montreal, SAS Catering had run the restaurant at the Scandinavian 
Pavilion. They had cooperated with the Swedish construction company SIAB, and 
when SAS wanted representation at Expo ’70 as well, it was natural to ask SIAB to 
draw and construct the restaurant. Thus, when they started negotiation with the 
Swedes on whether they could cooperate also in Osaka, they already had plans on 
how the architecture of the restaurant would be. It was modified because they needed 
area for the exposition part of the pavilion, and also changed when the designers of 
the pavilion theme had given their opinion. To get started as soon as possible with the 
construction at the exposition site, they did not start from scratch to find a new 
constructor and a new architect. They neither change more than necessary, even 
though critique of the exterior was raised in the Scandinavian Pavilion Committee.  
The NMFA thought the process of participation was failing on July 5, 1967. 
This was completely untrue. Instead, the process speeded up. In mid July, the SMFA 
gave the Embassy the authority to apply for an option on space at the exposition 
area.172 This was basically the same as giving a positive answer to the Expo 70 
Committee of Swedish participation. Probably, Sweden had prepared for this over a 
longer period than they had given indication of to the Norwegians (probably the 
Danes and Finns as well, but I have no evidence for this). 
During the summer, Sweden had drastically changed their position, at least in 
saying. During a two-week period, they went from being negative to participation, to 
being so positive that they even gave Japan positive indications. The other Nordic 
countries were curtly informed that the time for talk was up and the attitude was 
harsh: they informed the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Shipping of their new 
decision, stating that they wanted Nordic cooperation, but would do it on their own if 
necessary. 173 The cooperation with SAS on a restaurant was a solution they could not 
be sure that the organizers would accept, but when they got the needed approval, it 
was seen as win-win situation.174 Sweden would gain goodwill in Japan, without 
spending too much money because SAS would contribute. At the same time, they put 
pressure on Denmark and Norway. If one of the Nordic countries would be present, 	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the others would loose even more goodwill than if none of them were represented. It 
looks like a calculated risk from the Swedish side. They knew that Denmark and 
Norway had to join, and they would, because they had taken the initiative, have the 
upper hand in the joint venture. This would give them a better position when the 
anticipated Nordic cooperation began. Suddenly, Norway had lost what seemed like a 
balancing position, which could have put them in the leading role in a possible joint 
Nordic project. Sweden had taken charge of the situation instead, and won the game 
of passing the buck.  
In response to this, Mowinckel-Larsen informed the NMFA of his view on the 
situation. He would not give any definite statement as to whether Norway should 
participate, before the agreement between SAS Catering and Sweden was in place. 
Still, Mowinckel-Larsen warned once again against cooperation with the Swedes. 
From what he had seen of the Swedes, he thought it wise to “show great caution when 
it comes to a Norwegian exhibition participation”.175  
3.3.2	  The	  Nordic	  Council	  
On February 20 1968, the Nordic Council recommended that the Governments of the 
Nordic countries secure Nordic cooperation at the Expo 70.176 The minute of meeting 
shows that Iceland was positive, but that Finland had not yet decided whether to 
participate. It was very important for the Nordic Council that all the Nordic countries 
acted jointly. They pointed out the positive experience that the Montreal cooperation 
had given them. The pavilion in Montreal had been visited by seven million, and the 
Nordic Council suggested that the commercial and informational outcome was greater 
than if they had presented themselves as five different countries. Also the lower costs 
of cooperation were stressed, but the most important issue was that the Nordic region 
manifested its interdependence to the rest of the world. The Nordic Council had 
earlier stressed the greater impact the region had together on the information area 
compared to what each of the countries could do on its own. Also, the rest of the 
world had historically looked at the Nordic region as one unit, and that this notion 
was still strong, especially in places far from the Nordic region. A Nordic pavilion 
would easily coincide with the notion of the region in Asia, they argued. Thus, it was 
important that they took care to nurse interest for the region in the Eastern hemisphere 
by cooperating on the Expo 70 pavilion. Still, that the Nordic Council encouraged the 	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Nordic Governments to work together is hardly new. If something were somewhat 
near a possible joint project, the Nordic Council would recommend it being a reality. 
For them, it was crucial to keep the image of the joint Nordic region strong.177	  
3.3.3	  Japan	  
Because of the reluctance of the Nordic governments to participate, the Japanese 
government sent their Special Representative for Expo ’70 together with a man with 
the somewhat peculiar title “the Expo 70’s Chief of Propaganda” to Scandinavia in 
May 1967. They wanted to meet with key decision-makers regarding Expo 70, 
including the Minister of Commerce.178 A dinner was planned for the delegation in 
Oslo. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry was afraid at this point that Norwegian 
participation could not be avoided, even though no one really wanted to.179 Therefore, 
to prepare the delegation for the official dinner, he wrote that “Under these 
circumstances, there should probably not be held any real speech during the dinner – 
there would be very little positive to say.”180 
In August 1967, the Danish Ambassador to Japan, Zytphen-Adeler, had a 
meeting with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Takeo Miki.181 The Ambassador 
expressed his hope for a positive outcome of the forthcoming aviation negotiations in 
Stockholm in September. The Foreign Minister could not give any direct response to 
this, but answered instead by mention the negative Danish attitude regarding Expo 70, 
which had made him disappointed. Denmark was present in Montreal, and Miki 
claimed that for Denmark, the Japanese market was at least as important as the 
Canadian. He hoped that Denmark would reconsider in the question, and after all 
participate at the exposition. He intended to invite the Nordic Ambassadors to the 
Foreign Ministry to discuss the matter more. For the Ambassador, it was obvious that 
the Japanese Government, Japanese authorities, and the Japanese public found it 
important that as many countries as possible would participate at the Expo. He 
warned that the negative side effects and the loss of goodwill in Japan would be great 
if Denmark did not partake.182  	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 The link between the aviation rights and the Expo was at this point explicit. 
The Danish Ambassador forcefully pointed out the fear when stating that  
 
the question would not be without influence on the outcome of the 
forthcoming aviation negotiations in Stockholm and that the Japanese attitude 
during this could be far more positive than expected at this moment, if one 
could announce the Japanese that the question of the three Scandinavian 
countries’ participation at EXPO 70 was taken into renewed consideration.183  
 
Obviously, the plan of keeping the negative attitude towards participation a secret had 
failed, and this could have consequences that influenced the negotiations on landing 
rights. This is a good example of situations where participation at World Expositions 
has larger consequences than the goodwill effects achieved after the end of the World 
Exposition. The negotiations in front may be of importance for other questions 
regarding the host country and potential participating countries – in this case landing 
rights for SAS in Japan. Thus, World Exposition may have a wider importance for 
countries’ foreign policy than merely gain or loss of goodwill. Still, the importance of 
world expositions should not be exaggerated. For the Scandinavian countries in the 
1960’s, it cannot be seen as crucial to their foreign policy. Instead, as in this case, it 
should merely be seen as a tool to gain other goals than as a goal in itself.  
In late August 1967, the NMFA arranged a meeting with Norwegian interested 
parties.184 The situation was not the one Norway wanted, because the negative 
information had leaked to the Japanese. They, in turn, had put more pressure on the 
Scandinavians to try to convince them of changing to a more positive attitude towards 
participation. In a note to the NMFA, the Japanese Ambassador to Norway pointed 
out the great economical interests Norway had in Japan. The NSA was still interested 
in Norwegian participation, and was positive to cooperation with the Swedes, as 
proposed in early August, but rather not represented by a restaurant run by SAS. The 
FNI had not changed their view either; they were still negative to participation due to 
the small interests in Japan of Norwegian manufacturing industries. The Ministry of 	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Trade had not yet decided. They were positive to participation, but feared the costs. 
Mowinckel-Larsen at the Norwegian Trade Fairs saw it as possible to present a small 
exhibition linked to the restaurant, but warned that no single Scandinavian country 
should be able to have a dominant position. Once again he warned about the Swedes, 
even though it is not stated explicitly here – he might have been worried about the 
Danes, but this is less likely. The NMFA wanted to meet informally with the other 
Foreign Ministries and discuss the matter. Mowinckel-Larsen liked the idea; 
especially since they had to decide which area at the exhibition ground they wanted. 
He suggested that a Norwegian should go to Japan to look into this, something which 
Per Borgen thought should be discussed with the others first. Here it obviously was of 
high importance for Mowinckel-Larsen to take control over the situation. He always 
was worried that the Norwegian interests might suffer from the Swedes’ domination. 
And he was right. Borgen noted that Norway had more interests in Japan than Sweden 
and Denmark, something that Principal Officer at the NMFA backed up. He thought 
Norway had the largest economic interests in Japan, and therefore should take the 
lead, and let the Swedes and the Danes comply with them. If this was the NMFA’s 
position, I think they were a little late. The Swedes were already in the forefront of 
the possible participation. It is strange that the NMFA did not see this before, and thus 
made an effort earlier. Now, they had to follow the Swedish line. Director General 
Stokke at the Ministry of Trade was not so sure about Norway having the greatest 
interests in Japan. He noted that Sweden and Denmark had large industrial interests, 
and this seems true. Norwegian shipowners had of course large interests in Japan, but 
had not made any effort to affect the Norwegian Government in any convincing way. 
It was after all Swedish industry in Japan that had, together with SAS, managed to 
make Sweden turn in a positive direction because of the potential loss of goodwill and 
exports.  
The Japanese Foreign Minister, Miki, summoned representatives from 
Sweden, Finland and Norway to a meeting at the Japanese Foreign Ministry in late 
August 1967 so that they could communicate his personal wish that the Nordic 
countries could find possibilities of joining the Expo ’70.185 He had already spoken to 
the Danish Ambassador. Finland had notified the Japanese government of their 
negative response, but Miki wanted the Ambassador to push for reconsideration. The 	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Swedish Ambassador informed that Sweden would participate, and informed of the 
measures taken to prepare for this. The Norwegian Ambassador could not give any 
definite answer as to whether Norway would participate or not, but informed that they 
would consider it together with Denmark and Sweden.  
No other country than the Nordic ones was invited to a meeting like this. Miki 
said that it was of special interest for Japan that the Scandinavian countries were 
present at Expo ’70. He looked upon them as the gateway to Europe. The aviation 
agreement had made Japan and Scandinavia neighbors. The Japanese people 
considered Scandinavia as good friends, because of the idealism and way of living of 
the Scandinavians. It would cause great disappointment in Japan if the Scandinavian 
countries abstained from the exhibition. Here again, the arguments of the feeling of 
the Japanese people were used to convince the Scandinavians of the importance of 
their participation.  
Soon after, on August 30, the Japanese Minister of International Trade and 
Industry, Kanno, announced by telephone that he would come to Norway in mid-
September 1967 to ask the Minister of Trade, Kåre Willoch, to make a quick and 
positive decision regarding Norwegian participation at Expo 70.186 This sounded 
strange to the Norwegians; especially as Foreign Minister Miki did not mention this at 
the meeting with the Ambassadors August 24, nor had anyone else.  
Kåre Willoch produced a memo for a Cabinet Meeting in the beginning of 
September 1967, where he noted that the Japanese, in several ways, saw it as 
important that the Scandinavian countries would participate. The Norwegian Export 
and FNI did not recommend Norway to spend money on this, but SAS and the 
Shipowners were positive, because of the potential loss of goodwill, which an 
abstention could lead to. Sweden had taken the initiative for Scandinavian 
cooperation on a small scale, where SAS would take on a great deal of the costs. At 
the Cabinet Meeting, Willoch wanted a preliminary decision to be made. A separate 
Norwegian pavilion would be very expensive, and could not be recommended. At the 
same time, it would not be advisable either to stay away if Sweden and Denmark 
participated, and a joint pavilion would not be alarmingly expensive. He also noted 
that “it would be very hard to refuse participation if Sweden decides to participate, 
too, (which we probably have to count on), even if the other Nordic countries 	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abstain”.187 Here, Willoch is clearly alarmed by the possibility of Sweden 
participating alone. He considered the goodwill-loss greater if Sweden participated 
and Norway abstained, than if both decided not to be present.  
As earlier noted, it seems like it was a calculated risk for Sweden to be so sure 
of cooperation. Sweden knew the others had to join if they gave impression that they 
would do it anyhow. The loss of goodwill for a country that abstained was higher if 
another comparable country would participate. Willoch’s conclusion was that Norway 
should continue negotiating with the other Nordic countries and Norwegian 
commercial interests, and that they should participate at the lowest possible cost. If 
the decision to participate were to be taken, it would be important to make it sooner 
than later. If negative, it could wait. Both options were based on how to make the 
goodwill loss the smallest possible.188 
The Scandinavians were initially hopeful that the SAS aviation rights would 
have been conducted before any Expo decision had been made. That proved to be a 
false hope as negotiations were postponed until early 1968. Thus SAS became a pawn 
rather than a trump in the game.189 Sweden had reserved an area at the Expo ground, 
which they obtained on a temporary basis and they only had the rights of the spot to 
the end of the year. When the aviation negotiations were postponed, they had to 
prolong. The two questions were interrelated, and manipulated by both sides.  
The Norwegians were more reluctant to state that without a positive solution 
of the aviation rights negotiations, they would definitely abstain from Expo ’70. 
Instead, they wanted Sweden to take the initiative and summon a meeting when a 
preliminary budget was in place, which depended on SAS Catering. Thus, everyone 
agreed on waiting for a concrete offer from SAS Catering, which would be followed 
by a Swedish initiative for a Nordic meeting where further steps would be taken 
regarding practical questions in the matter.190 They would inform that the 
Scandinavian countries worked on a positive solution that would make them able to 
participate, but that the Japanese stance in the aviation rights negotiations made it 
difficult, though they would not place an ultimatum of not participating if the 
negotiations failed. They did not mean to communicate this directly to the Japanese, 	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but at the same time, they would not give the Japanese any ultimatum or answer with 
this if asked.  
The Danish business sector was not interested in Danish participation, and 
therefore the Government was reluctant at best. In addition, the Danes claimed that 
their experiences at the Montreal Expo were of a negative kind, and for that reason as 
well they were disinclined to participate.191 I have found no indications in the 
Norwegian or Swedish archives of such dissatisfaction on the part of any of the 
Scandinavians, and the Danes did not elaborate on the issue. Thus we do not know 
what caused the Danes to consider the Montreal experience a negative one. Perhaps it 
was the old argument of little outcome of the large expenses and thus not worth it, or 
it could have been dissatisfaction with the cooperation. Anyhow, they were reluctant 
to participate at a point where Sweden had made it almost impossible for them not to 
join.  
The aviation rights negotiations were adjourned on September 14 without any 
other agreement than to continue in January 1968.192 According to one of the 
Japanese delegates to the meeting in Stockholm, the negotiations had been very 
difficult and acrimonious.193 Apparently, the Japanese delegates had been shocked by 
the Swedish Foreign Minister’s angry outburst directed at the Japanese Ambassador at 
the meeting, which in turn had led to resentment not only at the Japanese Embassy in 
Stockholm, but also home in Japan.194 The Stockholm meeting in September made for 
somewhat strained relations, but matters improved when the Japanese Minister of 
Transportation visited Denmark later in September 1967. The Counselor for 
International Affairs at the Ministry of Transportation, Mr. Yoichi Hayashi, met the 
Norwegian Ambassador Thommessen in Tokyo after the Minister’s return to Japan. 
Hayashi told Thommessen that the Minister felt that the Danish way of presenting the 
question was far more appropriate than the Swedish one. Thommessen answered him 
that he was sorry that the negative outcome of the meeting might result in 
Scandinavia abstaining from Expo ’70, because it was SAS that would make it 
possible for them to be represented. They would not contribute if the negotiations 
failed. Mr. Hayashi replied that they did not pair aviation rights with other questions, 
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and that traffic rights were strictly a question of aviation, nothing else.195 This was 
clearly not the case, but for some parties it seems like it was important not to talk 
about the connection openly - as is evident when the Norwegian newspaper Verdens 
Gang interviewed SAS on the connection in September 1968.196 According to 
Thommessen, the Swedish Minister felt that SAS and Sweden were badly treated by 
the Japanese, and thus the outburst at the meeting in Stockholm. But also the 
Norwegians felt they were badly treated by the Japanese, and he told Hayashi that a 
negative outcome would affect the relationship also between Japan and Norway. He 
also stressed that Japan was the 7th most important trading partner for Norway, which 
required increased transport capacity between the two countries.197 Thommessen 
obviously made no attempt to separate the two questions, as both SAS did afterwards 
and Hayashi tried to do when talking to Thommessen. 
Hayashi then said that the Japanese Ministry of Transportation was positive to 
the increase to three SAS flights a week, but that JAL objected. Hayashi said the 
Ministry put as much pressure at JAL as they possibly could, but they had to keep in 
mind that the president of JAL could walk in and out at Prime Minister Sato’s office 
as he wished, and thus the Trade Ministry had to be very cautious in bringing critique 
to the Prime Minister.198  
The problem was that SAS wanted permission to land in Japan three times a 
week, not two. The number of people traveling on the North Pole Route increased, 
and more flight were necessary, the Scandinavians argued. There would even be 
possible for Japan Airlines to land three times in Scandinavia each week, if they 
wished so. According to SAS, another flight a week would give approximately 30 
million SEK more each year. The costs of participation at the Expo would be around 
10 million SEK.199 The Danes used the argument that if Japan were more positive to 
this, the Scandinavian business sector would see it as more interesting to participate in 
Expo ’70, and thus it would be possible to produce the collect funding needed.200 
The Swedish Trade Minister, Gunnar Lange, told his Japanese counterpart, 
Mr. Konno, that Sweden was positive to participation, but that the short time between 	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the two Expositions in Montreal and Osaka made it difficult to find the money. SAS 
was initially interested in contributing to the Swedish pavilion, Lange said, but the 
negative results of the Aviation Rights negotiations constituted a serious hurdle. The 
Japanese Minister said he would inform the Minister of Transportation of this view.201  
Also the Norwegian Prime Minister, Per Borten, met with Minister Konno in 
September 1967. He, as Lange, also favored a Norwegian participation in Osaka, but 
feared the financial costs. This would be easier if SAS would contribute, he argued, 
something they would consider if the aviation rights were granted. Konno replied in 
the same way as he had done with the Swedish Minister and would pass the question 
on to the Government when he returned to Japan.202 These episodes show that the 
aviation rights were used as an important argument when negotiating the participation 
in Expo 70. Or the other way around – Expo 70 was used to achieve goals that were 
important for the Scandinavian countries. In this way, World Expositions were a part 
of the foreign policies that is not possible to see when visiting an exposition or 
pavilion. It is probably not only the Scandinavian countries that tried to accomplish 
own agendas in the process before accepting participation at exhibitions. In this way, 
World Expositions becomes a part of the game played at the international arena in 
more ways than is seen at the surface.  
Were the Scandinavian Governments prepared at this time to finance 
participation if the aviation negotiations favored SAS? The sources do not give 
explicit evidence about this. It looks like they felt they had to participate in one way 
or another, and that they are pressured into this, but that they wanted to gain 
something from it. Exactly how important aviation rights were for the Scandinavians 
is not possible to read from the documents. On the one hand, SAS clearly wanted 
additional landing rights, and the Governments clearly used Expo ’70 to achieve that. 
On the other hand, the Scandinavian governments initially were not keen to 
participate. They were brought to change their minds by Japanese pressure by means 
of the landing rights issue above all, and by SAS pressure. If this is true, they used the 
aviation negotiations to have some gain, in a situation that was locked already. Both 
sides tried to bring other issues to bear on Expo ’70 participation. A Swedish 
magazine wrote in October 1967 that it would be easier for SAS to succeed in their 
negotiations if the Scandinavian countries said yes to participation at Expo 70. This 	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information apparently came from a Japanese source.203 The same article quotes Kjell 
Öberg who suggested that there were no positive arguments in favor of 
participation.204  
For a host country like Japan in 1970, there must have been several 
negotiations like this. It was possible loss of prestige if large countries abstained, and 
also if several small countries choose not to participate. Japan managed to get 70 
countries to be represented at the Expo, which is high. If half of them negotiated like 
the Scandinavians did, it must have been at a high cost in different areas in trade and 
foreign policy. Still, they clearly considered the goodwill gain from arranging a 
World Exposition as higher than the overall costs. It is thus important not only to look 
at the documented costs of everything from making the site ready for construction 
work and setting up all the pavilions to the salaries for staff, but it is also important to 
take into consideration the costs that are hidden in pre-Expo international 
negotiations. 
The Nordic Council (NC) sent a recommendation to all the Nordic 
governments in October 1967.205 The Council had long wanted more joint Nordic 
representation abroad, and was pleased with the efforts made at the World Expo in 
Montreal in 1967. They wished the next one would go even further, by having a joint 
exhibition at the pavilion, and not divide the pavilion into five different parts – one 
for each country. They also suggested that the Nordic countries would have one joint 
Commissioner General to coordinate the work, instead of having five who had to 
agree in everything before any decisions could be made. A handwritten remark on the 
left margin of the letter shows that the Norwegians marked it as important.206 The 
pavilion was in fact organized with one joint Commissioner General and as one 
exhibition, not divided into separate ones for each country. It was therefore NC who 
suggested the result, even if the Swedes presented it later. Maybe it thus was more 
difficult to reject the offer of participation, when NC was in favor and also had 
suggested how to manage it. 
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  In October 1967, SAS decided to participate if certain conditions were 
fulfilled:207 All the three Scandinavian countries had to join; if the budget were 
exceeded the extra costs had to be divided on all of the participants; and that 
negotiations between SAS Catering and the Nordic nations could not be started before 
the end of the negotiations on aviation rights in mid-November. Regardless of the 
outcome of the JAL-SAS negotiations, SAS saw the positive aspects of showing the 
flag in Japan. It would be of less interest if they could not have more frequent flights, 
and it would be difficult to justify spending the requested amount of money if they did 
not get the landing rights. The new requirements from SAS thus put Sweden in a 
situation where they had to pressure the others to join. It was important for Sweden to 
be represented at Expo 70, not only because of SAS (they held more shares in SAS 
than the others), but also for other exporters of Swedish goods to Japan. Followed by 
this, when SAS directly joined the two issues, it was even more important to have a 
positive outcome in the aviation negotiations. It is also possible that the process of 
negotiation and talking to different actors present in Japan – both at the Embassies 
and in private firms – had made the Scandinavians at home more aware of the 
importance of being present at Expo ’70. By talking to people with more knowledge 
and negotiating internally, it is possible that more understanding of the situation came 
forth. Especially the experience Denmark and Sweden had after their no-show at 
Brussels in 1958 could have played a part. Probably, not everyone knew about the 
negative effects this had on exports to Belgium and the loss of goodwill this resulted 
in, and it was probable that this could have the same influence in Japan. Japan was 
seen as something unknown and special, but they could not be certain that the 
Japanese would treat the countries, which did not come to Expo 70 better than 
Belgium did. In fact, it is more likely that they regarded the goodwill loss in Japan 
harder to win back than the loss they had in Belgium. Still, the Brussels experience 
had made them realize that not being present at World Expositions actually could 
have the consequences some of the actors warned against.  
One of the actors who warned against this was the Norwegian Ambassador 
Thommessen, who welcomed the new possibility for Norway to participate at Expo 
70. Earlier he had tried to persuade the Foreign Ministry to accept the fact that it was 
important to participate. The only objection he had was of practical character: that the 	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area at the pavilion for an exhibition was small when the SAS Catering restaurant 
took the better part of the space. He also warned that one of the countries might find 
more resources at a later stage and through this overshadow the others.208  
In January 1968, SAS, SAS Catering and the Scandinavian countries met in 
Copenhagen to negotiate participation at Expo 70.209 At first, the offer from SAS/SAS 
Catering was too small for Denmark, Norway and Sweden. At this stage, Sweden and 
Norway considered participation to be too expensive and they considered the 
possibility of cancelling both the negotiations and the Expo participation, even though 
they had been positive at the beginning of the meeting. Denmark was eager to 
continue the negotiations with SAS/SAS Catering and did not want to give up the 
possibility of participation at the Expo. It is remarkable that Sweden was willing to 
give up and that it was Denmark that pushed forward at this stage. After all, it was 
Sweden that had the option for the pavilion area and had managed to get Denmark 
and Norway in a positive direction. It might also be a part of the negotiation to put 
pressure on SAS to contribute more than they initially wanted to. Both Sweden and 
SAS were far into in the process at this stage, and it would not have been easy for 
either of them to suddenly drop out. During the negotiations it seems like SAS also 
was more reluctant at this stage than they were 6 months earlier. Thus, it is plausible 
to think that it was merely negotiation tactics to be that negative to participation 
during the meeting.  
The negotiations with JAL had not been successful and the possibilities of 
increasing frequencies were small. Therefore, it was less interesting to spend 
resources in Japan – because of the restrictive aviation policies – than in Northern 
America where there were better possibilities of increasing the number of flights, SAS 
argued. Thus, they were more reluctant to spend the same amount of money on Japan 
as they had spent in Montreal.210 Department Chief Müller from the Danish Ministry 
of Trade was surprised by this, because he had the impression that is was important 
for SAS that Scandinavia participated at Expo 70 because of the aviation rights 
negotiations. Also Kjell Öberg noted that it was mostly because of SAS that they 
considered participation at Expo 70, and if it was of lesser interest for SAS to be there 
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than first expressed, a reevaluation of participation had to be done.211 SAS did not 
respond directly to this. In separate meeting session, which SAS and SAS Catering 
did not attend, the representative from Denmark’s Foreign Minister, Müller, 
suggested that it was not of crucial significance that SAS/SAS Catering was in. 
Mowinckel-Larsen at the Norwegian Trade Fairs agreed with this. They were actually 
willing to pay for a pavilion without SAS contributing. Öberg agreed. Groot (Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) suggested that without a restaurant, it would lead to a 
less impressive pavilion. Öberg replied that it would be less expensive when they did 
not have to contribute to the SAS Catering restaurant. The most important argument 
was that they would be there to show their flags, and in that way they would avoid the 
possible goodwill-loss in Japan. This was new. All the Scandinavians were at this 
point positive to participation even is SAS/SAS Catering did not contribute. The 
possibility of loosing goodwill was suddenly higher on the agenda than before. I have 
not found any evidence for the reasons for the sudden change in attitude. This seems 
very odd. It might be because they acquired more knowledge as time went by, and it 
might be a result of other negotiations that are not present in the archives I have read. 
It might also be a part of the negotiation with SAS and SAS Catering – they were not 
dependent on them to realize the project. Thus, SAS could not dictate the conditions 
and the Scandinavian Governments would have a better hand when playing the game.  
At the end of the meeting, an agreement was made where SAS/SAS Catering 
took greater risks and contributed somewhat more than they initially had suggested. 
The representatives from Denmark, Norway and Sweden concluded by 
recommending their governments to accept the conditions and cooperate with 
SAS/SAS Catering on a pavilion at Expo 70. It seems that the negotiators from the 
Scandinavian Governments had succeeded in pushing SAS into taking responsibility 
they did not want to take in the first place.  
The whole process to get the Nordic governments to participate is pushed 
forward by pressure from outside. First, none of them wanted to make the effort. Then 
SAS and other Swedish exporters pressured Sweden into negotiations. This, in turn, 
made Denmark and Norway more positive – they could not refuse if Sweden 
participated. It was Kjell Öberg’s impression that if Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
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participated, then Finland would join in as well.212 After all, the Nordic Council had 
recommended a joint Nordic pavilion at Expo ’70. If Finland joined, Iceland had to 
participate too – even though it would have to be symbolic.213 It is obvious that 
pressure from outside has been a major source of participation at expositions. No one 
actually wanted to participate, but at the same time they have to if the economical 
interest are strong enough, and that in turn leads to a domino effect by forcing other 
countries to join as well. For Finland, World Expositions was a good opportunity to 
be associated with their western neighbors. Participation of this kind could not offend 
the Soviet Union, which they had a friendship agreement with. At the same time, 
Finland would not want to be associated with Eastern Block countries as a Soviet 
satellite state, and by presenting themselves as a part of Scandinavia, it was possible 
to contribute to avoidance of this. Iceland did not have the same problem of balancing 
in the Cold War. For them, it was merely an issue of economy. They had no major 
exporters to Japan, and no real interest in representation at Expo 70. For them, the 
pressure came from being part of the Nordic region, and from the Nordic Council.  
Finland opened up for participation if the conditions were acceptable. First, 
they had decided not to participate, but then Japan laid pressure on the Scandinavian 
countries, much because of SAS, and they decided to participate after all, Finland 
found a possibility to join. Because SAS had been the main reason for the others to 
participate, Finland used this as a reason to contribute to less – after all, they did not 
have any interest in SAS increasing goodwill in Japan.214 Why they wanted to 
contribute, even at a lower cost than the Scandinavian countries, is not clear according 
to this document. Officially, it had to do with recommendation from Nordic 
Council.215 This can of course be the whole truth, and it shows the ability the Nordic 
Council had to influence the Nordic Governments. NC wanted the Nordic region to 
present itself as a unit abroad, and this was in several ways in Finland’s interests as 
well. 
In a meeting at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in March 1968, it was 
discussed whether Finland should be allowed to pay less than the others because of 
the SAS question. The Norwegians did not consider SAS as a valid argument for 
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Finland to pay less than the three Scandinavian countries.216  Why they thought so is 
not clear. It was in fact a valid argument, because SAS was the main reason for the 
Scandinavians to participate. It seems that they just thought it would be for their own 
good if Finland contributed with the same amount, and thus lowered the cost for 
Norway. The issue was to be discussed at the Copenhagen meeting on March 20, and 
the question is whether Norway brought this up or not. Probably, the argument 
drowned in Finland’s and Sweden’s views and Mowinckel-Larsen did not manage to 
come through with his/Norway’s thought in the matter. 
Öberg was often the only Swedish representative present at meetings and 
negotiations. Two or three different persons often represented Norway. One could 
think that more people to argue a case would give more credibility and thus make a 
greater impact. Still, Öberg managed to be a driving force. The reason for this can of 
course be that he was better prepared and knew the stuff better. Another possibility, 
and it does not rule out the first, is that he had mandate to talk and decide on behalf of 
Sweden, something the Norwegian representatives never had. The Norwegians had to 
bring back results from negotiations for consideration in Norway, before any 
decisions could be made. In theory, this would probably apply to Öberg as well, but it 
seems like he has the position of doing and deciding what he thought was best.  
His minute of January 12 meeting illustrates the differences. There is no 
evidence that the Norwegian Government agreed to participate at Expo 70 before the 
next meeting held in Stockholm in February 1968. Still, the Swedish Embassy in 
Japan had notified the General Commissioner for Expo 70 that Scandinavia would 
participate.217  
Öberg’s minute of the January meeting stated that “Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden agreed on creating a joint Nordic exhibition and to designate a general 
commissioner”.218 Handwritten remarks were made by G Hærum, who attended the 
meeting in Copenhagen, that what they “agreed on in Copenhagen was to recommend 
to the governments that the guidelines suggested here should be followed: of course 
no final decision was made.”219 He added that, “most likely, everything would be as 
outlined by Öberg”. He furthermore agreed with Per Borgen (NMFA), who also noted 	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in a handwritten remark that a Commissioner General’s power had to be restrained 
and his power should be precisely expressed.220 The fear was probably that one 
country would enjoy too much power if the position were not restrained in any way. 
They could not count on a Norwegian being appointed as General Commissioner, and 
did not like the idea that a Swede was most likely to get it. 
Another memo from Öberg was attached to the Minute of Meeting from July 
1, 1968. The memo was written June 14 in Stockholm.221 The memo regarded the 
process from 1967 until June 1968. The question whether the Nordic countries would 
participate at Expo 70 started in the spring of 1967. The attitude was at that time 
negative in all the Nordic countries. Companies with commercial interests in Japan 
stressed that abstaining possibly could have negative effects, and this fear was 
especially strong among Swedish companies and SAS. Talks with SAS during the 
summer of 1967 opened up for a possible Scandinavian participation, even if it would 
be in a modest way.  
The talks resulted in a meeting in Copenhagen on January 12, 1968, with 
representation of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Government (as Öberg cites 
from the Danish Minute of Meeting). Öberg points out that Norway had several 
delegates present: Director of Trade Glad from the Ministry of Trade, Office Director 
Hærum from the NMFA and Secretary General Edward Mowinckel-Larsen from the 
Norwegian Trade Fairs. He does not remind the reader of who represented Denmark 
or Sweden, so this memorandum must have been written for the Norwegians to 
understand what happened during the receding 6 months.  
According to Öberg, the meeting led to a preliminary agreement between the 
Nordic countries of a joint pavilion at Expo 70, and that they would cooperate with 
SAS Catering. They also agreed that a working committee would meet in Stockholm 
on February 21 to discuss a draft agreement, how to organize the cooperation and the 
theme of the pavilion. They also agreed on starting the construction of the pavilion in 
1968.  
At the meeting on February 21, Mowinckel-Larsen was present. The 
Norwegian and the Danish delegates informed that they soon would give an official 
notification of their participation, and the Swedes informed that they already had done 	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so. Because Japan needed an answer, the meeting decided that Sweden would say that 
they intended to participate together with Denmark and Norway.  
3.3.4	  Short	  Memory	  
In October 1968, critique was raised towards the Danish participation at Expo ’70. 
Much of this was directed towards the architecture of the exterior of the Scandinavian 
Pavilion.222 There had been no competition to decide which project or architect who 
would get this honorable task. When the contract was signed between the 
Scandinavian countries and SAS, SAS Catering already had engaged Bent Severin, 
who already had started the process. Because SAS Catering had the exterior design 
ready when entering the cooperation, the critique was raised that the Scandinavian 
was participation at Expo ’70 due to pressure from SAS. The Danish Government 
denied this.223 In the beginning, Denmark had decided not to participate at all, 
because the Danish industry and exporters found it of little interest. The gain was to 
small compared to the costs. Denmark changed in the question, but it was not SAS 
who made the Danes change their mind. Instead it was pressure from Japan that was 
the decisive factor for the Nordic countries, the article argues. 
 As a comment to this, Hærum at NMFA wrote “It was certainly neither of 
these, at least not on our behalf!” in margin.224 For him, it was clear that it was neither 
pressure from Japan nor SAS that made Norway participate. Instead, it was solely the 
Norwegian economical interests in Japan that were decisive. How correct this was is 
debatable. The Norwegians did not see too much interest in participating before SAS 
and Sweden agreed on cooperation. The Norwegian Export Council and the 
Indistriforbundet was negative towards Norwegian Expo ’70 participation, but the 
Shipowner’s Association was positive. SAS put pressure on Sweden, first to establish 
a pavilion for SAS and Sweden, then to make Denmark and Norway join. SAS was 
obviously very important to make the Scandinavian countries participate at Expo ’70.  
Pressure from Japan is also evident, and this is in one way also connected to the 
pressure from SAS. The aviation negotiations were important in this regard, but also 
the Japanese performed other form of pressure. It is of course of interest that the 	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official stance in Denmark was that Japanese pressure was decisive, whereas Norway 
reject that it was pressure from outside in any form that made them participate.  
In a newspaper article in Verdens Gang (VG), a Norwegian representative – 
without a name – was answering the critique raised in Denmark. Here, the 
Norwegians admitted that the relationship with the aviation negotiations had played a 
part, but the main reason for the Government to participate was shipping interests. 
Willoch had reminded Stortinget of this at the Parliament debate: Japan was the 
second largest market for Norwegian shipping services. Also, several Norwegian 
shipowners build their ships in Japan, and several Norwegian companies exported 
goods to Japan – among them equipment for ships and goat cheese.  
VG also asked SAS if there was any connection between the World 
Exposition and aviation rights.225 The deputy PR director Sjögren at the head quarters 
in Stockholm denied any connection between the two questions. He stressed that they 
did not influence any governments in this way. Instead, he thought the decision to 
participate was base don an increasing understanding of the importance of Japan and 
their development, and that they had an understanding that it would be somewhat 
strange if they did not participate in the first World Exhibition in Japan. He admitted 
that the decision could have been made with regard to general economically 
considerations where SAS was on of many factors, and perhaps also with regards to 
specific companies, where SAS’ aviation rights was a major reason for participation. 
He still stressed that the question of landing rights was determined by hard facts of 
traffic and freight volumes, but added that negotiations of this was held between 
governments. He denied that landing rights and participation on Expo 70 was 
connected from SAS’ side, and said he had never heard of any such connection 
internally in SAS. The connection is obvious when looking at earlier documents, but 
clearly no one wanted the public to know. Officially, there were no connection 
between SAS’ negotiations with Japan and the Nordic Expo 70 participation.  
Even though the VG article gave no name of the Norwegian official 
representative leaking the information, it is exactly the same arguments as Hærum 
commented in the margin of the Danish article. For Hærum to argue like he did must 
either be an example of his ignorance or yet another example of the strangely short 
memory among Norwegian bureaucrats. Or did he “forget” the reasons deliberately, 	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because he wanted to sell the other reasons to the public? It is at least quite easy to 
understand that VG had talked to someone at the NMFA. Even though they did not 
refer to any singular person, it was the same arguments presented in the paper as the 
comments written to the Danish article. This is also puzzling. Why did Hærum (or 
whom it was) not want to be presented by name in the paper? The article refers only 
to the government’s position, even though it is clear VG got the information from a 
source. It looks like propaganda, and SAS backed the arguments. Was this because it 
was not suitable to connect landing rights with other issues – possibly to protect SAS? 
Aall held a press conference in Oslo to inform the press of the designers and the 
theme of the pavilion. Here, he stressed that the Scandinavian countries did not make 
any decision to participate based on SAS. He said the decision was made “totally 
independent of the initiative from SAS”.226 
3.4	  The	  Pavilion	  Theme	  
Before February 1968, the pavilion theme had not been discussed in depth. The spring 
of 1968 would still be months with much misunderstandings and disagreement.  
In the middle of February, Kjell Öberg produced two memorandums for the 
meeting in Stockholm on February 21. One concerned the theme of the pavilion; the 
other was about personnel and how to administer the work ahead of the expo.227 He 
considered that the presentation at Expo ’70 would be modest, and reminded the 
reader that the Scandinavians did not participate to impress, but rather to avoid 
damage if they did not attend.228 He still thought it to be important that the exhibition 
was of the best possible quality, and had several suggestions on how to achieve this. 
As a general frame on how to find the pavilion theme, he suggested that the theme 
should illustrate a problem the Scandinavian countries faced, and suggestions on how 
to solve these problems. These problems should be of the highest importance in the 
Nordic region, it had to be relevant for Japan as well. In addition to this, it should be 
relevant for exports to Japan, for aviation and for shipping. At the meeting in 
February 1968 Swedish delegates handed out a memorandum for discussion regarding 
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the theme, which stressed that the theme should meet certain criteria:229 it should 
illustrate problems and solutions of high relevance both for the Nordic region and for 
Japan, and even though the exhibition was not of a commercial character, it was 
commercial interests that motivated participation (export, aviation and shipping). The 
theme would have to be in compliance with this, but at the same time there should not 
be any likeness with a trade fair. The memo also stressed that Nordic cooperation, the 
industrial level of development, and the communication with Japan should be 
incorporated. The conclusion was thus that the Nordic exhibition should illustrate the 
Nordic environment, the threats against it and the efforts made to preserve it.  
The most relevant topic Öberg could find that matched all the desired criteria, 
was how to protect the environment. It was relevant for Japan and for the Nordic 
region, he argued. Öberg argued that several Nordic thrusts had been made to address 
the environmental problems. Sweden brought them up in the Nordic Council, but 
even if none of the others argued that it was of little importance, they did not see the 
environment as an important issue either. The question is if this was merely a Swedish 
attempt to find a way of increasing goodwill on an area that had not been taken by 
anyone else. They wanted to hold the first UN conference on environmental issues, 
which they did in 1971, and it fits perfectly into the plan to set environmental 
protection on the agenda for Expo ’70. At this stage, they already had arranged a 
competition for Swedish designers regarding the theme, which they hoped to use in a 
future exhibition abroad. The Swedes were well prepared and acted quickly.  
It is, however, fascinating that they would try to connect shipping and aviation 
with environmental protection. SAS was one of the major reasons for Nordic 
participation at Expo ’70. Thus, increased flights to and from Japan were one of the 
issues the Scandinavians wanted to achieve by attending the exposition. Obviously, 
they did not think of airplane pollution as a major problem when deciding the theme. 
This may of course also apply to shipping, though oil spills were becoming a 
problem.230 The explanation of what we today see as inconsistency, can be that time 
has passed, and so did the meaning of environmental protection. In the late 1960’s, 
almost no one in Scandinavia cared for the environment – at least not in the same way 
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as today. Global warming alarmed no one. The focus was on people’s health problems 
connected to littering and pollution. It was thus smog from industry and cars, more 
than from aircrafts that was meant to be at the center of attention. The hope was that 
the exhibition might stimulate Japanese tourism to the Nordic region through 
traveling with SAS over the North Pole. Today, it would be odd to connect increased 
tourism by airplanes with environmental protection, but it was not like that in 1968.  
In mid February 1968, the Norwegian Embassy in Tokyo was requested to 
meet at the Danish Embassy to discuss possible participation, and their views would 
be forwarded to the February 21 meeting in Stockholm.231 The Danish Foreign 
Ministry wanted to know how the Scandinavian Ambassadors could imagine what 
(an) inter-Scandinavian pavilion might be like. According to Counselor Prøitz, who 
was the Norwegian representative at the meeting, they discussed different theme 
possibilities: Environmental Destruction and Conservation; Modern Living; Industrial 
Design; Quality and Specialization; and How We Live and Work. Prøitz did not 
recommend any of the solutions, and instead he forwarded the question to the 
Ambassador. He understood that there probably would be difference in opinion in the 
three countries – some might want greater emphasis on the character of the individual 
countries. After deliberating on the question, they agreed that the Swedish proposal of 
environmental conservation deserved closer attention. An exhibition on this theme 
would probably be of great interest for the Japanese. Japan with its large cities fought 
the problems of pollution, and they would therefore probably welcome such an 
exhibition. The theme was seen as original, and as a possibility to show the 
Scandinavian welfare state and their highly developed industry and science.  
Öberg also suggested a timeframe of how to find a designer for the pavilion. If 
the budget could be set and the program could be agreed upon before March 8, the 
competition could start April 16 and the designers could be appointed May 1. It was 
important to find the designer as soon as possible, so that he could start cooperating 
with the constructors as soon as possible. None of the others in the Scandinavian 
Committee had shown any signs on being as prepared for this meeting as Öberg was. 
He got most of his ideas through, the deadlines were a little longer, but they were 
good ideas and no one else came up with anything comparable. Still, it was ambitious 
of Öberg to think that everyone at the meeting would love his ideas, and in two weeks 	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approve on his theme suggestion, and have the competition winner ready on May 1.  
Instead, at the February 21 meeting, they agreed that all countries had to 
present a proposal for the theme of the joint exhibition, and also suggest architects 
and designers who could join the pavilion design competition. Before March 15, each 
country should take up for discussion and make a draft of program, theme and budget, 
which could circulate before the next meeting in Copenhagen on March 20. A 
program proposal with theme and budget would be distributed in April, with closure 
of the designer competition on July 1, and finally a decision would be made at a 
meeting on a winning designer on September 1.232 
The meeting was informed that the Swedish Ambassador in Tokyo had 
already notified the Japanese authorities that the Scandinavian countries would 
participate with a joint pavilion.233 This must have come as a surprise for the 
Norwegians, since the Storting had not yet approved this. The meeting then decided 
that all the Nordic countries were to notify the Japanese General Commissioner for 
the Expo ’70 that they intended to participate. The Norwegian participation was 
officially confirmed March 6, 1968, with the disclaimer that the Storting needed to 
approve.234 The area for the Scandinavian pavilion was reserved and the contract 
signed by the three nations’ Ambassadors in late March. As we shall see later, theis 
was not sufficient, because the Commissioner General had to sign the contract, but it 
gave a clear indication on the commitment of the Scandinavian countries. 
All the different minutes of the meetings are quite clear when comes to dates 
of when different decisions were to be made, and also which suggestions had been 
presented regarding the pavilion theme. Even Mowinckel-Larsen’s reports are clear 
on this. Still, the Norwegians, with Mowinckel-Larsen as their leader, misunderstood 
and complained to the top. He claimed that he, and the rest of the Norwegian 
representatives, were not aware of the timeframe, and thus that the Swedes had fooled 
Norway to accept an unacceptable theme. Still, Mowinckel-Larsen wrote minutes of 
meetings that clearly show that he was aware of decisions made at these meetings. 
The Swedish minute of the meeting confirms the one by Mowinckel-Larsen.235  
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At the February 21 meeting, Mowinckel-Larsen was the only Norwegian 
representative. He emphasized at the meeting, and in his report, that at the next 
meeting there would be only one representative from each country. At the Stockholm 
meeting, Sweden had three and Denmark five representatives. Iceland and Finland 
had one each, and SIAB and SAS were also present. The one Norwegian voice was 
probably not so loud compared to those of the others, and that is perhaps the reason 
why Mowinckel-Larsen stressed the importance of one delegate per country for the 
next meeting. The report is in Swedish, but at the end there is an addition in 
Norwegian regarding this. The NMFA got the protocol from Norwegian Trade Fairs 
where Mowinckel-Larsen was the director, and thus it is plausible to think that he 
himself added the remark to the protocol.  
At a pre-Copenhagen meeting in Oslo at the NMFA on March 18, the 
Norwegians analyzed the forthcoming meeting’s agenda. Among the topics was the 
question of pavilion theme. Clearly, they were aware of the fact that this would be 
discussed. Still, it is not clear whether they knew that a decision would be made in 
this regard. At the preparatory meeting, they only talked of the fact that the question 
would be brought up, not what the Norwegian position would be. They were supposed 
to give a suggestion of a theme to present to the Nordic delegates, but there was not 
produced any such suggestion from the Norwegian side. The minute of the meeting 
did not require Mowinckel-Larsen to take any particular stance on the question either. 
Because he did not have any authorization to make decisions on behalf of Norway, he 
had nothing else to do but take the views of the other Nordic delegates back to 
Norway for further discussion. He was the only Norwegian delegate at the 
Copenhagen March 20 meeting.236  
At the meeting, several Danish propositions were submitted even though 
nothing on paper. They were just headlines without any presentation or motivation. 
The only serious suggestion was Öberg’s environmental theme. The discussion ended 
with the proposal from Denmark to change the negative connotation in the Swedish 
proposa to “Environmental Protection Under Industrialization”. Everyone agreed, and 
Öberg later recalled that the meeting assumed that a decision was made regarding the 
pavilion theme.237  	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Mowinckel-Larsen wrote an unofficial memorandum after the meeting in 
Copenhagen March 20 where he reported the long debate about the theme of the 
pavilion.238 He also conveys that the meeting would suggest the theme to be 
environmental protection in industrial societies, but that they at the same time would 
show the Scandinavian topography and the culture. The official minute of the meeting 
stated that the theme of the pavilion was the subject of a long and lively debate.239 
Öberg considered that his own suggestion of environmental protection was best 
suited. Smog was a common problem in Japan, which made the question interesting in 
the host country. Mowinckel-Larsen stressed the importance of the increasing 
economical interests they had in Japan, and Bo agreed that the business sector had to 
be a part of the theme as well. Öberg agreed that they had to present the Nordic region 
as highly industrialized, and still show the means by which they try to reduce the 
pollution. Kai Johannesen, Permanent Undersecretary in Denmark, suggested that 
Öberg’s proposal was too abstract, and that they instead would gain more by focusing 
on shipping.  
The meeting at last agreed on the elements constituting the theme – with the 
title Protection of the Environment During Increased Industrialization. The intention 
was to show “the highly industrialized Scandinavia, the mobile element, the 
communication point of view, the Nordic cooperation, the cultural aspects with basis 
in environmental protection, and the technical element”.240 The title was wider than 
the original suggestion from Öberg, but at the same time, no other suggestion was 
forwarded, and thus, when everyone agreed on this new theme, Öberg had won 
through with his vision.  
There is a discrepancy between Mowinckel-Larsen’s memorandum and the 
official one. Mowinckel-Larsen thought it was just a suggestion, whereas the official 
minute of meeting said it was decided. Why the Norwegians did not react to the 
minute of the meeting is strange, since Mowinckel-Larsen had another notion of the 
outcome of the meeting. If he had objected to this when he first received the minute of 
meeting from Stockholm, the whole misunderstanding could have been much smaller 
and easier to handle. No one else reacted to the differences in interpretations either. 
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At the next meeting in the Scandinavian Pavilion Committee on May 15, the 
Norwegian Honorary Commissioner General Nils Fredrik Aall met for the first time. 
According to Öberg, he was obviously not informed of the decisions made at the 
meeting on March 20. As it was understood by Öberg, this was due to Mowinckel-
Larsen being too occupied with the Shipping Exhibition in Oslo to keep his 
Norwegian colleagues informed in addition to that Aall had been absent due to a trip 
with the Norwegian King (Olav) to the United States. Aall had to accept that five 
decisions already were made, even though he was not aware of this: the contract with 
SAS Catering; which entrepreneur and architect to hire for the pavilion construction; 
who would be the Nordic CG; and the pavilion theme. Aall thus had to work under 
the assumption that this was correct. He also agreed on appointing two architects from 
each country to participate in the competition of designing the pavilion exhibition. 
They also decided on the number of representatives for the referee committee, in 
addition to how they would be organized.  
A meeting in the Nordic Osaka-Committee was planned in Oslo on May 15. 
Here, Mowinckel-Larsen was prepared to discuss the theme, and to decide how to 
present the region at Expo ’70. This meeting was cancelled, but another meeting was 
held in Stockholm the same day.241Architects and the jury for the architectural 
competition were summoned together with the representatives from the national Expo 
’70-committees in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The agenda was to 
present the competition and the pavilion theme. The Stockholm meeting gave no 
opportunity to deliberate on this, which made Mowinckel-Larsen disappointed, and he 
had to realize that the pavilion theme already was decided.  
To inform the architects of such an unusual theme that few people had much 
knowledge about, Öberg had asked a specialist, Hans Palmstierna, to write a 
document with background information on environmental issues that could be used 
when planning the exhibition. The memo Palmstierna wrote was called Avoid the 
Point of No Return. Mowinckel-Larsen had the impression that this theme would kick 
back at the manufacturing industry and shipping as the reason for the environmental 
degradation and the pollution. This could be seen as an unwelcoming patronization in 
an industrialized country like Japan with a dense population that had strong 
nationalistic feelings of its own ability to solve problems, he argued. Thus, he could 	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not see that Norwegian interests could gain from this theme and he asked the Minister 
if he could contact his colleagues in all the Nordic countries as soon as possible. He 
also argued that the possibilities of theme were not consistent with what the 
Norwegian Storting had approved as a Norwegian presentation at Expo 70.242  
The Scandinavian Embassies had in February, as we have seen, approved of 
the environmental theme, and suggested that this was very suitable for Japan. The 
Ambassadors welcomed it. It is thus quite peculiar that the Norwegian Minister of 
Trade, Kåre Willoch, was persuaded to call the Swedish Foreign Minister, Torsten 
Nilsson, and afterwards write a letter to him explaining that the Norwegian interests 
were not taken care of.243  
In the letter, Willoch informed Nilsson that the Norwegian Expo Committee 
had complained to him regarding the pavilion theme, which they felt they had not the 
opportunity to discuss in depth.244 According to Willoch, a Swedish proposition under 
the name “Avoid the point if no return” had been presented as a fait accompli at a 
meeting in Stockholm May 15. Attempts from the Norwegians to discuss this further 
had been turned down. The Norwegian Committee disagreed on the topic, and 
Willoch stated that he agreed with the Norwegian Committee. He considered it not to 
be in accordance with the preconditions that were discussed in the Norwegian 
parliamentary debate. The Swedish proposal was of great interest, he wrote, but from 
a Norwegian point of view, it was unnatural to use it in a setting like this. Willoch 
then asked Nilsson to intervene and to put pressure on the Swedish Committee so that 
they would agree on discussing the matter one more time. Willoch hoped they could 
find a theme that all the participating countries could accept.245 
It is somewhat striking that Willoch sent this letter to the Swedish Foreign 
Minister, and not to the Danish as well. The Danes were also present at every 
meeting. The Norwegians complained about not having had the opportunity to discuss 
the theme. At the Copenhagen meeting on March 20 they also had discussed the 
theme, so there was no immediate reason why the Norwegians did not complain to the 
Danes. Probably, the most natural thing to do in this situation, if they considered the 
cooperation to be equal, Willoch would have addressed his letter both to the Swedish 
and to the Danish Foreign Ministers. It is obvious that they considered the Swedes as 	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the strongest negotiator in general, and Öberg in particular, and thus the one to 
complain to. 
The confusion in the Norwegian camp is obvious. Mowinckel-Larsen had 
attended meetings and written minutes of these afterwards, and thus informed the 
Norwegian delegation of the situation. Still, he himself and the others seemed 
unaware of the situation in May 1968. In March, Aall was the Norwegian 
representative at the Copenhagen meeting, and could do nothing else than follow what 
the others decided, even though he was not informed prior to the meeting. The 
Norwegians always had people present at meetings, there were always official 
minutes of meetings written, and the Norwegians should have been well informed of 
all decisions. Still, they acted confused.  
Whether they had an extremely bad memory, or it was a part of some game 
strategy, is hard to say. If their memory was that bad, it is strange they did not read 
the memos and minutes of meetings one more time to be sure they were right before 
asking the Minister of Trade to help. Another option is that they just pretended to 
have bad memory, and used this as an opportunity to oppose to the Swedes, but in that 
case they lied to the Minister and asked him to complain to his Swedish counterpart 
who had nothing to do with the matter. As the Swedes must have viewed the case, he 
made an utter fool of himself. We may assume that they concluded Mowinckel-
Larsen was the instigator and may have put it down to poor memory or possibly 
downright dishonesty.  
From the memos and minutes produced by and sent to NMFA, the Norwegian 
Ambassador Thommesen was able to understand the whole picture, without any 
problems. It was not that complicated to understand that the Swedes (and Danes) were 
right.246 It might be possible that Thommessen had access to more information than 
Mowinckel-Larsen and Aall had in Oslo. Thommessen could possibly have read 
Swedish documents that Aall and Mowinckel-Larsen not yet had seen. A good 
working relationship between the Norwegian and Swedish ambassadors might be a 
reason the reason for Thommessen’s well-informed position. Still, the Norwegians 
complaining to the Swedes were not badly or wrongly informed. They clearly knew 
that they had missed the opportunity to influence the process, and were probably 
disappointed. Unfortunately for Willoch, it was he who lost the most credibility next 	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to Mowinckel-Larsen – who made a fool out of himself at several occasions.  
Even though the Norwegians felt overshadowed by the Swedes and possibly 
rather would break out of the Scandinavian project than to be overruled once more, 
Thommessen warned against this. He understood that Mowinckel-Larsen and the 
other Norwegians back home were afraid of the strong Swedes, but tried to reassure 
them that there was no danger to this.  
An example is that he reminded them of the evaluation committee which 
consisted of three Swedes, two Norwegians, two Danes and two Finns, “as it will be 
seen solid non-Swedish majority”.247 Here, he reassured the reader that the Swedes 
would not have the majority and thus could not decide alone. The fear of the Swedes 
was obvious, and they clearly did not fear Denmark or Finland in the same way. Why 
Sweden would have one more member at the committee than the others is perhaps a 
bit strange, but Thommessen did not think that this was of any great importance. 
Instead, he reminded the NMFA that the crucial part was Norwegian participation. A 
Scandinavian pavilion might build a platform for national manifestations and a 
starting point for commercial contact and information activities of great importance 
for Norway. The pavilion theme was of relatively less importance. The advice from 
the Embassy was thus not to jeopardize the Norwegian partaking in the Scandinavian 
cooperation – according to Thommessen, it was not in the national interest of Norway 
to withdraw.  
Öberg was deeply concerned with the situation, and hoped that the 
misunderstanding about the MEMO would be solved so the Norwegians would be 
able to uphold the decisions made in Copenhagen.248 The process had come too far to 
halter, because the architects already had received the information based on the 
decisions made in March 1968. If new inter-Scandinavian deliberations had to be 
made on the pavilion theme, the process had to take a pause and the time frame would 
have to be expanded, as followed by this, also the costs would rise. Öberg was aware 
that the Norwegians perhaps thought the theme did not coincide with the shipping 
interests, but reminded that shipping was of little importance for the rest of the 
Scandinavian countries. Also, it was important, Öberg claimed, to keep the theme that 
had interest in all the Nordic countries as well as in Japan. From Sweden, and surely 	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also from Denmark and Finland, they would probably argue for holding on to the 
theme they had agreed on. Öberg thought this was the best foundation for making a 
joint exhibition, which also coincided with the Japanese theme program. 
Nilsson had little to do with the Swedish Expo ’70 participation, and 
forwarded it to Gunnar Lange, the Swedish Minister of Trade. It took some time for 
him to reply, due to Öberg being absent. Lange could not give any statement without 
Öberg informing him first. The Minister totally relied on and trusted the man Sweden 
had made in charge of their information work abroad. The Swedish system worked in 
the way it should – they were better organized than the Norwegians. One person had 
the authority to make decisions without interference from politicians. In Norway, on 
the other hand, the ones who were handling the question were not able to manage the 
situation and asked politicians for help. Mowinckel-Larsen had misunderstood the 
situation, even though present at meetings where decisions, and time frames for future 
decisions, were made. Still, Mowinckel-Larsen persuaded Willoch to deal with the 
issue, something that must have been awkward to the Swedes. It must have looked 
like the Norwegians were even more poorly organized than they actually were.  
Anyhow, Gunnar Lange replied to Willoch in June 1968.249 He attached a 
memo written by Öberg, stating that all delegates were agreed in the theme. At the 
same time, he stressed the problems they would face if they would cancel the 
competition at that point. Thus, he suggested that they would leave the theme as it 
was until the competition was finished. Afterwards, they could look at the results – 
and possibly discuss the theme then. It was Lange’s personal opinion that there must 
have been a misunderstanding, which could best be solved by a meeting between the 
delegates from all the Nordic countries. And so it went.  
On July 1, 1968, a meeting was held in Oslo to discuss the pavilion theme. 
Present were Kristen Bo, Olle Herold, Kjell Öberg, Nils Fredrik Aall, in addition to 
Sven A. Hansson and Edvard Mowinckel-Larsen. They discussed in depth the course 
of the preceding discussion, but the minute of meeting did not emphasize the different 
arguments in the debate.250 It was written in Norwegian, and perhaps Aall did not 
wish to make this matter larger than it already was. Instead he stated that the theme 
they previously had agreed on would stand, and focused on the extra information they 
would give the architects participating in the architectural/design competition.  	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The Norwegian Expo 70 Committee also had a private meeting on July 1.251 
Nils Fredrik Aall informed the Norwegian Committee of the proceedings at the 
Scandinavian Committee. With a very difficult starting point, the Norwegians were 
trying to change the theme of the pavilion, he told them. Aall informed that even 
though the starting point was difficult, they had achieved significant changes, and he 
said he was pleased with the result. Of course, all the Norwegians would have liked 
another theme, but because the name was changed from the negative “degrading” to 
the more positive “environmental protection and environmental creation”, the 
possibility was better for creating something good.252 This seems to be more 
rhetorical than real. The theme was never said to be the negative version that the 
Norwegians claimed it was. As the minute of meeting from the Norwegian 
Committee’s session suggests, the Norwegians considered that a new and far better 
situation had been established after the meeting with the Scandinavian Committee the 
same day.  
This sheer phantasy is obvious misleading, whether intentionally or not hardly 
true. The Norwegians had not achieved anything at that meeting, other than agreeing 
on what already had been agreed on earlier the same year. It seems like they were 
ignorant of the reality of the situation, and it must have been strange to the other 
Scandinavians that they were so pleased with the result after the July 1 session. This 
holds for both the theme and the situation of the Joint Commissioner General. Is it 
possible that they were that ignorant? Or did they just pretend, just to avoid having to 
admit that they were wrong? The others must have seen that they did not achieve what 
they thought they had achieved, and that must have been even stranger to them. 
Otherwise, they argued in this way to let others in Norway believe they had achieved 
more than they actually did. The conclusion of the Norwegian meeting was in any 
case that Norway would not withdraw from the Nordic cooperation. This was in fact a 
threat and would have caused large consequences, more than they possibly could 
afford. They decided to write a telegram for the Norwegian Ambassador to Japan, 
stating that “After all that has happened up until now, and after the Chairman’s 
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successful negotiations today, the Committee members have decided to continue in 
the Committee and let it constitute itself”.253 
 This situation must have been embarrassing especially for Willoch, who had 
to take the official embarrassment. He was the Minister of Trade and should be able 
to trust the information he was given by the bureaucrats involved. He clearly was 
misinformed. But it was not only embarrassing for Willoch. It must have been 
embarrassing for the whole Norwegian group, and maybe especially for Mowinckel-
Larsen. In most respects, he was not a good negotiator on behalf of Norway, and he 
did not seem well prepared for the task. Perhaps a good thing both for himself and for 
the Norwegian group: Mowinckel-Larsen resigned due to his age.  
 The Norwegian skeptical view of the pavilion theme was proven unnecessary 
by the welcome it had in Japan. It was of great interest in Japan at the time, and the 
interest also increased during the expo’s opening period.254 The great press coverage 
of the pavilion was argued to be due to the pavilion theme. A normal national pavilion 
bragging about the glory of the nation would never get this much attention. The theme 
gave the Scandinavian pavilion character which made it possible to compete in terms 
of attention from the press with many times larger pavilions. One Japanese newspaper 
even said it was the only pavilion worthy of a World Exposition. In Japan, the 
pavilion theme was a great success.255	  	  	   Still, the Norwegians did not recommend any further inter-Scandinavian 
participation at future World Expositions, mostly due to the theme and exhibition, 
which the Norwegians thought was too complicated and difficult to understand.256 
The reason why they did not manage to stop the theme was, as Grann recalls it 
afterwards, that the Norwegian Osaka Committee (NOC) was established too late. 
The theme was already decided on, “after Swedish initiative and argumentation” 
when the NOC was appointed by Royal Resolution in April 1968.257 Even though 	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they protested on a political level, nothing could be done. The theme was decided, and 
even though it did not suit Norway, it was highly appropriate for some of the others. 
Grann reminded of some facts:  
 
Many Swedish manufacturing industries work on the world market with 
environmentally friendly products, launched in the spirit of our time.  
The Swedish docent Palmstierna wrote the memo of the theme, without 
anyone asking him to do so.  
Sweden had, except for their national day, also a special environmental 
protection-day in Osaka, on May 21. 
Sweden shall in 1972 organize a large international conference on the 
environment in Stockholm, organized by the UN.258  
 
It was obvious to Grann that the suggested theme was part of a larger project for the 
Swedes. Even though he did not approve, he gave the Swedes credit by recognizing 
their clever ability to maneuver the whole region to endorse their activities.259  	   	  
3.5	  Appointing	  the	  Commissioner	  General	  
In February 1968 Kjell Öberg wrote two memos ahead of a meeting held in 
Stockholm on February 21. The second note Öberg made was on how to organize the 
joint Scandinavian work and personnel before and during the Expo.260 The 
precondition was that it would be only one exhibition in the joint pavilion – not like 
the one in Montreal with five different exhibitions. If this could be the case, the 
Scandinavian Pavilion only needed one Commissioner General (CG). As a comment 
to this, Per Borgen at the NMFA wrote “NB!” in the margin of the document. Further 
on, when Öberg’s suggested that the CG should have as much freedom of action as 
possible, he wrote “NO!”. Also the suggestion that the Board, consisting of 
representatives from the five countries, was only to give advice and not to execute and 
decide – that was instead the responsibility of the CG – Per Borgen once again put 
“NO!” in the margin. He had earlier concerned himself with the issue of Sweden 
getting too much power over the process and thus leaving Norway behind. He was 
clearly alarmed by the power a CG could get. The fear of Sweden is particularly 
evident with regard to Öberg’s suggestion that the secretary of the board should be 
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located in the hometown of the CG. In the margin, Per Borgen wrote “Stockholm!” 
which suggests that he feared that all decisions would be made by a Swede, and that 
Norway would be placed on the sideline.  
Little happened in this matter before the Scandinavian Committee met in 
Stockholm on May 15 1968.261 Öberg brought up the question of who would succeed 
Folke Claesson as the joint CG.262 Aall then submitted a request that each country 
have their own CG, but Öberg informed that the SPC had decided, at the meeting in 
Copenhagen on March 20, to have one joint CG. The Norwegians had once again 
misunderstood the process, and Aall was not informed of what had earlier been 
decided. He suggested that they would have a deputy CG, something Kristen Bo 
supported. The suggestion might be put forward because Aall, with Bo’s support, 
wanted to divide the power on two persons, and not let the Swedes have total 
domination. Öberg suggested Sven A. Hansson as the joint CG. Olle Herold was 
positive, he knew him from years back, and thought he would be perfect for the job. 
Hansson apparently knew Japan well and he would soon know Japanese. If the SPC 
did not agree on having Hansson as the joint CG, Öberg would hire him as his “Japan 
Man”. They thus decided to hire Hansson as the acting CG and later consider his 
status.  
A General Commissioner’s meeting was held in Kyoto in late May 1968. 
Thommessen participated as the Norwegian representative, whereas Sweden sent 
Kjell Öberg, Folke Claesson and the soon to be joint Nordic CG, Sven A. Hansson.263 
The main objective for the Scandinavians at this meeting was to investigate the 
Japanese reaction to the wish of starting to construct the Scandinavian pavilion as 
soon as possible after the first possible building start on July 1.264 They aimed at 
having it finished before the end of 1968. It was important for them to start early, due 
to anticipation of inflation and thus increasing costs the closer in time to the Expo the 
construction got started. Because of the hurry they were in, they needed to officially 
appoint Sven A. Hansson as the Scandinavian CG. Thommessen asked the NMFA to 
appoint him as soon as possible, in order for him to sign the official documents on 
behalf of the five countries. It was important that Hanson as the CG signed the official 	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contract, Thommessen argued, but he could not do this before all the five 
Governments had officially appointed him.  
Öberg also tried to influence the Norwegians back home. He sent a telegram 
from Kyoto to make the others follow Sweden and appoint Hansson as joint CG. The 
Norwegians did not think that this was very urgent, and did not see the complications 
that the representatives in Japan worried about. In Norway, they did not fear that 
appointing a joint CG right away would make any difference, since it had not made 
any difference in Montreal. Therefore, they answered the telegram from Öberg that 
they did not want to take a stand on the question of who would be appointed CG 
before the planned meeting in Oslo on June 26 1968.265  
In reply,  the NMFA received a telegram from Öberg June 14, 1968.266 Here, 
he explains in depth why Norway had to appoint Hansson right away. The Swedish 
Embassy had received a telegram from Japanese authorities that the Expo 70 
Secretariat, as a formality, as soon as possible needed official notification that 
Hansson was appointed the Nordic Joint Commissioner General. When talking to the 
Japanese Commissioner General Hagiwara in Kyoto, he advised that Sven A. 
Hansson be appointed forthwith by all the Nordic countries. At a later stage, all the 
countries should appoint national CGs, with the titles of  “Honorary Commission 
General”. At the conference in Kyoto, it was obvious to the Scandinavian participants 
that the Japanese held hard on formalities. Permission to start constructing was 
conditional on a participation contract signed by the Nordic CG. The application for a 
building permit had to be signed by the CG and it was estimated that it would take 
minimum three weeks to investigate the application. If they wanted to start building 
the pavilion in early July, and thus avoid extra expenses due to inflation, it was 
important that Hansson would sign the papers while still in Japan. With this in mind, 
Öberg asked one more time that Norway would appoint Hansson as the joint Nordic 
CG.  
Nils Fredrik Aall informed the NMFA that the Montreal experience had not 
shown any indication that the appointing of a joint CG had any significance for the 
construction start.267 He confirmed that the delegates at the meeting in Stockholm in 
mid May had agreed on asking Hansson to be CG. At the same meeting, they agreed 	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to postpone the decisions of national CGs until Öberg came back from Kyoto. Even 
though Öberg and Thommessen explained that the Japanese had made them 
understand how important the appointment of the CG was, and thus the situation had 
altered, the Norwegians at the NMFA and in the Norwegian Expo ’70 Committee did 
not want to listen to this. They would not change anything of what had previously 
been decided.268 
There were no other suggestions than Hansson of who would become the joint 
Nordic CG. Why the Norwegians could not appoint him before the meeting in June is 
therefore strange. It is likely that the Scandinavian representatives attending the 
General Commissioner’s meeting in Kyoto would have more information about how 
the Japanese worked than Norwegians in Norway. Japan could have had more strict 
rules than Canada had in these kinds of questions. At least, the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry did not have any other information than this. Still, they did not want to 
follow the recommendations from the Scandinavians present at the conference in 
Japan. Among them was Thommessen, the Norwegian Ambassador to Japan, and 
there is no evidence of him disagreeing with Öberg. Why Norway was so skeptical is 
therefore somewhat strange. Was it because they did not want to follow everything 
Öberg asked them to do? Was it just to make him wait? This must have been strange 
to the delegates present in Japan, because it was obvious to them that it was important 
to appoint Hansson as soon as possible. If the Norwegians were right, on the other 
hand, and it did not matter if they appointed Hansson two weeks sooner or later, it is 
strange that Öberg pressed for a quick decision. When dealing with the Japanese, no 
one really knew what to expect, so the Scandinavians present in Japan were probably 
right to worry anyhow. If it was true, as Öberg wrote in his second telegram, that the 
Japanese were strict with rules and regulations, it seems strange that the Norwegian 
would halt the process. Why would this be so important for the NMFA? It doesn’t 
seem as a question to argue too much about, but it puts the Norwegians in a position 
of unwillingness to cooperate.  
This question was raised in the same period that Norway had to admit they 
had misunderstood the process of the pavilion theme. Perhaps their reluctance to 
officially appoint Hansson would just be a demonstration of their independence. It is 
likely that they would not do whatever Öberg told them to, because of annoyance with 	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the process so far. Still, this is a somewhat childish behavior, so could this be the 
case? Yet there is no other explanation to the delay. The Norwegians appointed 
Hansson in late July, several weeks after the other Nordic Governments had done the 
same. There were no other options, so it could not be that the Norwegians wanted to 
debate whether they wanted Hansson or not. The only plausible explanation is that the 
Norwegians wanted to mark position. It is striking that they would jeopardize the 
construction start by not appointing Hansson, when they knew that delays would 
possibly be of great significance for the budget. They were aware that the longer they 
waited, the costs would increase due to other nations also needing the same work 
force to construct their pavilions, which would push the prices up. They could in fact 
possibly loose quite a lot of money on this game, if the Japanese and their 
bureaucracy, whom no one understood, made them postpone the construction start. 
At the end, the problem was solved and the Swedish Ministry of Trade 
announced Sven A. Hansson to be joint Scandinavian CG on June 28, 1968. The 
Danish Foreign Ministry followed on July 4, 1968.269 The Finnish Ministry of Trade 
and Industry announced the same on July 17, 1968.270The NMFA did not consider it 
proper to appoint a Nordic joint Commissioner General by a Royal Resolution. 
Instead, it was a task for the Honorary Commissioner General.271 If this was as 
important as they argued, they could have appointed Aall right away, and then he 
could have appointed Hansson. This would have solved the problem quite easily, but 
still they waited until July 12, 1968, to appoint Aall.272 After this, Aall appointed 
Hansson as the CG on behalf of Norway.  
When the Norwegian Honorary Commissioner General finally officially 
appointed Hansson as the CG, the construction could start. Even though it was a few 
weeks after the anticipated date, the Scandinavian was the second pavilion to have its 
groundbreaking ceremony. The first one to start building a pavilion was Canada, who 
had the honor of being the first because they were the last host of a World Exhibition. 
Thus, it is clear that the delayed notification from Norway actually did not have much 
real significance – the Norwegians were right, but considering the country they were 
in, the Norwegians could not be sure of this. It was a risky game they played, even 
though they were not aware of it because of their own ignorance of the Japanese 	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ways. It went well, but at the same time it made them look stubborn and stupid, 
because they jeopardized the budget of all the five countries. What they gained from 
marking position here is uncertain. Perhaps they just wanted to show the Swedes that 
Sweden could not always dictate Norwegian behavior.  
4.	  Conclusion	  
This thesis has delineated and discussed an example of Nordic cooperation in the field 
of foreign policy. In this example, we have seen what World Expositions are and for 
what reason they are hosted and attended, and we have seen how decisions were made 
within foreign policy bureaucracies. Also, we have seen an example of Nordic 
cooperation, in addition to an example of how the culture gap between the 
Scandinavian countries and Japan was handled by the Scandinavia policymakers.  
How to present a country at a World Exhibition and how negotiations with 
other countries are performed are parts of a country’s foreign policy, though they are 
not of the most central questions. For states like the USA and the Soviet Union, 
World Expositions were of importance, because the cultural part of the Cold War – 
the one that fought for people’s hearts and minds – was of great importance. This 
fight for goodwill abroad was also important for smaller states. If the soft power 
increased, also smaller states had the possibility of influencing international politics.  
The awareness of this is seen in how the Scandinavians looked at development 
aid. From the 1950s and increasingly so from the late 1960s, when these countries 
really expanded the number of aid projects, they were initially not at the top of the 
League of donors.273 But by identifying the value of being looked upon as altruistic, 
and working strategically to achieve this, the Scandinavian countries gained positions 
as particularly generous donors possess positions as “good” states. The Scandinavians 
together with the Dutch are seen as the UN norm countries.274 This in turn, gives more 
influence over certain questions in international relations than would be warranted by 
that exceed the size of the populations and economies.  
Even though the USA and the Soviet Union identified World Expositions as 
important for their public diplomacy and level of soft power, the Norwegians 
concerned with these questions were largely ignorant of or lacked interest in the soft 
power implications. Instead, they recognized the value of Word Expositions as merely 
export related. The question was not placed under the OCIA at the NMFA, but under 	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the Ministry of Trade. They realized it was a question that the NMFA also had to deal 
with, but it was still not placed under OCIA. It was the 3rd Trade Policy Office that 
dealt with the question, even though Per Borgen was a member of the Norwegian 
Osaka Committee.  
The somewhat striking feature of the Norwegian way of organizing their 
participation is the lack of bureaucratic capacity for handling the question. The most 
important Norwegians in this regard were first Edward Mowinckel-Larsen, and after 
he resigned, Nils Fredrik Aall replaced him as the Norwegian Honorary 
Commissioner General. At the Norwegian Trade Fairs Odd Grann was the 
replacement, and he also became increasingly important to the Norwegian work with 
Expo ’70. Mowinckel-Larsen and Grann were both the CEOs of the Norwegian Trade 
Fairs, and not employed by the state. Neither was Aall, who was the owner and CEO 
of a Norwegian manufacturing company. Still, they were the ones making foreign 
policy decisions on behalf of Norway. Of course, they also had bureaucrats like 
Hærum, Glad and Borgen, but they were not present at any important meetings with 
the Scandinavian Pavilion Committee (SPC). They were not the ones taking any 
decisions. This is different from how the Swedes organized their work. It was the 
former Ambassador Öberg, who at the time was the leader of the Information 
Collegium, who had most to say with regard to Swedish World Exposition 
participation.  
Another difference is the way politicians were involved in the process. In 
Norway, the bureaucrats were more in the background, while the politicians, both the 
ones in parliament and in government, were more active than was the case in Sweden. 
The difference in organization clearly was a contributory cause of misunderstanding 
in the spring of 1968, though sheer incompetence possibly also played a role. But that 
incompetence was also a consequence the organizational set-up. The Norwegian 
committee was not yet established – it had not yet been appointed by the Storting. 
Thus, Mowinckel-Larsen considered himself not in a position to make any decisions 
on behalf of Norway. For Sweden, the approval for Öberg to decide was given when 
he was employed years before, and they did not have any problems of the same 
nature. When Aall was officially appointed, it was too late to make many of the 
important decisions regarding how to present Norway.  
At no point were the soft power implications mentioned or even considered 
by the Norwegians, the virtually lone opposing voice Thyness excepted. As almost all 
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the Norwegians involved saw it, going to Osaka boiled down to economics, export 
gains possibly, but certainly the need to avoid being blackballed. The only reason for 
attending Expo ’70 was to increase exports to Japan, and participation was seen as 
otherwise unnecessary. They had already established that the possibilities of 
increasing market shares were low in the foreseeable future. For Sweden, things were 
different because they came to see attendance at World Expositions as merely export 
increasing efforts. They also saw it as a way of increasing goodwill, and thus, to be 
present at Expo ’70 could have greater impact than merely market shares. The 
Norwegians, as we have seen, were very impressed afterwards of the Swedish way of 
negotiating and exercise power over the inter-Nordic debates. Because Öberg was 
such a good negotiator – he was both well prepared and smart, and took control over 
the process – the example in the thesis shows that Sweden was able to demonstrate 
which of the Nordic countries that were best at using soft power. It is of course 
possible and likely that the Swedes appreciated the importance of soft power better, 
but as much, the Swedish bureaucracy was better fitted to the task. 
In Norway the Expos were not about soft power. Furthermore, with the 
exception of development aid, Thyness and the tiny office in the Foreign Ministry, 
soft power issues in Norway were at the best on the back burner. Still, it would have 
been likely that the process of deciding the theme for the pavilion could have spurred 
the debate of how to increase the Norwegian soft power. Still I have found no 
evidence of such. The only issue they were concerned with was that the 
environmental protection-theme would not be of any help for Norwegian exports. 
Instead, they wanted something more closely related to the shipping industry. The 
Swedes were, on the other hand, better prepared. Öberg had prior to the decision of 
Scandinavian participation at Expo ’70 organized a designer’s competition of how 
Sweden could install a pavilion with a theme concerning questions of the 
environment. In 1972, Sweden wanted to host the first UN conference on challenges 
to the environment. It seems as Sweden had a long-term strategy of being a forerunner 
on the area of environmental protection. The Scandinavian Pavilion at Expo ’70 fitted 
perfectly in this strategy. None of the other Nordic countries had ever thought of the 
possibility of selling their country to the world as environmentally friendly. By being 
better organized, and clearly more in tune with emerging international environmental 
trends, they steamrolled the neighbors into submission.  
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One of the arguments used was that environmental issues were of great 
interest in the host country. I have not found evidence of how Sweden knew that it 
would be a success in Japan, but they were obviously anyhow right. During the 
exhibition period, the debate in Japan on these issues flourished and gave the 
Scandinavian Pavilion much more attention than they probably expected, possibly 
excepting the Swedes. This was fortunate, and valuable especially to Sweden and its 
long-term strategy. By the mid 1960s the environmental problem was high on the 
agenda in the USA, not the least due to Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring.275 We 
may perhaps assume that Carson made more of an impact in Sweden at an early stage 
than was the case in Norway, and Japan was obviously afflicted by these challenges. 
To choose the environment as the pavilion theme was a clever move. 
The literature on the post World War Japanese state paints a picture of one 
that in terms of political authority and decision-making differs fundamentally from 
Scandinavia. The Scandinavians were clearly both clueless about and frustrated by 
what they were up against. This is evident in the situation where the Swedish Minister 
has an outburst during the landing rights negotiations – he obviously did not 
understand the Japanese ways of negotiation.  
It must have been difficult for the Scandinavians when asking a question and 
never getting a straight answer – they could never know who in Japan actually made 
the decisions. Still, when the delegation of Scandinavian Ambassadors, Öberg and 
Hansson went to the Commissioner General’s meeting in Kyoto in the spring of 1968, 
they were worried that the Japanese bureaucracy would make the construction of the 
pavilion hard. At the meeting, they were assured that the Japanese authorities would 
make an effort to keep it as simple as possible, and the Scandinavians were actually 
able to start constructing the pavilion only weeks after all the Nordic Governments 
had appointed the joint Commissioner General and Hansson had signed the official 
documents. The Japanese must have made an effort to make it easier for the 
participating countries to deal with their bureaucracies.  
This willingness to cooperate in a, for Europeans, understandable way, might 
be evidence of the urge to win some of the goodwill Japan obviously wanted by 
hosting such a time- and cost consuming event a World Exhibition is. The exhibition 
was just one of three such huge international events that Japan hosted in the 1960s 	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and 70s: in 1964, they hosted the Summer Olympics in Tokyo and in 1972 they were 
the hosts of the Winter Olympics in Sapporo. During this period, Japan clearly wanted 
to increase the awareness of the country among people, international organizations 
and politicians around the world. This is one of the ways of constructing goodwill 
abroad, and all these events are good for a county’s interaction with people of other 
states. It was certainly a part of Japan’s public diplomacy strategy.  
The reason for Nordic participation is not uniform in all the countries, but for 
all of them, some kind of pressure from outside is evident. None of them were 
positive when they first received the invitation to attend Expo ’70, but when SAS and 
other Swedish representatives from the manufacturing industries reacted on the 
negative reception, Sweden changed. Denmark and Norway were unwilling to 
participate as long as none of the other Nordic countries were positive. When Sweden 
decided to join, with or without the others, Denmark and Norway suddenly had no 
choice. For both of them, it was unthinkable to abstain if one of the others would go. 
This would reflect badly on the one staying home; the loss of goodwill would be too 
great. They could bear the loss in Japan if all of them decided not to be present, but to 
be the only one staying away appeared to carry unacceptable political and economic 
risk. For Finland, the recommendation from the NC was important. When the Nordic 
countries could cooperate, and Finland could appear as a part of a Western European 
region without provoking the Soviets, it was in their national interest to cooperate on 
a Scandinavian pavilion at the Expo ’70.  
As the example of the Expo ’70 shows, it was important for Japan to have the 
Nordic countries at the exhibition. They put relatively much pressure on Scandinavia 
to attend, by inviting to meetings in Japan and visiting Ministers in Scandinavia. It is 
obvious that it was a great deal of prestige involved, and the consequences of 
disappointing the Japanese were difficult to predict. Because SAS was important to 
the Scandinavians, the uncertainty of possible retaliation from the Japanese must have 
been an important factor when deciding. Thus, it was in the national interests for the 
Scandinavian countries not to provoke the Japanese. Because it was a negative 
argument in favor of participation, they wanted to make the costs as low as possible, 
and thus the best option was Nordic cooperation.  
Cooperation is therefore possible if it is in the national interest of the Nordic 
countries to join in different projects. When it is of no national interest anymore, or 
possibly seen as directly contrary to the national interest of any one of them, 
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cooperative attempts fail. This is evident in the case of for instance the many customs 
union proposals, monetary unions, and especially in the abortive negotiations for a 
Scandinavian defense union during 1948-49, as well as in different development aid 
projects. In other areas, also of potentially high security risks during the Cold War, 
the Nordic countries could establish well-functioning cooperation. The best example 
is the passport union established in the beginning of the 1950’s. Other cooperation 
projects have functioned well, as is seen in UNESCO and the World Bank. A very 
good example of well-functioning cooperation is the NC. Still, the NC has only power 
to give recommendations to the Nordic governments, but because of them, several 
projects of smaller and larger scale have been initiated. Some of these projects are in 
the area of high politics; some are not. Of course, the high politics include questions 
that are of key national importance. Thus, cooperation may be feasible also in 
sensitive areas of national importance. But still it is not the area of politics that 
determines the outcome of the cooperation; it is basically the national interest. 
World Expositions are not crucial to a state; it is not a question of national 
survival. It can be of importance for some part of public diplomacy, and for export 
interests. But often, the expenses required from each of the countries presenting a 
pavilion are so high it is considered not being worth it. To be able to attend anyhow, it 
is a viable option to present joint pavilions together with likeminded and similar 
countries, from for example the same region. Still, in retrospect the Norwegians were 
not happy with the cooperation, and Grann recommended not cooperating again. At 
the World Expositions held afterwards, in Sevilla in 1992, in Lisbon in 1998, in 
Hannover in 2000 and in Shanghai in 2010, most of the Nordic countries have 
participated, but never again with a joint pavilion.  
In this thesis, we have seen that it turned out to be more in the national interest 
of all the Nordic countries to continue cooperation than abandon it. Even though the 
Norwegians on several occasion felt that the Swedes were running all over them, as 
they did in the confusion over the pavilion theme on environmental protection, they 
did not want to stop cooperating. They could have decided not to participate at all, if 
the presentation was not in the national interest of Norway. In a short-term 
perspective, it probably was surprising and unwelcomed in Norway – it was not a 
pavilion theme Norwegians understood the value of. But the Swedes had foreseen this 
theme as one of international interest, and has been a forerunner on the field since 
the beginning of the 1970s, starting with Expo ’70, continuing two years after with 
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the first UN conference on environmental concerns. Norway also could have chosen 
to present their own pavilion at Expo ’70, if it had been seen to be in their national 
interest. None of these alternatives were as attractive as continuing the cooperation 
with the rest of the Nordic region. Thus we may infer that there were no persuasive 
arguments for doing it alone, by staying away or going for a separate pavilion. And 
thus, it proved possible by default to cooperate with the rest of the region. 
This thesis concerns the Nordic cooperation on the World Exposition in Osaka 
in 1970. It analyzes an example of the ways in which foreign policy is made, 
especially in Sweden and Norway and on a field that is not at the core of a state’s 
foreign policy. It is also concerned with the culture gap between the Nordic region 
and Japan in the 1960s, what reasons states have to attend and host World 
Exhibitions, and it concerns Nordic cooperation in general. It has been great working 
with this material, but even though I have extended the research material compared to 
previous research, Nordic cooperation at World Expositions before Expo ’70 has not 
yet been fully analyzed. Nor has archives in Denmark, Iceland and Finland regarding 
World Expositions. I am sure there are plenty more research of interest to be done on 
the field – especially to also include archives from Denmark and to analyze the 
Nordic cooperation at Expo ’67 in depth. 
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The	  Main	  Bureaucrats	  and	  Politicians	  Involved	  	  
Edward Mowinckel-Larsen – born 1895, CEO of the Norwegian Trade Fairs 1947-
1968. Leader of the Norwegian participation at Expo ’58 and  the Norwegian 
Commissioner General at Expo ’67. 
 
Kåre Willoch – born 1928. Norwegian politician. Member of Parliament 1958-1989. 
Minister of Trade in 1963 and 1965-1970. Prime Minister 1981-1986. 
 
Per Borgen – born 1921. Norwegian diplomat. Ambassador and employed by the 
NMFA 1946-1989. Head of the NMFA Cultural Department 1966-1970. 
 
Nils Fredrik Aall – born 1911. Norwegian estate owner and CEO of Aall-Ulefos 
Brug. 
 
Knut Thommessen – born 1911. Norwegian diplomat. Ambassador to Japan 1965-
1972.  
 
Gunnar Odd Hærum – bord 1923. Norwegian diplomat. Head of the 3rd Trade 
Political Office at the NMFA 1964-1969.  
 
Sven A. Hansson – the joint Nordic Commissioner General at Expo ’70. 
 
Kjell Öberg – born 1913. Leader of the Collegium for Sweden Information Abroad 
from 1962. 
 
Karl Fredrik Almquist – born 1906. Swedish diplomat. Ambassador to Japan 1963-
1970. 
